CHILES v. MACHINE SHOP, INC
Case Details
- Citation
- 238 Mich. App. 462
- Judge(s)
- Before: Markman, P.J., and Hoekstra and Zahra, JJ.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- jury verdict
- State
- Michigan
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
Plaintiff prevailed on worker's compensation retaliation claim and was awarded $18,000 in damages, but the court reversed and remanded on the disability discrimination claim, finding plaintiff did not suffer from a perceived disability that substantially limited a major life activity under the PWDCRA.
Excerpt
CHILES v MACHINE SHOP, INC Docket No. 207395. Submitted March 10, 1999, at Lansing. Decided November 5, 1999, at 9:35 am. Robert E. Chiles brought an action in the Isabella Circuit Court against Machine Shop, Inc., and others, alleging that the defendants violated the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (wdca), MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq., and the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, now the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (pwd-. cra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.) MSA 3.550(101) et seq., by laying him off and not recalling him, actions the plaintiff claims were in retaliation for his filing of a worker’s compensation claim for a back injury and a result of discrimination based on a perceived disability. Before jury déliberations, Machine Shop, Inc., did not object to the stipulated dismissal of all other defendants from the action. The court, William R. Rush, J., thereafter entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and award of damages to the plaintiff. Machine Shop, Inc., appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The jury properly considered Machine Shop, Inc., to have been the plaintiff’s employer for purposes of determining its liability under the wdca and the pwdcra even though the plaintiff was classified as an employee of Forestry Products, Inc., which had loaned ■ him to Machine Shop, Inc. Machine Shop, Inc., did not object to the dismissal of the other defendants from the action, and Machine Shop, Inc., can properly be deemed under the economic-reality test to have been the plaintiff’s employer for purposes of the wdca. With respect to the pwdcra, liability under the act is not dependent on the existence of an employer-employee relationship at the time of the adverse employment action, but on the ability to affect adversely the terms and conditions of an individual’s employment or potential employment. 2. The trial court did not err in denying motions by Machine Shop, Inc., for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the plaintiff’s worker’s compensation retaliation claim. The plaintiff established that there was a causal connection between the filing of the worker’s compensation claim and the layoff and nonrecall by showing that he applied for and received worker’s compensation benefits, that Machine Shop, Inc., laid him off and did not recall him, that the stated reasons for the layoff and nonrecall were a pretext, and that the real reason was retaliation for filing the worker’s compensation claim. 3. The trial court erred in denying motions by Machine Shop, Inc., for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the plaintiff’s pwdcra claim. The plaintiff did not suffer from a perceived disability within the meaning of the pwdcra. Although the plaintiff was perceived to have had a physical impairment, that impairment was not a disability under the pwdcra because it was temporary and did not prevent the plaintiff from performing a range of jobs. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 1. Worker’s Compensation — Employer-Employee Relationships — Economic-Reality Test. The economic-reality test is used in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act; the test involves four factors: control of the worker’s duties; payment of wages; the right to hire, fire and discipline; and performance of the duties toward the accomplishment of a common goal (MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237[101] et seq.). 2. Civil Rights — Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act — Employers. Employer liability under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act can arise in the absence of an employer-employee relationship because the act encompasses potential employment in prohibiting ' discrimination based on handicaps not related to ability to perform job duties (MCL 37.1201[b], 37.1202[l][a]; MSA 3.550[201][b], 3.550[202][l][a]). 3. Worker’s Compensation — Employer Retaliation for Employee Claims. An employee establishes employer retaliation against the employee for the filing of a worker’s compensation claim where the employee shows that the employee asserted the right to worker’s compensation, the employee was discharged, the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext, and the real reason was retaliation for the employee’s filing of the worker’s compensation claim (MCL 418.301[11]; MSA 17.237[301] [11]). 4. Civil Rights — Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act — Employment Discrimination. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act by show-mg that the plaintiff is “disabled” as defined by the statute, the disability is unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and the plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of the ways set forth in the statute (MCL 37.1202[l][b]; MSA 3.550[202][l][b]). 5. Civil Rights — Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act — Disabilities. A three-step process is used by a court in determining whether a plaintiff is, or is perceived to be, physically disabled within the meaning of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act; first, the court considers whether the plaintiff suffers from a physical impairment; second, the court identifies the life activity alleged to be limited by the impairment and determines whether it constitutes a major life activity; third, the court determines whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity (MCL 37.1103[d] [i] [A], [in]; MSA 3.550[103][d][i][A], [iii]). 6. Civil Rights — Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act — Major Life Activities — Working. Work can be considered a major life activity that is substantially limited by an impairment when an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity; the impairment must significantly restrict an individual’s ability to perform a range of jobs, not a particular job (MCL 37.1103[d][i][A], [iii]; MSA 3.550[103][d][i][A], [iii]). 