Court Rulings

The Defendant, Ladarius Quashon Kees, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and reinstatement of the remainder of his original five-year sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to adequately consider the appropriate consequences for his violations and by failing to weigh his request for a rehabilitation program. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Retired State Employees; Class Action Suit Sovereign Immunity; Interlocutory appeal; Substantial Right; Cost of Living Allowances; Contractual Right; N.C. Gen. Stat. § Sec. 135-5

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court ordering the equitable distribution of real property that he jointly owned with the defen- dant and ordering the defendant to pay him $2000 as just compensation for his interest in the property pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-500 (a)). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in determining that he had only a minimal interest in the property. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff had only a minimal interest in the property for purposes of § 52-500 (a) because that determination was supported by the legislative history, which indicated that the plaintiff's one-half fee interest in the property did not preclude such a finding, and the relevant equitable factors. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of just compensation to the plaintiff for his interest in the property because his one-half ownership interest did not entitle him to 50 percent of the equity, and the court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not contribute financially to the property's purchase, mortgage, taxes, or insurance, that he provided only $2000 in maintenance expenses, and that his claims of other contribu- tions to the maintenance of the property were not credible. Argued May 20—officially released November 19, 2024

The trial court did not err in finding that the driver of a borrowed tractor on a public roadway was not an "insured" under a farm owner's policy of insurance, as the driver was not performing "domestic duties" relating to the "insured premises" or performing duties "as an employee of an insured, or for the benefit of the insured." Additionally, the policy's "incidental coverage" provision did not offer reinstatement of coverage to the motorized vehicle exclusion, because the incident occurred on a public roadway, not on the "insured premises." Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the insurance company. Judgment affirmed.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Andre Davis, Jr., for one count each of harassment and aggravated stalking. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective two-year sentence. Defendant appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a motion to set aside a default judgment. Roland Brown ("Plaintiff") sued HDR Logistics, LLC ("Defendant") in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County ("the Trial Court") alleging that he sustained injuries from an incident in which Defendant's employee backed his tractor-trailer into Plaintiff's parked tractor-trailer. Plaintiff served a copy of the complaint and summons on Lisa Blackwell ("Blackwell"), Defendant's designated agent in Tennessee for service of process. Defendant failed to respond, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant later filed a motion to set aside. Defendant submitted the affidavits of two individuals who said that the company did not receive notice of the lawsuit. Notably, the record contains no affidavit from Blackwell explaining what happened. The Trial Court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant appeals, arguing that its failure to respond was due to excusable neglect in that it lacked actual notice of the lawsuit even though its agent was served, and that the Trial Court failed to conduct a writ of inquiry on unliquidated damages as required. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to set aside default judgment. We hold further that Defendant failed to meet its burden showing the Trial Court did not conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. We affirm.