D. S. v. D. S.

Excerpt

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment dissolv- ing his marriage to the defendant, who was a partner at a large law firm. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the defendant's interest in a potential stream of retirement payments, which was to be paid pursuant to the relevant provisions of the firm's partnership agreement, was too speculative to constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution under the statute (§ 46b-81) govern- ing, inter alia, the assignment of property in marital dissolution cases. Held: A trial court's determination of whether an asset or interest constitutes marital property for purposes of § 46b-81 presents a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review, the trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the question of how such determi- nations as to any particular asset fit into the mosaic of the trial court's financial orders is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments did not constitute property subject to equitable distribution for purposes of § 46b-81. The defendant did not have an enforceable right to receive the retirement payments insofar as the defendant's firm had a contractual right under the partnership agreement to unilaterally reduce or eliminate them at any time, even after the defendant started receiving them, and, accordingly, the defen- dant's receipt of the retirement payments was too speculative. Moreover, changes in the law firm's demographics and compensation struc- ture supported this court's conclusion that the firm's exercise of its authority to modify or terminate the retirement payments was more than a theoretical possibility, and equitable considerations weighed in favor of a conclusion that those payments should b