7. Civil Rights — Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act — Impairments — Substantial Limits on Major Life Activities. A court determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity considers the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the permanent or expected permanent or long-term effect; temporary medical conditions or intermittent, episodic impairments are not disabilities within the meaning of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (MCL 37.1103[d][i][A], [iii]; MSA 3.550[103][d][i][A], [iii]). Charles W. Palmer, for the plaintiff. Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, PL.C. (by Thomas R. Wurst and Jennifer L. Jordan), for the defendant. Before: Markman, P.J., and Hoekstra and Zahra, JJ. Per Curiam. In this action brought under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (pwdcra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.\ MSA 3.550(101) et seq., and the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, (wdca) MCL 418.101 et seq.] MSA 17.237(101) et seq., defendant Machine Shop, Inc., appeals as of right a jury award of $18,000 in favor of plaintiff and from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov), or a new trial. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In 1973, plaintiff began working for Morbark Industries, Inc., in its machine shop division. In 1988, Morbark Industries, Inc., split into several separate corporations. Plaintiff became classified as an employee of Forestry Products, Inc. However, plaintiff actually worked for defendant, Machine Shop, Inc., a similarly created offshoot of Morbark Industries, Inc. In December 1991, plaintiff sustained a work-related back injury. Despite this injury, plaintiff continued working as defendant’s sole Blanchard grinder operator until February of 1993, when he took a disability leave. Plaintiff received full worker’s compensation benefits from February until June of 1993, when he returned to work in a “favored” position. While plaintiff was on disability leave, another employee, Jim Zeneberg, was moved to plaintiff’s shift and assigned to operate the Blanchard grinder. However, in July 1994, as part of progressing from the favored position to a work-hardening program, plaintiff was reassigned to the Blanchard grinder. Plaintiff initially operated the grinder four hours a day, but eventually increased to full-time. During this period, Zeneberg was temporarily assigned to other machines. While plaintiff participated in the work-hardening program, he was paid $6 an hour and a supplemental worker’s compensation wage-loss differential. He was told that he would resume earning his regular wage of $11.75 an hour when his doctor lifted his work restrictions. On February 24, 1995, plaintiff’s treating physician provided documentation to defendant indicating that plaintiff could return to work without restrictions. On February 27, plaintiff resumed earning his regular wage. The next day, February 28, 1995, plaintiff was laid off and notified that he would not be rehired. Craig Price, the health and human services director for all of Morbark Industries, agreed that plaintiff was misled into believing that once his restrictions were lifted, he would return to his full-time position as a grinder operator. According to defendant’s president, Gary Cotter, plaintiff was laid off because he was not as productive as Zeneberg, the replacement operator. On May 4, 1995, plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was laid off and not recalled in retaliation for filing his worker’s compensation claim and because he was perceived as suffering from a disability (impaired back). In November 1995, following Zeneberg’s unfortunate death, plaintiff was called back to work as the Blanchard grinder operator. Upon his return, plaintiff was classified as defendant’s employee. i For its first claim of error, defendant contends that because it was not technically plaintiff’s employer when the alleged retaliatory and discriminatory actions occurred, it was not a proper party to this suit. We disagree. At the onset of trial, the named defendants included defendant Machine Shop, Inc., Morbark Industries, Inc., Morbark Maintenance Company, and Forestry Products, Inc. Before jury deliberations, plaintiff offered to stipulate the dismissal of all entities except defendant. In response, defense counsel indicated that he was “not going to object.” Consequently, the jury considered only defendant’s liability. Under the facts in this case, we find that the jury properly considered defendant’s liability under the wdca and the pwdcra. This Court applies the economic-reality test to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the wdca. James v Commercial Carriers, Inc, 230 Mich App 533, 537; 583 NW2d 913 (1998). The test involves four basic factors: (1) control of the worker’s duties, (2) payment of wages, (3) the right to hire, fire, and discipline, and (4) performance of the duties toward the accomplishment of a common goal. Id. In applying these factors, the totality of the circumstances must be examined, with no single factor controlling. Id. Under this test, defendant was plaintiff’s employer for purposes of the wdca. At the time plaintiff participated in the work-hardening program and when he was laid off, he was working for defendant as a loaned employee. Defendant directed his activities. Further, defendant clearly had the right to hire, fire, and discipline plaintiff because, in making the decision to lay off plaintiff and not recall him for over eight months, defendant exercised these rights. With respect to factor four, plaintiff performed work that was part of a “common objective integral to [defendant’s] business” and work that would “normally follow the usual path of an employee.” Id. The only factor that arguably does not weigh in favor of the finding of an employment relationship is the payment of wages. However, we note that defendant paid plaintiff’s actual employer, Forestry Products, Inc., for the right to use plaintiff’s services. Thus, under the economic-reality test, we find that defendant was plaintiff’s employer. With respect to the PWDCRA, we hold that because liability under the act is not dependent on the actual existence of an employer-employee relationship at the time of the adverse employment action but, rather, on the ability to affect adversely the terms and conditions of an individual’s employment or potential employment, defendant’s position lacks merit. The act addresses the conduct of an “employer” who takes adverse employment action against an “individual” because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job. MCL 37.1202(1)(a); MSA 3.550(202)(1)(a). The act does not limit the definition of “employer” to the plaintiff’s employer but, instead, simply defines it as a “person who has 1 or more employees.” MCL 37.1201(b); MSA 3.550(201)(b). The scope of the act clearly encompasses actions taken by an employer before an employment relationship even exists, e.g., discriminatorily refusing to hire an applicant on account of a disability. Our reading of the plain language of the statute does not require that an employment relationship exist, but simply that the employer/defendant have the authority to affect a plaintiff’s employment or potential employment. Consequently, we find that the act was intended to encompass the relationship present in this case. n Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and JNOV with respect to plaintiff’s worker’s compensation retaliation claim. We disagree. The grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV is reviewed de novo. