Court Rulings

A Sumner County jury convicted the defendant, Corey Denzal Williams, of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus eight years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance and in admitting autopsy photographs of the victim, the testimony of Sergeant Harry Harper, and video testimony of the victim. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and false imprisonment. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and false imprisonment and remand to the trial court for a new trial. We otherwise affirm the trial court's judgments.

The plaintiff employee appealed from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. The trial court had upheld the decision of the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, which determined that the defendant employer was not vicari- ously liable for the creation of a hostile work environment by another employee, K, in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court incorrectly had applied the definition of the term ''supervisor,'' adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University (570 U.S. 421), in concluding that the employer could not be held vicariously liable because K, the individual to whom the plaintiff reported and who allegedly made racially discriminatory comments to the plaintiff and in her presence, was not a supervisor under the definition of that term adopted in Vance. Held: The Appellate Court correctly applied to the plaintiff's hostile work environ- ment claim the definition of the term ''supervisor'' adopted in Vance, which is limited to employees who are empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim of the alleged discrimination. Because there was no evidence in the record that K had the authority to take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff, the employer could not be held vicariously liable for K's creation of a hostile work environment. (Three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued March 20—officially released August 1, 2024