Michael Brune, Claimant/Respondent v. Johnson Controls, a/k/a Hoover Universal, Inc., Employer/Appellant.

<bold>Workers' Compensation — occupational disease —</bold> <bold>specific traumatic event</bold> <block_quote> The Industrial Commission erred in a workers' compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee bus driver's ulnar nerve entrapment neuropathy and cervical spine condition were compensable occupational diseases and that the injury to the cervical spine qualified as a specific traumatic incident, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, because: (1) the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard in finding plaintiff's ulnar neuropathy and cervical spine condition to be compensable occupational diseases pursuant to N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>97-53</cross_reference>(13) and the cervical spine condition to be a specific traumatic incident pursuant to N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>97-2</cross_reference>(6); (2) plaintiff failed to establish that his employment placed him at a greater risk of contracting either his ulnar nerve entrapment or his cervical spine condition than the general public; and (3) the evidence is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements enunciated by the General Assembly in N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>97-2</cross_reference>(6) that a specific traumatic incident occurred when plaintiff presented evidence that he experienced pain on a particular date but he presented no evidence linking that pain to the occurrence of an injury, and none of plaintiff's evidence establishes a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned that can be construed as an injury by accident to plaintiff's back.</block_quote> <block_quote> Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.</block_quote>

<bold>Workers' Compensation — occupational disease — Lyme disease — failure to</bold> <bold>show employment placed at increased risk</bold> <block_quote> The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee did not prove that there was a causal relationship between her employment as a veterinary technician and her Lyme disease because: (1) although the employment-related accident need not be the sole causative force to render an injury compensable, plaintiff must prove that the accident was a causal factor by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) a doctor's testimony on the issue of causation was at best equivocal, and the portions of the doctor's testimony relied on by plaintiff are not dispositive in light of the doctor's other testimony that supported a finding of no causation; (3) there was competent evidence in the record supporting a finding of no causal link; and (4) although plaintiff contends the Commission's finding of no causation should be rejected based on a consideration of the circumstantial evidence before the Commission as permitted by case law, the dispositive difference between this case and the others cited by plaintiff is that the Commission found causation and awarded benefits in the other cases whereas the Commission found there was no causal relationship between the employment and plaintiff's condition in the instant case.</block_quote><page_number>Page 419</page_number>