Wage Theft Cases

<p>Appeal from the circuit court of Hinds county.</p> <p>HoN. E. L. BeieN, Presiding Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Ruby Taylor, by her next friend, Dick Taylor,, ag’ainst the Jackson Light & Traction Company. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p> <p>This action was instituted in the circuit court of Hinds county by Ruby Taylor, a minor of the age of ten years, suing by her next friend, to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the Jackson Light & Traction Company in carrying plaintiff beyond her destination. Ap-pellee was allowed to recover punitive damages, and from a judgment awarding the sum of five hundred dollars appellant appeals.</p> <p>The record shows that the plaintiff and another little girl by the name of Tutt were in company with plaintiff’s mother, Mrs. Ada Taylor; that the three boarded one of the regular street cars of appellant at the Old Capitol station in the city of Jackson and paid three fares for their transportation north to Euclid street. According to the testimony of Mrs. Taylor, when the car was about half way from Pairview to Euclid, and half a block before they reached their destination, “the little girls gave the signal;” that this signal was given by raising the hand, and was the usual signal then employed by the company; that although they gave the signal, the car did not stop at Euclid street, hut ran for half a block beyond the point where they desired to alight from the car; that when she saw they had passed the stopping place, she “got up and began walking towards the back end, and he (the conductor) spoke in this manner: ‘Do you want to get off at this stop?’ and I says, H do; will you please back up?’ and he says, ‘No, you will get off right here.’ ” She further testified that the conductor “spoke rough;” that he refused to hack the car to Euclid crossing, saying that “he didn’t have time;” that the street in the middle of the block where the car actually stopped was muddy and wet, and that in getting off the ear s

<p>On Demurrerr to Indictment.</p> <p>The defendant, Robert Rowell, was jointly indicted with one Riggins, under sections 5508 and 5509 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3712], for conspiracy “to injure, threaten, oppress and intimidate” one Horace Maples, a negro citizen of the United States, in the enjoyment of certain rights and privileges claimed to be secured by the Constitution or laws, under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Maples was arrested at Huntsville, Ala., and confined by the sheriff on a charge of murder, that he might be dealt with according to law. On the 7th day of September, 1904. a mob overpowered or overawed the sheriff 'and a company of the Alabama National Guard which the sheriff had summoned to his assistance, took Maples from them, and hanged him in the state courthouse yard. The indictment contained six counts. The second, third, fourth, and fifth counts need not be further noticed, as they are based upon rights and privileges claimed under the thirteenth amendment, which the court was of opinion, under the decision of the Supreme Court in the Hodges Case, were not secured by the Constitution or laws of the United Slates. The first and fourth counts are based on rights and immunities alleged to he secured under the fourteenth amendment. The fourth count is as follows: “And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present: That at the time and place and within the jurisdiction aforesaid, in the counts* of Madison, and state of Alabama, the said Robert Powell and Thomas Riggins, whose Christian names are to the said grand jurors otherwise unknown, and divers other persons to said grand jurors unknown, did conspire, combine, and confederate together, to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate one Horace Maples, a citizen of the United States, in the free and full enjoyment of the right, privilege, and immunity secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to wit, the rig

