Joanne Silvestris vs. Tantasqua Regional School District (and a companion case)
Case Details
- Citation
- 446 Mass. 756
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Massachusetts
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court's judgment for the plaintiffs on their Massachusetts Equal Pay Act claims and directed entry of judgment for the school district. Although the trial judge found wage discrimination, the appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination under MEPA because the superintendent's allocation of prior work experience credit, though lacking defined criteria, did not have a disproportionately discriminatory impact on women.
Excerpt
Joanne Silvestris vs. Tantasqua Regional School District (and a companion case). Hampden. March 7, 2006. May 18, 2006. Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, & Cordy, JJ. Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Sex. Employment, Discrimination. Limitations, Statute of. School and School Committee, Compensation of personnel. Practice, Civil, Findings by judge. An action brought by female teachers (plaintiffs) against a regional school district (defendant), claiming violations of the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act, G. L. c. 149, § 105A, was not barred by the applicable six-month limitations period contained in G. L. c. 151B, § 5, where the statute was tolled by operation of 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(2) (1999), when the plaintiffs entered into grievance proceedings with the defendant concerning the alleged discriminatory act within six months of the conduct complained of, and subsequently filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination within six months of the outcome of those proceedings. [764-770] Female teachers (plaintiffs) were not entitled to prevail on their claims under the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act, G. L. c. 149, § 105A, against a regional school district (district), alleging that the plaintiffs’ starting salaries were set lower than those of male teachers because the plaintiffs were given less credit for prior work experience, where the evidence demonstrated that the superintendent of the district allocated credit for prior work experience without any well-defined and articulated criteria, and that such allocation did not have a disproportionately discriminatory impact on women. [770-777] Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 28, 2000. The cases were heard by Judd J. Carhart, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Maria E. DeLuzio (Karen W. Peters with her) for Tantasqua Regional School District. Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, for for Joanne Silvestris & another. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Danielle Y. Vanderzanden & Douglass C. Lawrence for Associated Industries of Massachusetts. Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, Catherine C. Ziehl, & Zoe Butler-Stark, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney General. Sara Smolik, Robert Mantell, & Elizabeth A. Rodgers for National Employment Lawyers Association, Massachusetts Chapter. Valerie A. Goncalves vs. Tantasqua Regional School District. Spina, J. Joanne Silvestris and Valerie Goncalves (collectively, plaintiffs) are teachers in the technical division of Tantasqua regional high school (Tantasqua). On July 14, 1999, each filed a discrimination charge against the Tantasqua regional school district (school district) with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), claiming that the school district had violated the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute, G. L. c. 15IB, and the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act (MEPA), G. L. c. 149, § 105A, by “failing to pay [them] salary and benefits equal to what male employees received from work of comparable character.” Eleven months later, Silvestris and Goncalves each filed a complaint against the school district in the Superior Court, alleging only that the school district’s conduct in paying them less than their male colleagues constituted wage discrimination in violation of MEPA. The thrust of the plaintiffs’ allegations was that, when they were hired by the superintendent of schools for the school district (superintendent), their starting salaries were set lower than the starting salaries of male teachers in the technical division because they were given less credit for their prior work experience. In its answer to each complaint, the school district asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the plaintiffs’ actions were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In response to a motion of the school district, agreed to by the plaintiffs, the two actions were consolidated. The plaintiffs then amended their complaints to add claims alleging that the school district’s conduct in establishing their starting salaries had violated G. L. c. 15IB and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (equal rights act), G. L. c. 93, § 102. The school district again raised the statute of hmitations as an affirmative defense in its answers. The parties presented their evidence to the judge in a jury-waived trial. At the close of all the evidence, the plaintiffs’ claims under the equal rights act were dismissed pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. R 41 (b) (2), 365 Mass. 803 (1974). After the judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996), he entered judgment for the school district with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims under G. L. c. 151B, and stated that, after a further hearing on damages, judgment would enter for the plaintiffs on their MEPA claims. He concluded that the plaintiffs’ charges had been timely filed with the MCAD, and that the school district had engaged in wage discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 149, § 105A, by failing to give the plaintiffs credit for their prior work experience in a manner that was comparable to the way in which male teachers had been given credit for prior work experience. The judge subsequently awarded damages in the amount of $60,370 to Silvestris, damages in the amount of $115,811.44 to Goncalves, and attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $42,893.08. The school district appealed from the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their MEPA claims, including the allowance of liquidated damages and the assessment of legal fees, and the cases were transferred from the Appeals Court on our own motion. The school district now contends that (1) the plaintiffs’ MEPA claims were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the judge’s findings that the plaintiffs were paid less than their male colleagues for prior experience were clearly erroneous; (3) the judge erred in calculating the plaintiffs’ damages by awarding back pay to their dates of hire, rather than limiting back pay to the six months preceding the filing of their MCAD charges and by using the maximum salary level when calculating their back pay; and (4) the judge erred in calculating the amount of attorney’s fees by failing to take into consideration the fact that the school district prevailed on two of the plaintiffs’ three claims, and by fading to deduct allegedly vague, duplicative, and unreasonable fees. For the reasons that follow, we now vacate the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their wage discrimination claims and direct the entry of judgment for the school district on those claims. 