Court Rulings

The petitioner sought relief in a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that R, his counsel during his first habeas action, and G, his criminal trial counsel, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present expert testimony from a forensic pathologist to support the petitioner's claim of actual innocence. The petitioner had been con- victed of several crimes, including murder, as a result of a drug related shooting. K, an associate medical examiner, had performed an autopsy that showed that the victim died from a single gunshot to the head at close range. At the petitioner's criminal trial, K testified that the barrel of the gun had been touching the victim's skin when the gun was dis- charged and that the wound was a typical contact gunshot wound of entrance. This court upheld the petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. At his first habeas trial, R presented the testimony of C, the state's chief medical examiner, which was consistent with that of K, and the testimony of D, a forensic scientist. At that habeas trial, the petitioner claimed, inter alia, that G had improperly failed to present the testimony of an expert witness, such as D, to attack K's testimony. D, however, testified at the first habeas trial that the victim's wound could resemble a contact wound but that he could not conclude with certainty that the victim had sustained a contact wound. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that G rendered ineffective assistance. This court upheld the habeas court's decision, concluding that D had not contradicted K's opinion at the criminal trial that the victim's wound was a contact gunshot wound and that D's testimony would not have been helpful at the criminal trial to establish that the petitioner did not shoot the victim. At the second habeas trial, the petitioner presented the testimony of W, an expert in forensic pathology, who disagreed with K's conclusio

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of various crimes, appealed to this court following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d) and (e)). On appeal, the petitioner claimed that his prior habeas counsel's failure to advise him of the statutory deadline for filing a new petition prior to the withdrawal of his previously pending petition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which constituted good cause for the delay in filing. Held that, in accordance with our Supreme Court's recent decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333) and this court's recent decision in Hankerson v. Commis- sioner of Correction (223 Conn. App. 562), this court reversed the judg- ment of the habeas court and remanded the case for a new hearing and good cause determination under § 52-470 (d) and (e). Argued April 15—officially released May 7, 2024

Summary Judgment Contracts Americans with Disabilities Act Discrimination Failure to Accommodate Retaliation Rule 37 Attorneys' Fees.

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of various crimes, appealed to this court following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d) and (e)). On appeal, the petitioner claimed that his prior habeas counsel's failure to advise him of the statutory deadline for filing a new petition prior to the withdrawal of his previously pending petition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which constituted good cause for the delay in filing. Held that, in accordance with our Supreme Court's recent decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333) and this court's recent decision in Hankerson v. Commis- sioner of Correction (223 Conn. App. 562), this court reversed the judg- ment of the habeas court and remanded the case for a new hearing and good cause determination under § 52-470 (d) and (e). Argued April 15—officially released May 7, 2024

Appellant-father challenges the termination of his parental rights. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing father's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship against the children's best interests, we affirm.

We affirm the district court's denial of appellant Becker Independent School District 726's (Becker ISD) motion for summary judgment because we agree with the district court's determination that the tasks at issue were ministerial in nature and therefore not shielded from suit by official immunity.

Bench Trial Manifest Weight Contract Breach Damages. Trial court's determination to prorate damages for breach of contract was supported by the evidence.

A court may compel arbitration of disputes that are covered by a binding arbitration agreement. A statute of limitations does not automatically prevent arbitration of a claim if the arbitration agreement does not make arbitration contingent on compliance with the statute of limitations, and if the relevant arbitration rules authorize the arbitrator to determine its own jurisdiction. A party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute unless the party has agreed in writing to do so, or if an exception applies that binds the nonsignatory party to an arbitration agreement. The agency exception that can bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement does not apply if there is no principal-agent relationship between the signatory and the nonsignatory. The estoppel exception does not apply if the nonsignatory has not directly benefited from the agreement containing the arbitration provision. A court may conclude that a party has not waived its right to arbitration if, based on the relevant factors and the procedural context, the party has not acted inconsistently with that right.