BETTY v. BROOKS & PERKINS
Case Details
- Citation
- 446 Mich. 270
- Judge(s)
- Cavanagh, C.J., and Levin, Brickley, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Griffin, J.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
- Circuit
- 6th Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed that plaintiff's state-law race and sex discrimination claim under the Michigan Civil Rights Act is not preempted by federal labor law (§301 of the LMRA) because it asserts nonnegotiable state rights independent of the collective-bargaining agreement and can be resolved based on factual findings about the employer's motivation without interpreting the agreement.
Excerpt
BETTY v BROOKS & PERKINS Docket No. 96538. Argued April 5, 1994 (Calendar No. 5). Decided August 24, 1994. Carnell Betty, brought an action under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., in the Wayne Circuit Court against Brooks & Perkins, her employer, claiming race and sex discrimination. The plaintiff, a black woman, alleged that a similarly situated white male employee with less qualifications and lower seniority was awarded a shift preference for which both had applied. The court, William Leo Cahalan, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant, finding that the case was preempted by § 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC 185(a). The Court of Appeals, Jansen, P.J., and Griffin, J. (Michael J. Kelly, J., dissenting), reversed, finding that the question to be resolved was one of fact, regarding the motivation of the employer, and not one of law, regarding interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and the plaintiff’s union (Docket No. 121952). The defendant appeals. In an opinion by Justice Griffin, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh, and Justices Levin, Brickley, and Mallett, the Supreme Court held: The plaintiff’s state law claim of race and sex discrimination in the workplace is independent of the collective-bargaining agreement between her union and her employer and, thus, is not preempted by federal law. 1. United States Supreme Court case law has held that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act expresses federal policy that federal courts should enforce collective-bargaining agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations by applying federal law. In general, a state-law claim alleging discrimination is not preempted by federal law if the claim is based on nonnegotiable state-law rights of employers and employees independent of any right established by a collective-bargaining agreement, or whether the claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the agreement. State law is preempted only if its application requires interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. 2. The essential elements of the state-law claim advanced by the plaintiff are that similarly situated people have been treated differently because of their race or sex. The claim turns on a factual determination regarding the employer’s conduct and motivation and can be resolved independent of the collective-bargaining agreement. The plaintiff is asserting nonnegotiable state rights secured by the Michigan Civil Rights Act that apply to all employees, whether or not they belong to a union, and cannot be waived or conditioned on success at the bargaining table. Because the duty owed under the act by the employer to the plaintiff does not stem from the collective-bargaining agreement, her claim is independent for purposes of § 301 preemption, parallel protection under the terms of the agreement notwithstanding. Justice Riley, concurring, stated that the plaintiff’s claim is not preempted under § 301. The dispositive inquiry under state law is not what the collective-bargaining agreement provides but what the motivation of the defendant was. Moreover, merely because the defendant might claim in defense that its conduct was compelled by some implied fairness gleaned from the collective-bargaining agreement as a whole would not preempt the claim in this case. This would only help answer the factual question whether defendant was motivated by discrimination, but would not require the court to determine the legality of the decision under the collective-bargaining agreement. The defendant’s burden is one of production only, rather than persuasion. After the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case, Michigan courts place the burden of production on the defendant as a means of properly framing the dispositive issue, i.e., the motivation of the defendant, so that the plaintiff can then show that the purported defense was simply a pretext for discrimination. Justice Boyle, concurring in parts i and hi of the majority opinion, stated that the defendant essentially conceded that the collective-bargaining agreement did not entitle the white male employee to retake the test. Affirmed. 198 Mich App 28; 497 NW2d 512 (1993) affirmed. Rodrick K. Green for the plaintiff. Blake, Kirchner, Symonds, MacFarlane, Larson & Smith, P.C. (by Christopher G. Manolis), for the defendant. Amicus Curiae: Sachs, Waldman, O’Hare, Helveston, Hodges & Barnes, P.C. (by Theodore Sachs and Patricia J. Fabrizio), for Michigan State AFL-CIO. Griffin, J. We must decide whether plaintiff’s state-law claim of employer race and sex discrimination is preempted by §301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act (lmra). Because her action, based upon the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., is independent, and resolution does not require interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement between plaintiff’s union and her employer, we conclude that the claim is not preempted by federal law. i Plaintiff Carnell Betty is a black female who began working for defendant Brooks & Perkins as a welder in 1979. She and Brian Krawczyk, a white male who worked as a welder in the same department, were members of the United Auto Workers Union Local No. 157, and were covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. As a quality control measure, pursued with approval of the union, defendant required a group of six welders, including