1. Statutory framework. General Laws c. 149, § 105A, states, in pertinent part: “No employer shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between the sexes, or pay any person in his employ salary or wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for work of like or comparable character or work on like or comparable operations; provided, however, that variations in rates of pay shall not be prohibited when based upon a difference in seniority. Any employer who violates any provision of this section shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, and in an additional equal amount of liquidated damages.” The purpose of this statute is “to remedy pay inequities between male and female employees in comparable positions.” Jancey v. School Comm. of Everett, 421 Mass. 482, 497 (1995), S.C., 427 Mass. 603 (1998). 2. Factual background. Teacher salaries at Tantasqua are governed by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (agreement). The agreement states, in relevant part: “Initial salary levels of teachers new to the [school district] shall be set by the [superintendent in accordance with existing salary schedules.” The superintendent assigns each new teacher a level and year designation from the salary schedule set forth in an appendix to the agreement, which is based on a matrix reflecting educational achievement and years of experience. Level I covers one through three years of experience, Level II covers four through nine years of experience, and Level in covers ten and more years of experience. A teacher would progress through the levels in increments equal to the number of years taught. For example, the designation “Level I, Year 1” would signify that a teacher was in his or her first year of teaching, whereas the designation “Level II, Year 5” would signify that a teacher was in his or her fifth year of teaching. While an entry-level teacher could expect to reach the maximum salary category of “Level III” in ten years, a new teacher who began at a higher level (due to prior experience) could expect to reach the maximum salary category sooner, depending on the level and year designation assigned by the superintendent. In June, 1993, Silvestris applied for a newly created position at Tantasqua as an allied health teacher in the technical division. The job was designed to prepare students for careers in nursing. Silvestris had experience in this field prior to applying for the Tantasqua position. In 1972, she received an associate’s degree in nursing from Springfield Technical Community College, passed the State licensing examination, and became a registered nurse. For the next six years, Silvestris worked as a nurse at Holyoke Hospital and provided instruction to student nurses. In 1980, she took a position with the Westover Job Corps, where she taught students in the nursing assistants program and coordinated job-related training for students already under the direction of employers. In 1986, Silvestris began a new job at Holyoke Community College as a job developer, working with business leaders to establish employment opportunities for business, computer science, and secretarial science students. Silvestris remained at Holyoke Community College for two years. During this same time period, she attended Westfield State College, from which she received a bachelor of science degree in occupational education in 1991. Silvestris also obtained a vocational teaching certificate in the field of allied health. After interviewing for the position at Tantasqua in June, 1993, with the director of its technical division, Silvestris met with the superintendent, David Roach, to discuss her educational background, her prior work experience, and her salary. According to Silvestris, the superintendent said that she would receive credit for her teaching time at the Westover Job Corps because it involved the nursing assistants program and because the students there were generally the same age as high school students. However, she would not get credit for her time at Holyoke Community College because that was postsecondary experience. Further, according to Silvestris, the superintendent told her that the school district did not give credit for prior work experience “in the trade.” On July 19, 1993, the superintendent notified Silvestris that she would be hired for the 1993-1994 school year, that she would be placed in the “vocational certificate plus bachelor’s degree” education category, and that her starting salary would be established at “Level n, Year 6.” This meant that she was given credit for five years of experience. Silvestris accepted a contract with the school district. At the time she was hired, there were six male teachers and no female teachers in the technical division, and she had the highest starting salary of any teacher who had been hired for the technical division to that point in time. Silvestris’s ongoing job responsibilities were essentially the same as those of her male colleagues, although she was charged initially with the task of developing the allied health program for the freshmen and sophomore classes and securing its certification by the Department of Public Health and the Department of Education. In 1997, Silvestris reached “Level III” status, the highest classification, and she has remained in that salary category. In June, 1995, Goncalves applied for a position at Tantasqua as an allied health teacher in the technical division. Like Silvestris, she had experience in the field of nursing prior to applying for this position. In 1975, she received a bachelor of science degree in nursing from Fitchburg State College, passed the State licensing examination, and became a registered nurse. For the next four years, Goncalves worked as a nurse at Ludlow Hospital. In 1979, she took a position as a registered nurse at Mercy Hospital in Springfield where she provided direct patient care and supervised nursing students. In 1984, Goncalves began a new job working as a nurse in a private medical office. She left private practice in 1994 and joined the staff of the Hampden County house of correction, where her duties included providing patient care and performing health screenings for newly admitted inmates. In addition, Goncalves taught, for one year, at the Lower Pioneer Valley Educational Collaborative, where she prepared students for