Court Rulings

Jeffrey Cruce, a former athletic director and head football coach at Berkeley High School, sued the Berkeley County School District (the District) for wrongful termination and defamation. The trial court granted the District a directed verdict on Cruce's wrongful termination claim and on Cruce's defamation claim related to the District's silence on why Cruce had been removed from his positions at Berkeley High. The trial court denied the District's motion for a directed verdict on Cruce's remaining defamation claim related to an email sent by a District employee about Cruce, ruling Cruce did not qualify as a public official or limited public figure, and as such, the District was not entitled to sovereign immunity the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the Tort Claims Act). The jury found in Cruce's favor on his defamation claim and awarded him $200,000 in actual damages. In a published decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding Cruce was a public official, and thus, the Tort Claims Act barred Cruce's defamation claim. Cruce v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch. Dist., 435 S.C. 7, 21-22, 865 S.E.2d 391, 398-99 (Ct. App. 2021). We reverse the court of appeal's finding that Cruce was a public official, find Cruce was not a public official or limited public figure, and reinstate the jury's damages award.

The plaintiff, Jordan Nissensohn, Administrator of the Estate of Michael Nissensohn, appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendants, University Medical Group (UMG), Alan Epstein, M.D., and Steven Sepe, M.D. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Superior Court erred by finding that: (1) the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (RIWPA), G.L. 1956 chapter 50 of title 28 (2) Dr. Epstein and UMG's allegedly defamatory statements were substantially true or untimely (3) the plaintiff's teaching duties were voluntary (4) the plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim was preempted by the Payment of Wages Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 14 of title 28 (5) the plaintiff failed to establish his claim for tortious interference with contractual relations (6) Dr. Epstein's alleged interference was not causally connected to the plaintiff's failure to set up a new practice and (7) the plaintiff did not provide sufficient nonhearsay evidence to support his conversion claim.<br><br>The Supreme Court determined that: the plaintiff did not engage in RIWPA-protected conduct because he did not report a violation of the law the plaintiff's defamation claims abated upon his death Dr. Epstein's promise to pay the plaintiff additional teaching money was not supported by consideration the plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim based upon UMG's failure to pay him for patient care was untimely under the Payment of Wages Act the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support each element of his tortious interference claims and the plaintiff waived any argument that his conversion claim was supported by nonhearsay evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. <br>

Summary Judgment, Qualified Immunity, Civ.R. 56(C), 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), Civil Conspiracy, Wrongful Termination. Defendant established that tolling statues did not apply to Plaintiff's claims for civil conspiracy and wrongful termination in violation of public policy as the state of Ohio has consented to be sued in only one forum – the Court of Claims. Additionally, the Court held that the savings statute did not apply to Plaintiff's third attempt at filing the same claims. The remainder of Plaintiff's claims for conversion, intellectual theft, unjust enrichment, and lost opportunities were held to be untimely filed. Plaintiff's initial cause of action originated more than four years prior to the filing of this case. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiff corporation filed this action against the defendant independent contractors, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants violated their contracts and covenants not to compete. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the defendants request review of the trial court's denial of their motion in limine to exclude an email sent to defense counsel that contains privileged information. The email was inadvertently attached as an exhibit on two separate briefs filed with the court by defense counsel and then repeatedly referenced by defendants in later briefs in response to a motion to disqualify counsel and for sanctions. The trial court held that the repeated disclosure of the email operated as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. We affirm the trial court.

Appellant Eric Israel appeals the circuit court's issuance of a preliminary injunction that enjoins Israel from using documents to which he had access during his prior employment with Respondent Jennings Dill, Inc. (JDI). The injunction explicitly prohibits Israel from using the information in the documents to bid on any project on behalf of his current employer, Place Services, Inc. (PSI), or to solicit JDI employees. JDI alleged the documents contained confidential information and trade secrets. Israel argues the circuit court erred in finding JDI demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because (1) no evidence was presented to show that Israel possessed or misappropriated a trade secret or confidential information, and (2) the circuit court relied exclusively on hearsay and speculative statements to find Israel had solicited JDI employees. Israel also argues the circuit court erred by improperly \balancing the equities\ between the parties to support granting the preliminary injunction. We affirm.