plaintiff and Mr. Krawczyk, to attend classes for four weeks at Weld Tech Welding Education Center. A letter of understanding, signed by defendant and the union, provided that each of these employees was required to "successfully conclude [the course of] training to be considered as qualified to retain seniority within the Welder’s Classification.” On March 14, 1983, Mr. Krawczyk completed a segment of the course and took a welding test. His instructor advised defendant that Mr. Krawczyk had passed. However, after he had completed the course and returned to work, defendant was notified by Weld Tech that the earlier report was an error and that Mr. Krawczyk had actually failed a portion of the examination. As a result, Mr. Krawczyk lost his seniority within 'the classification and was laid off. In the meantime, plaintiff had also taken the welding course at Weld Tech and passed. At that point, she stood higher on the seniority list than Mr. Krawczyk. Mr. Krawczyk complained to the union, which in turn complained to defendant’s management that if he had been timely informed of his failure, he could have retaken the test before completion of the course. Management determined that the treatment was unfair, and on April 12, 1983, Mr. Krawczyk was allowed to return to Weld Tech and retake the test. This time he passed and his seniority was reinstated. Thereafter, on December 17, 1984, plaintiff and Mr. Krawczyk each applied for the same shift preference. According to defendant, the preference was awarded to Mr. Krawczyk in accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement because his seniority ranking was higher. Plaintiff complained to the union, which refused to file a grievance. Plaintiff then filed this discrimination suit, claiming that a similarly situated white male employee with less qualifications and lower seniority was awarded the shift preference. While the group required to take the Weld Tech course included both blacks and whites, plaintiff asserts that all of the whites passed the test except one, Brian Krawczyk, and that all of the blacks failed the test except one, plaintiff* Carnell Betty. She further contends that black employees who failed also retook the test and passed; however, they were placed at the bottom of the seniority list. At the close of discovery, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), (8), and (10), and argued, inter alia, that plaintiff’s discrimination claim was preempted by § 301 of the lmra. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion on the narrow ground of § 301 preemption and found it unnecessary to address the other issues. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The panel majority opined that the "question to be resolved is a factual one regarding the motivation of defendant, and not the legal one of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement,” citing Hall v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 184 Mich App 277, 280; 457 NW2d 143 (1990). See also Lingle v Norge Div of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 US 399, 419; 108 S Ct 1877; 100 L Ed 2d 410 (1988). We then granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal. 444 Mich 914 (1994). ii The authority of Congress to preempt state law is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1; 6 L Ed 23 (1824). Whether a state claim is preempted by a federal statute "is, of course, a question of federal law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp v Lueck, 471 US 202, 214; 105 S Ct 1904; 85 L Ed 2d 206 (1985). "[W]here Federal questions are involved we are bound to follow the prevailing opinions of the United States supreme court.” Harper v Brennan, 311 Mich 489, 493; 18 NW2d 905 (1945). A Section 301 of the lmra provides: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. [29 USC 185(a).]_ In Textile Workers v Lincoln Mills, 353 US 448, 455; 77 S Ct 912; 1 L Ed 2d 972 (1957), the United States Supreme Court concluded that § 301 "does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations.” From the legislative history of § 301, the Court gleaned an expression of "federal policy that federal courts should enforce [collective-bargaining] agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.” Id. With this Congressional objective in mind, the Court concluded that "the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.” Id. at 456. The import of Lincoln Mills was demonstrated when the Court first addressed the preemptive effect of §301 in Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95; 82 S Ct 571; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962). At issue was whether a suit in state court seeking "damages for business losses caused by [a union] strike” could be decided by the application of state contract law. Id. at 97. Because resolution of the dispute turned on . the question whether the strike breached the collective-bargaining agreement, the Court held that "incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law.” Id. at 102. In broad terms, the Court declared: The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under - the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy. More important, the subject matter of § 301(a) "is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.” [Id. at 103.] While Lucas Flour made clear that a state action that alleges breach of a collective-bargaining agreement is preempted by § 301, the Court’s subsequent task of delineating the extent to which § 301 displaces state-law claims when breach of a collective-bargaining agreement is not specifically alleged has proved to be more difficult. In Allis-Chalmers Corp v Lueck, supra at 210, the Court observed that "[i]f the policies that animate § 301 are to be given their proper range, . . . the pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations.” While acknowledging that some tort actions must be preempted to achieve the desired uniformity in the interpretation of labor contracts, the Court took pains to explain that the reach of § 301 preemption has limits: In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent ... to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract. Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements. [Id. at 212-213.] In resolving the case then before it, the Lueck Court articulated this standard: Our analysis must focus ... on whether the [state] tort action . . . confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. If the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted, [Id. at 213. Emphasis added.][] In Lingle v Norge Div of Magic Chef, Inc, supra at 413, the Supreme Court again emphasized the limits of § 301 preemption. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that "application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 . . . only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” The Court observed that the plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim under Illinois law required a factual determination regarding "the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer.” Id. at 407. Because "this purely factual inquiry . . . does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement,” the Court concluded: [T]he state-law remedy in this case is "independent” of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of "independent” that matters for § 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement. [Id. at 407.] It has been suggested that development of the scope of preemption under § 301 has been driven, in part, by an effort to make certain that " 'parties [are not allowed] to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.’ ” United Steelworkers of America v Rawson, 495 US 362, 369; 110 S Ct 1904; 109 L Ed 2d 362 (1990) (quoting Lueck, supra at 211). Guided by these general principles and parameters, we turn now to an analysis of the issue before us — whether resolution of plaintiff’s state civil rights claim requires interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. B We begin by focusing on the essential elements of the state-law claim advanced by plaintiff. She complains that a similarly situated, nonblack male employee with less qualifications and lower seniority received special treatment by defendant during the testing process, in violation of her rights protected by the Michigan Civil Rights Act. In order to establish a prima facie case of "[d]isparate treatment” race discrimination, a plaintiff "must show that [she] was a member of the class entitled to protection under the act and that, for the same or similar conduct, [she] was treated differently than one who was a member of a different race.” Schipani v Ford Motor Co, 102 Mich App 606, 617; 302 NW2d 307 (1981) (citing Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537; 189 NW2d 243 [1971]). Likewise, "the essence of a sex discrimination civil rights suit is that similarly situated people have been treated differently because of their sex.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). See also Marsh v Dep’t of Civil Service (After Remand), 173 Mich App 72; 433 NW2d 820 (1988). Plaintiff argues that resolution of her state discrimination claim turns on a factual determination regarding defendant’s conduct and motivation in allowing Mr. Krawczyk to retake the welding test and in reinstating his seniority. Contending that her claim can be resolved without interpreting the collective-bargaining agreement, plaintiff posits that it is "independent” of the agreement and not preempted by § 301. We agree. Highly instructive is a statement by the Lingle Court that acknowledges the unique character of a state discrimination claim:_ In the typical case a state tribunal could resolve either a discriminatory or retaliatory discharge claim without interpreting the "just cause” language of a collective-bargaining agreement. [Lingle, 486 US 413. Emphasis added.] Implicit is the recognition that claims under state statutes prohibiting discrimination often turn on issues of fact pertaining to the conduct or motive of the defendant, rather than on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. That is the case here. It is undisputed that Mr. Krawczyk had an earlier date of entry than plaintiff, and therefore more seniority within the welder’s classification at the point when the Weld Tech course began on February 28, 1983. The parties have registered no disagreement concerning the terms or meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement as it relates to seniority, shift preference, or lay off. Although defendant seeks to emphasize that Mr. Krawczyk was awarded the shift preference because of a higher seniority ranking, the critical issue is whether the decisions to allow Mr. Krawczyk to retake the test and then to reinstate his seniority were based on racial or gender considerations. Plaintiff’s argument that her claim is independent of the collective-bargaining agreement is strongly buttressed by the fact that she is asserting nonnegotiable state rights — secured by the Michigan Civil Rights Act. These are rights that apply to all employees, whether or not they belong to a union. Such rights cannot be waived or conditioned on success at the bargaining table. While acknowledging that this factor alone may not establish the independence of a state claim, the Lingle Court took note of the fact that "most state laws that are not pre-empted by § 301 will grant nonnegotiable rights that are shared by all state workers . . . .” Id. at 408, n 7. The jurisprudence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is in accord. In Smolarek v Chrysler Corp, 879 F2d 1326 (CA 6, 1989) (en banc), cert den Chrysler Corp v Smolarek, 493 US 992 (1989), an eight-judge majority ruled that the particular claims presented under Michigan’s Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq., were not preempted by § 301. Id. at 1335. Seven judges dissented in part. Speaking through Judge Kennedy, they reasoned that because no right of accommodation is conferred upon a handicapped employee by the hcra, the accommodation sought by the plaintiffs in Smolarek was negotiable, and that to that extent such a claim is preempted by § 301. However, even the dissenting judges recognized that interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement is not required in the typical case alleging race, sex, or age discrimination. Judge Kennedy explained: In race, sex, and age cases, interpretation of the collective bargaining contract is unnecessary. . . . The right to be free of race, sex, or age discrimination is independent of any ancillary right contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Likewise, if an employee is terminated for a handicap unrelated to his ability to perform the functions of his job, interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is unnecessary to his claim. The hcra has provided a nonnegotiable right to be free of this type of discrimination. [Id. at 1338 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).][] Relying on Lingle and Smolarek, supra, the United States Court of App