<p>Appeal, No. 143, Oct. T., 1906, by R. H. Murray, executor et al., from decree of O. O. Clarion Co., distributing royalties from sale of coal under a coal lease in Estate of W. P. Murray.</p> <p>Exceptions on adjudication upon issue awarded by tbe orphans’ court to the common pleas.</p> <p>In the common pleas Wilson, P. J., found the facts to be as follows:</p> <p>A dispute has arisen between the widow and collateral heirs of W. P. Murray, late of Callensburg, Pennsylvania, deceased, as to the distribution of the royalty from a certain coal lease, dated February 1, 1899, from W. P. Murray to E. N. Miller and alleged to have been in full force at the time of the death of W. P. Murray, on July 7, 1901. An issue was framed and certified from the orphans’ court into the court of common pleas to determine the validity of said lease; a jury was waived and the ease submitted to the court for trial under the Act of April 22, 1874, P..L. 109. The widow, Elizabeth A. Murray, claims against the will and alleges that she is entitled to one-half of the royalty from the aforesaid lease which was a sale of the coal in place and converted it into personalty.</p> <p>There are various questions of fact and law raised by the respective requests for findings, but independent of everything else in the case, the fact that the lease had not been forfeited in the lifetime of W. P. Murray, and that upon his death one-half of the royalty thereof descended to his widow, Elizabeth A. Murray, and that as against her, R. H. Murray, executor, had no right to declare a forfeiture and substitute a new lease therefor, is decisive of the present controversy.</p> <p>The following indorsement appears on the lease in controversy :</p> <p>“ June 2nd, 1900, for value received I hereby extend the provisions of this lease until August 1st, 1900.</p> <p>“ Signed: W. P. Murray,</p> <p>“ H. F. Miller.”</p> <p>This sentence as it stands alone is plain and free from ambiguity, but as applied to the lease upon

<p>CASE 13. — ACTION BY Z. T. PROCTOR AGAINST THE I. C. R. R. CO. AND OTHERS FOR DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES. — November 8, 1905.</p> <p>Appeal from Grayson Circuit Court.</p> <p>Weed S. Chele, Circuit Judge:</p> <p>Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.</p> <p>POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.</p> <p>1. Admission of incompetent testimony of statements of someone in overalls not shown to be an employe of appellant.</p> <p>2. Misconduct of counsel in his closing argument. (McHenry, &-c., Co. v. Sneddon, 98 Ky., 684; L., H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 121; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Hull, 24 Ky. Law' Rep., 379; 113 Ky., 572; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Jolly, 27 Ky. Law Rep., 118.)</p> <p>3. The jury should have been instructed peremptorily to find for Ihe defendant. (Prance’s Admr. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 15 Ky. Law</p> <p>Rep., 244; 22 S. W., 851; Ward’s Admr. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 22 Ky. Law Rep., 191; 56 S. W., 807; Yates v. I. C. R. R. Co. (not yet reported), September 21, 1905; Manning v. I. C. R. R. Co., 27 Ky. Law Rep., 142.)</p> <p>4. This action has been removed to the United States Circuit Court ior the Western District of Kentucky, and the Circuit Court erred in assuming jurisdiction of this action after the petition and bond for removal were filed. (C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S.; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 26 Ky. Law Reg., 31; 80 S. W., 484; Daughtry v. R. R. Co., 138 U. S., 299 (34 L. Ed., 963); B. C. R. & N., &c., Co. v. Dunn, 122 U. S., 513 (30 L. Ed., 1160); Durkee v. I. C. R. R. Co., 81 Fed., 1; Kelly v. Co., 122 Fed., 286; Gustafson, &e., v. Co., 128 Fed., 85; Crawford v. I. C. R. R. Co., 130 Fed., 395; Dishon’s Admr. v. C., N. O. &T. P., 133 Fed., 471; Wharton on “Agency and Agents,” section 536, p. 350; Blackstone, Vol. 1, p. 431; Wharton’s Agency, section 535; Shear. & Red. on Neg., 5th Ed., p. 52; Colvin v. Holbrook, 2 N. Y./129; Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y., 549; Kelly v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 122'Fed., 290; Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co., 124 Fed