certification as nursing assistants and home health aides. Goncalves also obtained a vocational teaching certificate in the field of nursing. After interviewing for the position at Tantasqua with both the outgoing and incoming directors of its technical division, Goncalves met with the superintendent, Rosemary Joseph, to discuss her educational background, her prior work experience, and her salary. According to Goncalves, the superintendent initially told her that she would not be given credit for her prior work experience and, therefore, would be offered a salary commensurate with that of an entry-level teacher. Goncalves did not accept this offer. Subsequently, the outgoing technical director notified Goncalves that she would be hired for the 1995-1996 school year, that she would be placed in the “bachelor’s degree” education category, and that her starting salary would be established at “Level n, Year 4.” This meant that she was given credit for three years of experience. Goncalves accepted a contract with the school district. At the time Goncalves was hired, Silvestris was the only other female teacher in the technical division. Goncalves’s ongoing job responsibilities were essentially the same as those of her male colleagues, although she initially was charged with the task of developing the new allied health program for the junior and senior classes and securing its certification by the Department of Public Health and the Department of Education. In 2001, Goncalves reached “Level III” status, and she has remained in that salary category. In August, 1998, the school district hired Gary Manuel as a technology teacher at Tantasqua for the 1998-1999 school year. He had four years of prior teaching experience at a public middle school and eighteen years of work experience as a general contractor. Manuel was placed in the “master’s degree plus 30” education category, and his starting salary was established at “Level II, Year 8.” Around this time, the plaintiffs spoke with their male colleagues in the technical division, including Manuel, about whether their years of trade experience had been credited toward teaching experience, thereby enabling them to start at higher salaries. Based on these conversations, the plaintiffs came to believe that, when they were hired, they were started at lower salary levels than male colleagues with purportedly comparable backgrounds. Consequently, on September 22, 1998, the plaintiffs wrote a letter to the president of the Tantasqua Teachers’ Association (association) expressing their concern that they had been subjected to sexual discrimination when their initial pay grades were established. In particular, they asserted that when they were hired, there was no mention of their prior work experience counting toward teaching experience. After receiving the September 22, 1998, letter, the association scheduled a “Level Two” grievance hearing with the superintendent, the purpose of which was to hear the plaintiffs’ complaint and their proposed remedy. At this point, the plaintiffs did not know the starting salaries of the other teachers in the technical division, their levels of educational achievement, or their prior work experience. The grievance hearing was held in November, 1998, and was attended by the plaintiffs, a representative from the association, a representative from the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the superintendent, and the school district’s legal counsel. According to the superintendent, the plaintiffs declined to proceed with the hearing when they learned of the presence of the school district’s legal counsel. The association subsequently requested from the superintendent, on several occasions, the personnel records of all of the teachers in the school district. In May, 1999, the plaintiffs received a document listing the names of nine teachers in the technical division (including themselves), their degree statuses, their positions, their dates of hire, their level and year designations, and their starting salaries. Once they had this specific information, the plaintiffs commenced the present actions. 3. Statute of limitations. The school district first contends that the judge erred in failing to conclude that the plaintiffs’ MEPA claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. It asserts that the plaintiffs were required to file their complaints with the MCAD within six months of the alleged discriminatory act. See G. L. c. 15IB, § 5. However, the plaintiffs did not file their charges with the MCAD until July 14, 1999, which, according to the school district, was too late. The school district further contends that the judge erred in determining that the trigger for the statute of limitations was April, 1999, when the plaintiffs’ suspicions of discrimination were confirmed by documentary evidence as to the starting salaries of teachers in the technical division. Relying on Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521 (2001), the school district asserts that the trigger for the statute of limitations should have been the date that the plaintiffs were aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of the alleged discriminatory action. In the school district’s opinion, the plaintiffs knew of their claims in September, 1998, when they spoke to their male colleagues about their starting salaries and, then, when they wrote a letter to the association expressing their concerns. Thus, the school district argues that it was in September, 1998, that the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiffs’ claims, and their charges should have been filed with the MCAD by March, 1999. The plaintiffs agree with the school district, as do we, that the governing statute of limitations was six months. When they filed their charges with the MCAD, the plaintiffs alleged that the school district had discriminated against them in violation of both G. L. c. 151B and G. L. c. 149, § 105A, by failing to pay them in a manner that was comparable to their male colleagues. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims fell within the purview of the statute of limitations set forth in c. 151B. General Laws c. 151B, § 5, requires that a complaint alleging wrongful conduct be filed with the MCAD within six months after the alleged act of discrimination. See Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., supra at 531; School Comm. of Brockton v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 423 Mass. 7, 10 (1996); Jancey v. School Comm. of Everett, 421 Mass. 482, 497-498 (1995). The filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the MCAD is a prerequisite to the filing of such an action in the Superior Court. See Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., supra at 531 n.11; Andrews v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 1021 (1996); Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583-584 (1
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