Court Rulings

decedent-employee's workers' compensation benefits marital status

decedent-employee's workers' compensation benefits marital status

Respondent State Teachers Retirement System board did not abuse its discretion in denying retirement credit to claimant pursuant to R.C. 2207.53, where some evidence supported the board's determination that the claimant was of service on a full-time basis during the years for which claimant sought such credit. Petition of writ of mandamus denied.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for the alleged wrongful termination of his employment in violation of the statute (§ 31- 290a) prohibiting discrimination against employees exercising their rights under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The plaintiff had worked for the defendant since 2002, and, every year, received a seasonal layoff notice with recall. In October, 2016, the plain- tiff sustained a work injury, received medical treatment, and filed a workers' compensation claim. Approximately one month after the plain- tiff filed his claim, he received a seasonal layoff notice without recall, terminating his employment. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of § 31-290a. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not meet his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792), the plaintiff having presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action: the plaintiff presented evidence that he sustained a work injury, reported his injury to the defendant, received medical treatment for his injury, filed a workers' compensation claim arising out of his work injury, and, thereafter, approximately two weeks before he received his seasonal layoff notice without recall, the defendant made the decision to terminate his employ- ment, which showed a sufficiently close temporal connection between the exercise of his rights protected under the act and the defendant's adverse action against him; moreover, the plaintiff produced

The plaintiff banking firm sought to recover damages from the defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with bonus agreements between the parties. The plaintiff, which had paid annual discretionary bonuses to its employees, was unable to pay the plaintiff his 2014 bonus until 2016 because of financial difficulties. When the defendant shortly thereafter requested his bonus for 2015, U, the plaintiff's chief executive officer, told him that the plaintiff was not paying 2015 bonuses at that time because it had just paid 2014 bonuses. The defendant thereafter told U that, in exchange for the 2015 bonus, he would bring his family to the United States from the Philippines, buy a home in Connecticut and redouble his efforts at the plaintiff's firm. Pursuant to written agreements the parties executed, U agreed to pay the defendant an advance on the 2015 bonus and an additional payment at a later date. Six days after receiving the advance on the 2015 bonus, the defendant informed U that he was resigning and moving to the Philippines. On his last day of employment, the defendant returned to the plaintiff a laptop computer that the plaintiff had provided to him. U thereafter discovered on the laptop e-mails from the defendant to friends and coworkers indicating that he had been preparing to start an information technology business in the Philippines upon receipt of the 2015 bonus. U concluded that the defendant had used the plaintiff's resources to develop that business. The plaintiff thereafter sought repay- ment of the 2014 bonus and the 2015 bonus advance. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on its complaint in part and thereafter granted in part the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. On the defen- dant's appeal and the plaintiff's cross appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly rendered judgment for the plaintiff and granted its motion for attorney's fees, and, because the court's me

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, his allegedly wrongful discharge from employment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. The plaintiff asserted that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendant's termination of his employment violated public policy for the protection of children. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant independent school as a history teacher and he also served as the defendant's Director of Food Studies, a role that required him to establish and maintain a garden on campus and use it to teach a class on food studies. In May, 2015, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's suggestion that telephone poles that had been treated with creosote, a pesticide and wood preservative, be used to make raised beds in the garden because he believed that the chemical posed a health risk to himself and his students. Following the dispute, the plaintiff was relieved of his duties relating to the garden but remained employed as a teacher at the school, entering into at-will employment agreements with the defendant in July, 2015, and April, 2016. In September, 2016, the plaintiff's employment was terminated. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff set forth a valid wrongful discharge claim: the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his dismissal occurred for a reason that violated public policy because it did not violate any explicit statutory or constitutional provision, as there were no state or federal regulations prohibiting the use of creosote- treated wood, and it did not violate any judicially conceived notion of public policy, as, although the courts may have recognized a public policy of protecting children in their prior interpretations of child protection sta