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>This action was commenced in a justice’s court in Saline Township, Saline County, Arkansas, by Charles Paul against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arkansas, and owning and operating a railroad within that State, to recover $21.80 due him as a laborer, and a penalty of $1.25 per day for failure to pay him what was due him when he was discharged. The case, was carried by appeal to the Circuit Court of. Saline County and there tried de novo. Defendant demurred to so much of the complaint as sought. to recover the penalty on the ground that the act of the general assembly of Arkansas entitled “ An act to provide for the protection of servants and employés of railroads,” approved March 25,. ,1889, Acts Ark. 1889, 76, which provided therefor, was in violation of articles five and fourteen of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and also in violation of the constitution of the State of Arkansas. The demurrer was overruled, and defendant answered, setting up certain matters not material here, and reiterating in its third paragraph the objection that the act was unconstitutional and void. To this paragraph plaintiff demurred, and the demurrer was sustainéd. The case was then heard by the court, the parties, having. waived a trial by jury, and the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum claimed and the penalty at the rate of daily wages from the daté of the discharge until the date of the commencement of the suit, and entered judgment accordingly. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas, which affirmed the judgment, 64 Arkansas, 83, and this writ of error was then brought. .</p> <p>The act-in question is as follows:</p> <p>“ SectioN 1. Whenever any railroad company or any company, corporation or person engaged in the business of operating or constructing any railroa

<p>Appeal, No. 115, April Term, 1897, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Butler Co., Sept. T., 1895, No. 13, on verdict for plaintiff.</p> <p>Trespass. Before Barker, P. J., of the 47th judicial district, specially presiding.</p> <p>Trespass by the Standard Plate Glass Company, a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing plate glass against the Butler Water Company, an upper riparian owner, to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff company as a riparian owner by reason of the diversion of the waters of a creek by the defendant company.</p> <p>Other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $900 with interest and costs of suit. Defendant appealed.</p> <p>Errors assigned were (1) In instructing the jury in the general charge as follows: “Now, it has been argued by defendant’s counsel (and as to this we shall more formally instruct you -in answering the points submitted by counsel), that the plaintiff company had no right to use this water for artificial purposes created by it, after the defendant company had entered on the stream and commenced taking the water, and then complain because the supply is diminished. If the water company was rightfully taking water from the stream by virtue of its rights of eminent domain it had the right to take all the water, if necessary. If the water company was unlawfully using the water, or occupied the position of an upper riparian owner, as to it, the lower owner would have the right to use all the water for any purpose, and it would not lie in the mouth of the defendant to say to the plaintiff, ‘ you can use this water for watering cattle or irrigating the ground, but you cannot create an artificial use or demand for the water.’ ” (2) In the answer to the first point of plaintiff, said point and answer being as follows : “ In this action, being an action against a water company to recover injury to land caused by diversion of water from

<p>Appeal, No. 168, Jan. T., 1895, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. Berks Co., Dee. T., 1893, No. 31, for defendant non obstante veredicto.</p> <p>Assumpsit for wages.</p> <p>The facts appear by the opinion of the court below, Eni>lich, J., which was as follows :</p> <p>The peculiar importance of this case consists in the fact that there are about a hundred others pending which will be controlled by the principles decisive of this. At the conclusion of the testimony upon the trial, there being no facts whatever in dispute, a verdict was, by agreement of counsel, directed for plaintiff subject to the opinion of the court upon the questions of law raised by defendant’s points, which were reserved. It may be that some of these points were not technically such as to warrant their reservation, had their form been objected to: see Heany v. Schwartz, 155 Pa. 154. The point, however, alleging that “ there is no evidence in the case showing any liability on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff” was sufficient, under Chandler v. Ins. Co., 88 Pa. 223, and Koons v. Telegraph Co., 102 Pa. 164; and fairly raises every question involved. I confess that I have labored to find some way in which to sustain the verdict consistently with recognized legal principles— appreciating as I do the unfortunate situation, at this time, of the mechanics and workmen who are kept out of the wages of their toil. But I cannot get away from the objection that their rights cannot be worked out in this form of action, whatever remedy there may be presently or hereafter available to them.</p> <p>The facts of the case are as follows: Under authority conferred upon the governor by the act of June 22, 1891, P. L. 379, a commission was appointed to select a site and build an asylum for the accommodation of the chronic insane of the state, the sum of f500,000 being put at the disposal of said commission for the purpose by section 6 of that enactment. A site in the neighborhood of Wernersville, this