Similar Rulings
BETTY v BROOKS & PERKINS Docket No. 121952. Submitted April 23, 1992, at Detroit. Decided January 19, 1993, at 9:25 a.m. Leave to appeal sought. Carnell Betty brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Brooks & Perkins, her employer, alleging race and sex employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. The defendant alleged that its treatment of the plaintiff was mandated by a collective bargaining agreement and a letter of understanding. The court, William Leo Cahalan, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant, finding the plaintiff’s claim to be preempted by § 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC 185. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held: The court erred in ruling that the plaintiff’s claim was preempted by federal labor law. Section 301 preempts a claim based upon state law only where the claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. State courts are not preempted from determining questions of law involving labor relations where such questions do not involve construction of a collective bargaining agreement. The questions to be resolved in this case, whether the plaintiff was subjected to disparate treatment and, if so, whether the treatment was motivated by racial discrimination, are factual, regarding the motivation of the defendant, and not legal, requiring interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Where a plaintiff alleges discriminatory disparate treatment and the defendant claims that the treatment was in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, there is no federal preemption of the discrimination claim. Reversed and remanded. Michael J. Kelly, J., dissenting, stated that the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims involves interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Rodrick K. Green, for the plaintiff. Reynolds, Beeby & Magnuson, P.C. (by Jonathan N. Wayman), for the defendant. Before: Jansen, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Griffin, JJ. Jansen, P.J. On July 2, 1985, plaintiff filed this action against defendant alleging discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. On September 22, 1989, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10). Plaintiff appeals as of right, and we reverse. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court properly ruled that plaintiff’s claim was preempted by federal labor law. We conclude that the trial court erred in so ruling. Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against by defendant on the basis of race and sex. Specifically, plaintiff claims that she was laid off by defendant despite having passed a welding test, whereas a white male who failed the test was not laid off. Defendant alleged that its treatment of plaintiff was mandated by a collective bargaining agreement and a letter of understanding. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (lmra), 29 USC 185, preempts a claim based upon state law only where the claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Lingle v Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 US 399, 413; 108 S Ct 1877; 100 L Ed 2d 410 (1988); Hall v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 184 Mich App 277, 280; 457 NW2d 143 (1990). State courts are not preempted from determining questions of law involving labor relations where such questions do not involve construing a collective bargaining agreement. Lingle, p 413; Hall, p 280. In this case, as in Hall, the focus of inquiry is not upon the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, but on whether plaintiff was the recipient of disparate treatment and whether that treatment was motivated by racial discrimination. Id., pp 279-281. The question to be resolved is a factual one regarding the motivation of defendant, and not the legal one of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id., p 280. Although it is true that state law discrimination claims that assert denial of rights under collective bargaining agreements necessarily require the interpretation of the agreement, and are therefore preempted by federal labor law, "where the plaintiff alleges discriminatory disparate treatment and the defendant claims that plaintiff’s treatment was in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining contract, there is no federal preemption of plaintiff’s discrimination claims.” Id., pp 280-281. We conclude, consistent with Hall, that plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by § 301 of the lmra. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. Griffin, J., concurred. Michael J. Kelly, J. (dissenting). I dissent because I believe the plaintiff’s claims involve interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, particularly those areas regarding seniority and layoff. I do not see how plaintiff’s claim of denial of shift preference can be resolved without interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. It is inextricably intertwined because it involves seniority rights, job preference rights, and union grievance procedures. Resolution of these issues involves interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and I believe the trial court’s determination that federal law governs was correct. Metro v Ford Motor Co, 169 Mich App 549, 552-553; 426 NW2d 700 (1988).
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