Court Rulings

CIVIL – vacating a post-judgment garnishment on wages recovery of money damages consumer auto loan Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment manifest weight an order vacating a garnishment and finding that the judgment was paid and discharged is a final appealable order R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and (3) Civ.R. 60(B)(4) satisfaction of a judgment proof of payment the trial court held, pursuant to the transcript of the August 10, 2015 hearing, that the judgment was paid in full and discharged while pro se Appellee acknowledged she owed approximately $3,000 at the time of the August 2015 hearing, she stated to this court during oral argument that that amount has since been paid it is abundantly clear from the record that Appellant seeks over $21,000 from Appellee for a vehicle purchased 19 years ago for under $8,000 and which has since been repossessed and resold, with no credit to Appellee further, it has been eight years since Appellant has pursued whatever rights it retained in this matter thus, based on these facts and in the interests of justice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the garnishment and constructively finding the judgment was paid and discharged the court's judgment under these circumstances is not against the manifest weight of the evidence judgment affirmed.

Motion for judgment on the pleadings Civ.R. 12(C) breach of contract constitutional rights federal preemption declaratory judgment. Plaintiff filed this claim against defendant following misconduct proceedings based on his research practices and the non-disciplinary actions that resulted. The court found that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract because consulting income was not addressed in anything plaintiff submitted that could be his employment contract. Further, the court determined that the issue of how the proceedings were handled was preempted by federal law. The court found that it did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's constitutional claims. Finally, the court determined that because plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief were subsumed into plaintiff's contract claim, that claim must fail as well. Therefore, the court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

I concur in the Court's judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion's analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority's conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court's judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do.

I concur in the Court's judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion's analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon's ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority's conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court's judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do.