Court Rulings

The Defendant, Jackson Chapman North, pleaded guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of vandalism valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, vandalism valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony, vandalism valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-408 (2018) (vandalism) 39-14-105 (2018) (grading) 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful weapon possession). The trial court ordered partial consecutive service and imposed an effective six-year sentence, with four years, sixty days in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the Defendant's sentence, but as a matter of plain error, we reverse the trial court's restitution order and remand the case for proper restitution determinations.

This appeal arises from a school bullying lawsuit. Doug Zukowski and Aimee Zukowski filed suit in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County ("the Trial Court") on behalf of their son Taylor Alexander Zukowski ("Alex," who later joined the suit in his own right after turning 18) ("Plaintiffs," collectively) against the Hamilton County Department of Education ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs alleged that Alex was bullied while a student at Chattanooga's Center for Creative Arts ("CCA"), a public fine arts magnet school, and that Defendant breached its duty of care to protect Alex. Plaintiffs appeal, raising a number of issues. We find that the record does not contain the requisite clear and convincing evidence necessary to overturn the Trial Court's credibility determinations. We also find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's factual finding that Defendant's employees responded appropriately when Alex reported to them that he was bullied. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant employer appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Work- ers' Compensation Commissioner that the plaintiff's claim for benefits as a result of heart disease was compensable under the Heart and Hypertension Act (§ 7-433c). The defendant claimed that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's award because the plaintiff was not a ''member'' of the fire department pursuant to statute (§ 7-425 (5)) before July 1, 1996, and, thus, was precluded from receiving § 7-433c benefits. The commissioner found that the plaintiff, who was hired as a part-time firefighter with the defendant in 1992, and as a full-time firefighter in 1997, was employed in 1992 for purposes of § 7-433c and, thus, was entitled to benefits. After the board affirmed the commission- er's decision, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the board properly affirmed the commissioner's award: although §§ 7-425 and 7- 433c are both contained within part II of chapter 113 of the General Statutes, they do not concern the same subject matter and cannot be read together without reaching an absurd result, as § 7-425 defines terms related to the governance of a retirement fund provided by the state for participating municipalities and their employees, including the term member, who must be a regular employee who receives pay from a municipality that participates in the fund, and § 7-433c mandates that municipal employers pay heart disease and hypertension benefits to qualified uniformed members of paid municipal fire departments, regard- less of whether the municipality participates in the retirement fund; moreover, § 7-425 expressly defines terms ''except as otherwise pro- vided,'' and the definition of the term ''member'' in § 7-433c is such an exception to the definition of ''member'' in § 7-425. Argued April 12—officially released July 27, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's postjudgment motion for modification of the custody of the parties' children. Pursuant to the separation agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, the parties shared joint legal custody of the children and the plaintiff had primary physical custody. The parties entered into a postjudgment agreement that permitted the plaintiff to relocate to North Carolina with the children, provided that, inter alia, the defendant retained rights to visitation and the plaintiff was required to pay to the defendant a monthly travel allowance for visitation related expenses. After the plaintiff and the children relocated, the parties entered into another postjudgment agreement, which, inter alia, stipulated that the courts in either Connecticut or North Carolina would have jurisdiction to decide any issues relating to custody and/or visitation. The plaintiff filed a petition for registration of a foreign child custody order in a court in North Carolina, which that court confirmed. The defendant then filed a motion for modification in Connecticut, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to pay alimony and the travel allowance in accordance with their agreement, which impacted her ability to visit the children. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion for modifi- cation, asserting that North Carolina was the children's home state and, as such, the Connecticut court should decline to exercise jurisdiction. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court determined that it no longer had jurisdiction to enter orders relating to the custody and visitation of the children pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-115l (a) (2)), and, accordingly, it granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Held that the trial court erred in granting the plainti

J. ROSS DYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I agree with the majority's conclusion that the criminal responsibility instruction in the instant matter was deficient, I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the proof presented at trial is not sufficient to support a determination that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A police officer appealed his termination by the Town of Greeneville to the Greeneville Civil Service Board, which upheld it. Appellant then appealed to the trial court, which also upheld the termination. Because we conclude that the record lacks information necessary to conduct appellate review, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand the case to the Board for further proceedings.