Court Rulings

This is a wrongful death action that was filed pro se by two sons of the decedent, in their capacity as co-administrators of the estate of the decedent, on behalf of the decedent's six children. The trial court found that the action was filed by persons not authorized to practice law on behalf of the estate and/or others, and therefore, it was void ab initio and a nullity. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The two pro se sons appeal. We conclude that the complaint was void to the extent that the pro se sons asserted claims on behalf of other heirs of the decedent, as they were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. However, the complaint was partially proper to the extent that the two pro se sons were also asserting their own right of action under the wrongful death statute. Consequently, the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint in its entirety. However, on remand, the additional heirs will be given an opportunity to file a motion to intervene. In the event they do not, the trial court is directed to consider Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 19.01 and 19.02 in order to determine whether the other heirs are indispensable parties and to consider issues related to such a determination. Thus, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Telecommunications harassment CCO 621.10 text messages emails sufficiency of the evidence jury instruction plain error prejudice admission of testimony Evid.R. 1002 harmless error manifest weight of the evidence criminal complaint defect in indictment Crim.R. 12(C)(2) R.C. 2941.29 ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in misstating the date of the offense, treating the criminal complaint as charging two offenses, or admitting testimony from the victim regarding the content of text messages. Appellant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Divorce spousal support modification change in circumstances indefinite support long term marriage imputed income retirement magistrate's decision abuse of discretion R.C. 3105.18. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified Husband's spousal support obligation to $2,500 per month. Husband voluntarily retired at the age of 69 years old, with a change in his employer's administration leadership and declining health. This constitutes a substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing award of $12,000 per month unreasonable, given his estimated post-retirement income reduced to $109,300 from $643,197. The court considered all the R.C. 3105.18 factors and made findings for each, ultimately explaining how they impacted the decision to modify Husband's spousal support obligation. The court did not abuse its discretion when it imputed to Wife a $25,000 annual income because the court considered and weighed the spouses' relative earning abilities along with other factors to arrive at a reasonable spousal support amount and term. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding indefinite spousal support because marriage was of long duration (28 years) and statutory findings were supported by competent credible evidence.

Laura Adams ("Wife") filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court for Robertson County ("the Trial Court") against Timothy Adams, Sr. ("Husband"). In its final judgment of divorce, the Trial Court determined that real estate in Lawrence County ("Lawrence County property"), purchased by Husband prior to the marriage, was marital property because it had become "inextricably commingled." The Trial Court awarded Wife "40% of the total proceeds" from the Lawrence County property. The Trial Court further awarded Wife the marital residence and any and all equitable interests in the marital residence. Husband has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's judgment.

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no

Following the voluntary termination of her parental rights, appellant challenges the denial of her motion to enforce a contact agreement for visitation with her biological daughter. In the alternative, she seeks relief from the order terminating her parental rights and to reopen the subsequent adoption proceedings. Because we conclude that the district court erred in determining that the contact agreement was unenforceable, we reverse.

The Defendant, Shane Dwight Bingham, appeals from his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant's flight from police and (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

What began as a public records request ended with the trial court imposing sanctions upon the requester for violations of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court concluded that the public records requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement and deceptive exhibit in her Public Records Act Petition, by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry before filing her Petition, and by having an improper purpose in connection with her anticipated speech regarding any public records that she might obtain via the Public Records Act. The trial court imposed multiple sanctions upon the requester including a $5,000 penalty, a requirement to associate counsel in any future pro se filing within the judicial district, and a dismissal with prejudice of her Petition. We conclude the trial court properly determined the requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement and deceptive exhibit in her Petition. Given the context of the Public Records Act, we conclude, however, that the trial court erred with regard to its conclusion that the requester made an inadequate inquiry prior to filing her Petition and had an improper purpose in connection with the requester's anticipated use of any documents she obtained. We also conclude the monetary penalty imposed by the trial court violates the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Because of our other findings, we vacate the trial court's imposition of all three sanctions, and remand for determination of an appropriate sanction in light of our decision.