Lafferty v. Jones
Case Details
- Judge(s)
- Bright; Moll; Prescott
- Status — whether other courts must follow this ruling
- Published
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- Writ of error challenging trial court's suspension order
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Outcome
Attorney P was suspended from practice of law for six months by the trial court for violating a protective order by disclosing plaintiffs' confidential information to unauthorized attorneys in Texas without obtaining confidentiality agreements or ensuring they understood the restrictions.
Excerpt
The plaintiff in error, P, the attorney for J and several other defendants in the underlying consolidated actions, filed a writ of error challenging the order of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months. The plaintiffs in those actions, including certain family members of those killed in the mass shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, had filed suit against J and the other defendants as a result of J's use of his nationally syndicated radio program and Internet websites he owned to publish content proclaiming that the mass shooting was a staged event. During trial, the court issued a protective order concerning sensitive personal and confidential infor- mation about the plaintiffs that the defendants had obtained through the discovery process. The order limited use of the information to counsel of record and others involved in the preparation and litigation of the underlying actions. The plaintiffs' confidential information was released during the course of communications P had with attorneys in Texas, including R, about related actions pending there and the possible collabo- ration between P and R on the cases in both states. During that time period, L, a Texas attorney, filed a bankruptcy petition for several defen- dants in the Texas cases. L then contacted W, who was counsel prior to P for several of the defendants in the underlying Connecticut actions, and requested access to all of the discovery materials obtained in the Connection actions. W then emailed L and P, warning that L might not be authorized to access the confidential documents in light of the protective order. Later that day, L obtained copies of the protective order. P did not ask L to sign a confidentiality order, and L was not informed by P or anyone from P's law firm that the discovery materials he was being provided included the plaintiffs' confidential information. A, an attorney in P's law firm, then emailed L, asking him to give R
What This Ruling Means
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
More Rulings in This Case
Other orders and opinions in Lafferty from the same court.
Similar Rulings
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