SANDERS v. TURN KEY HEALTH CLINICS
Case Details
- Status — whether other courts must follow this ruling
- Published
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- Motion to dismiss granted; plaintiff appealed interlocutory order; Court of Civil Appeals reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated appellate reversal for lack of jurisdiction; petition for prohibition denied
Related Laws
Outcome
Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' reversal, finding the plaintiff appealed a premature interlocutory order lacking appellate jurisdiction. The Court denied the petition for prohibition, holding that licensed medical professionals under contract with government entities providing care to detainees are state employees under the Governmental Tort Claims Act.
Excerpt
¶0 Plaintiff filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County and alleged a wrongful death caused by defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition and the Honorable Douglas W. Golden, District Judge, granted defendant's motion to dismiss and also granted leave for plaintiff to amend the petition. Plaintiff did not amend and appealed the trial court's order granting dismissal and leave to amend. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court, released its opinion for publication, and defendant filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court. We granted certiorari. We hold : Plaintiff appealed an interlocutory order, created a premature appeal, and appellate jurisdiction is absent; The Court vacates the opinion by the Court of Civil Appeals and withdraws it from publication; The Court recasts plaintiff's petition in error to an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for prohibition; The Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals to be employees of this state, regardless of the place in this state where duties as employees are performed, when the licensed medical professionals are under contract, including when under contract as an independent contractor, with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees in the custody or control of law enforcement agencies; The Court assumes original jurisdiction and denies the petition for writ of prohibition.
What This Ruling Means
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
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