Court Rulings

The trial court erred in entering judgment for defendant because the greater weight of competent, credible evidence regarding proximate cause established that the decedent's death was the natural and probable consequence of defendant's employee's failure to supervise the decedent's care.

A Sevier County jury found the defendant, Christopher Joe Whaley, guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a seatbelt violation for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction the trial court erred in sentencing and the judgments entered were incorrect and failed to properly award the defendant his pretrial jail credit. Upon our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences, but remand for the determination by the trial court as to whether the defendant is entitled to pretrial jail credit and for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 4.

The plaintiff licensed motor vehicle dealers and repairers, T Co. and R Co., appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, who determined that the plaintiffs had overcharged the owner of a damaged tractor trailer for certain nonconsensual towing and recovery services. The plaintiffs had been summoned by the state police to provide towing and recovery services after the tractor trailer, which was insured by the defendant S Co., was damaged in an accident on Interstate 84. The plaintiffs used special equipment to clear the tractor trailer from the highway and tow it to the plaintiffs' storage facility where it remained for twenty-eight days. The plaintiffs subsequently charged the owner of the tractor trailer for the towing and recovery services, which S Co. paid. S Co. thereafter filed a complaint with the Department of Motor Vehicles, claiming that the plaintiffs' charges were unreasonable and excessive in light of indus- try standards and the department's regulations (§ 14-63-34 et seq.) gov- erning charges for nonconsensual towing and recovery services. After a hearing, a department hearing officer, relying on §§ 14-63-36b and 14- 63-36c of the regulations, issued a decision, concluding that the plaintiffs had overcharged for their services, and ordering them to pay restitution to S Co. and a civil fine to the department. The hearing officer reasoned that the plaintiffs had established their own rate schedule based on the equipment they had used and charged for equipment using their rate schedule rather than the department's approved hourly rate for labor schedule. The hearing officer also declined the plaintiffs' request to dismiss S Co.'s complaint as to R Co., which was based on the plaintiffs' claim that R Co. was a separate entity that did not participate in the towing and recovery services involving the tractor trailer. On appeal, the

Appellant challenges his indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP), arguing that the district court clearly erred in finding that he (1) "engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct," (2) demonstrated a "habitual course of misconduct," (3) is "highly likely to reoffend," and (4) is "dangerous to others." Because the record supports the district court's factual determinations, we affirm.

Relator challenges the decision by an unemployment law judge (ULJ) that relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct and aggravated misconduct of paying herself unused paid time off (PTO) in violation of respondent-employer's policies. Relator also argues that the ULJ erred by failing to consider documents she submitted with her request for reconsideration. Because the ULJ did not err in determining that relator was discharged for employment misconduct, and the ULJ's error in failing to consider the documents relator submitted with her request for reconsideration did not prejudice relator's substantial rights, we affirm.

Appellant-mother challenges a district court order affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Human Services (the commissioner), which upheld a maltreatment determination by respondent Hennepin County Human Services (the agency). Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the commissioner's decision, we affirm.

Appellant argues on appeal that the district court: (1) erred in finding her in civil contempt and in awarding respondent attorney fees because the underlying harassment restraining order expired prior to the contempt ruling; and (2) misapplied Minn. Stat. § 588.10 (2022) when it fined appellant because such a fine is a criminal sanction and appellant was found in civil, not criminal, contempt. We affirm the district court's finding of civil contempt and award of attorney fees to respondent, but we reverse the district court's imposition of a fine under Minn. Stat. § 588.10.

In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the termination of her Section 8 rental assistance and lease. Because the termination is supported by substantial evidence and relator does not identify procedural defects in the proceedings upholding the termination, we affirm.

Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), her claims under the Minnesota whistleblower act (MWA), and her claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. She also challenges the district court's denial of her motions to compel discovery. Because no genuine issues of material fact exist precluding the grant of summary judgment for respondents and any error related to the motions to compel is harmless, we affirm.