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997); Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 204; 580 NW2d 876 (1998). In either case, this Court must view the evidence and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Forge, supra; Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d 745 (1998); Zeeland Farm Services, Inc v JBL Enterprises, Inc, 219 Mich App 190, 195; 555 NW2d 733 (1996). The denial of a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV is reviewed to determine whether the nonmoving party failed to establish a claim as a matter of law. Kubczak, supra; Forge, supra. Pursuant to the wdca, an employer may not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against an employee because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under [the wdca] or because of the exercise by the employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of a right afforded by [the wdca]. [MCL 418.301(11); MSA 17.237(301)(11).] The burden is on plaintiff to show that there was a causal connection between the protected activity, i.e., the filing of his worker’s compensation claim, and the adverse employment action. See, by analogy, DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997). The lower court instructed the jury that plaintiff had the burden of proving that (1) he asserted his right for worker’s compensation, (2) defendant laid off or failed to recall plaintiff, (3) defendant’s stated reason for its actions was a pretext, and (4) defendant’s true reasons for its actions were in retaliation for plaintiff’s having filed a worker’s compensation claim. The court further instructed the jury that it should find for defendant only if retaliation was not one of the motivating factors in its decisions. This instruction appears to have been based on SJI2d 105.04, which sets forth the shifting burdens of proof that apply in retaliation claims based on the Civil Right Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. Neither party objected to the jury instructions at trial, and this Court is satisfied that these instructions accurately set forth the shifting burdens of proof that should also apply in a worker’s compensation retaliation suit. See also, DeFlaviis, supra. It is undisputed that plaintiff applied for and received worker’s compensation benefits and that he was laid off and not recalled. Defendant claims that plaintiff’s layoff was not an adverse employment action. However, there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant’s stated reason for termination was a pretext. Evidence indicated that although plaintiff had worked for Morbark Industries, Inc., for twenty-two years, no disciplinary action was noted in his personnel file. To the contrary, personnel records expressly and repeatedly indicated that plaintiff was an excellent worker. Although Cotter indicated that these positive reports had been fabricated for internal reasons, the jury was free to reject this testimony as untruthful and self-serving. Along the same vein, defendant claimed that plaintiff’s performance was so poor that defendant had no intention of calling him back to work in any position. Yet, after plaintiff filed this lawsuit, defendant recalled him, allegedly because of the company’s standard practice of recalling the most qualified workers to fill open positions. From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that defendant’s stated reason for laying off the plaintiff and failing to recall him was pure pretext. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that a retaliatory motive contributed to defendant’s actions. DeFlaviis, supra at 436. Plaintiff testified that he actively pursued having his work restrictions lifted because company representatives assured him that this was the only obstacle keeping him from returning to his full wages. In effect, plaintiff was terminated on the day after he succeeded in ending his own worker’s compensation eligibility. On the basis of the timing of the layoff, evidence that cutbacks were not necessary, evidence that upper management inquired into the cost of plaintiff’s worker’s compensation benefits, and evidence of defendant’s role in having the work restrictions lifted, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that retaliation was a motive for laying off plaintiff and not recalling him. Thus, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motions for jnov and a directed verdict was not error. m Defendant next claims that the lower court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and JNOV with respect to plaintiffs pwdcra claim. We agree. We read the PWDCRA in light of the primary goal of judicial interpretation, which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 611; 566 NW2d 571 (1997). Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used. People v Lee, 447 Mich 552, 557-558; 526 NW2d 882 (1994). Provisions of a statute are not construed in isolation but, rather, in the context of other provisions of the same statute to give effect to the purpose of the whole enactment. Guitar v Bieniek, 402 Mich 152, 158; 262 NW2d 9 (1978). “Further, in interpreting provisions of the [pwdcra], analogous federal precedents are persuasive, although not necessarily binding.” Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 601-602; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). This Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have noted that the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., and the pwdcra share the same purpose and use similar definitions and analyses, and both courts have relied on the ADA in interpreting the pwdcra. Chmielewski, supra at 602-603; Collins v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 228 Mich App 560, 568; 579 NW2d 435 (1998); Stevens v Inland Waters, I
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