Court Rulings

A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Bobby Daniel Pettie, guilty of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, among other offenses. The court then imposed a six-year sentence for this conviction after implicitly finding that the Defendant had a qualifying prior felony conviction. Thereafter, the Defendant sought to have his sentence declared illegal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that the jury did not find that he had a qualifying prior felony conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Defendant waived the jury's determination of the issue. The Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Bobby Daniel Pettie, guilty of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, among other offenses. The court then imposed a six-year sentence for this conviction after implicitly finding that the Defendant had a qualifying prior felony conviction. Thereafter, the Defendant sought to have his sentence declared illegal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that the jury did not find that he had a qualifying prior felony conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Defendant waived the jury's determination of the issue. The Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion, the Court holds that a clause in an arbitration agreement attempting to shorten the statute of limitations is void as against public policy. The Court further holds the illegal clause is not severable and renders the entire arbitration section of the contract unenforceable.

summary judgment, R.C. 4113.52, retaliatory discharge

MODIFICATION/TERMINATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT – MANIFEST WEIGHT – COHABITATION : The trial court did not err when it found that appellee-wife was not cohabitating with another male regardless of the standard applied where appellant-husband failed to show how the trial court's judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence when there were facts supporting each party's positions.

CIV.R. 60(B) — RES JUDICATA — APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment after the trial court granted summary judgment to plaintiff where defendant did not appeal from the trial court's summary-judgment order, that summary-judgment order was final and subject to res judicata, and defendant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion attacked the merits of the trial court's summary-judgment decision, which was improper as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is not a substitute for a direct appeal and may not be used to collaterally attack the merits of a final judgment.

¶1 The State moved to terminate Father's (Parker) parental rights to Child, a member of the Choctaw Nation. After a jury trial, held in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act, the jury terminated Parker's rights. Parker was present for a portion of the trial. In this appeal we do not decide the merits of that termination decision. We are concerned only with whether Parker's procedural due process rights were violated, and whether the trial court was required to comply with the provisions of ICWA found in Title 25, Section 1912 (d) and (f) of the United States Code. We answer both questions in the affirmative and remand the case for a new trial.

This appeal arises from an automobile accident. Appellants, one of the drivers and her husband, filed a complaint for negligence against appellees, the other driver and his employer. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that immediately preceding the collision, the appellee-driver experienced a heart attack that left him physically incapacitated and unable to control his vehicle. In granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing the case, the trial court found that the sudden physical incapacitation doctrine provided appellees with a defense to appellants' negligence claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.