WEISHUHN v. CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF LANSING
Case Details
- Citation
- 279 Mich. App. 150
- Judge(s)
- Before: ZAHRA, EJ., and WHITBECK and Beckering, JJ.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
- Circuit
- 6th Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's order denying summary disposition and remanded the case for determination of whether plaintiff was a ministerial employee, whose employment claims would be barred by the ministerial exception under the First Amendment.
Excerpt
WEISHUHN v CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF LANSING Docket No. 273117. Submitted April 1, 2008, at Detroit. Decided May 22, 2008, at 9:05 a.m. Madeline Weishuhn brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court against the Catholic Diocese of Lansing and St. Mary’s Catholic Church, alleging violations of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., in connection with the termination of her employment at St. Mary’s, where she had taught mathematics and religion classes and performed other duties. The court, Archie L. Hayman, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition of the claim asserting violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition of the claim alleging retaliatory termination under the Civil Rights Act. The defendants appealed by leave granted from the denial of the motion regarding the claim under the Civil Rights Act. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The ministerial exception, which precludes subject-matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, exists in Michigan. The ministerial exception has its roots in the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The exception bars discrimination claims where religious employers employ or have employed plaintiffs with religious positions. Application of the exception is not inherently complex. It requires courts to determine only whether the resolution of a plaintiffs claim would limit a religious institution’s right to choose who will perform particular spiritual functions. The exception does not apply to all employment decisions by religious institutions nor does it apply to all claims by ministers. 2. The trial court erred in holding that the motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4) for summary disposition of the claim under the Civil Rights Act, which asserted that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim because of the application of the ministerial exception, might create a question of fact for the jury. A determination that there is no genuine issue of material fact can play a part in ruling on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and this may involve an evaluation of the factual elements of the case. However, this evaluation is for the trial court, not the jury, to make. 3. In determining whether the ministerial exception applies, courts must first determine whether the employer is a religious institution and next determine whether the employee is a ministerial employee. There is no question here that St. Mary’s is a religious institution. The order denying the motion for summary disposition of the claim under the Civil Rights Act must be vacated and the matter must be remanded for a determination by the trial court whether the plaintiff was a ministerial employee. The claim must be dismissed if it is determined that the plaintiff was a ministerial employee, and proceedings as necessary for a trial must be scheduled if it is determined that the plaintiff was not a ministerial employee. Vacated and remanded. 1. Constitutional Law — Ministerial Exception — Establishment of Religion — Free Exercise of Religion. Michigan allows the application of the ministerial exception, which precludes subject-matter jurisdiction by a court over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees where the resolution of the employee’s claim would limit the religious institution’s right to choose who will perform particular spiritual functions; however, the exception does not apply to all employment decisions by religious institutions or all claims by ministers. 2. Motions and Orders — Subject-Matter Jurisdiction — Issues of Material Fact. A determination that there is no genuine issue of material fact may play a part in a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition that alleges that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter; the determination regarding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact is for the trial court, not the jury, in regard to the motion for summary disposition (MCR 2.116[C][4]). Law Offices of Julie A. Gafkay, PLC (by Julie A. Gafkay and Sandra D. Hanshaw), and Joliat, Tosto, McCormick & Bade, PLC (by Michael T Joliat), for the plaintiff. Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, EC. (by Thomas R. Meagher and Stephen J. Rhodes), for the defendants. Before: ZAHRA, EJ., and WHITBECK and Beckering, JJ. Per Curiam. Defendants Catholic Diocese of Lansing (the Diocese) and St. Mary’s Catholic Church (St. Mary’s) appeal by leave granted the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition in this Civil Rights Act retaliatory-termination case. We vacate and remand for further proceedings. I. OVERVIEW This case involves the “ministerial exception.” The ministerial exception is a nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled exception to the application of employment-discrimination and civil rights statutes to religious institutions and their “ministerial” employees. The ministerial exception has its roots in the Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the First Amendment and generally bars inquiry into a religious institution’s underlying motivation for a contested employment decision. We first conclude that the ministerial exception exists in Michigan. We next conclude that the trial court erred when it concluded that the motion before it— which sought summary disposition of plaintiff Madeline Weishuhn’s retaliatory-termination claim on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter because of the ministerial exception— might create a question for the jury. We therefore remand to the trial court for an analysis of, and conclusions regarding, whether Weishuhn was a “ministerial” employee. We direct the trial court, in undertaking that analysis and reaching those conclusions, to focus on the totality of Weishuhn’s duties and responsibilities, her position, and her function. II. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. WEISHUHN’S BACKGROUND In 1992, Weishuhn obtained her Bachelor of Science degree in elementary education from the University of Michigan. For more than 10 years, until 1999, Weishuhn worked for St. Charles and Helena Catholic Church in Clio, Michigan. She was that church’s director of religious education for its “parish religious education] program” for approximately eight years. In 2001, she obtained her master’s degree in teaching from Marygrove College. B. WEISHUHN’S EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES AT ST. MARY’S In August 1999, Weishuhn began teaching at St. Mary’s Elementary School in Mount Morris, Michigan. Weishuhn taught mathematics for the fifth through the eighth grades and carried out religious responsibilities that included teaching religion for the sixth through the eighth grades. Initially, Weishuhn taught two mathematics classes and four religion classes each day, but she later taught four mathematics classes and three religion classes each day. And in her final year at St. Mary’s (2004-2005), she taught four mathematics classes and two religion classes each day. At her deposition, Weishuhn explained that her religious-education duties entailed teaching sixth-, seventh-, and eighth-grade religion classes. She was also responsible for planning Masses for those grades, as well as assisting a fourth-grade teacher with student liturgies. Weishuhn and the St. Mary’s pastor discussed the subject matter of the Masses. Weishuhn also prepared her seventh- and eighth-grade students for the sacrament of confirmation, and she developed reconciliation (penance) services twice a year. At her deposition, Weishuhn agreed that her responsibilities were ministerial in the sense that she provided religious direction for her students. She also testified that religion was an integral part of the school’s curriculum and her lesson plan. C. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW After a series of employment-related incidents, none of which involved the subject of religion, St. Mary’s terminated Weishuhn’s employment in the spring of 2005. Weishuhn later filed a two-count complaint against defendants, alleging violations of the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act and the Civil Rights Act for retaliatory termination. Defendants then moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), asserting that both of Weishuhn’s claims failed as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim, but it denied the motion with respect to the retaliation claim under the Civil Rights Act. In June 2006, defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Weishuhn’s employment-discrimination claim because of the ministerial exception. Defendants asserted that “[bjecause [Weishuhn’s] duties while employed by St. Mary’s School included a ‘spiritual function,’ the First Amendment of the United States Constitution preeludes application of the Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act... to [her] employment relationship with St. Mary’s School.” The trial court denied defendants’ motion, ruling that there was a question of fact for the jury in terms of whether Weishuhn’s primary function was spiritual in nature. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court noted that the caselaw cited by the parties used the word “primary.” The trial court also acknowledged that there appeared to be some overlap between Weishuhn’s duties in terms of secular and spiritual teaching, and opined that “this is a case that maybe could create some new law in this area, at least maybe get some clarification as to whether or not there needs to be an analysis by the court with respect to this primary or secondary purpose.” The trial court gave effect to its ruling in a subsequent written order. The trial court also denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration of this matter. Defendants now appeal. III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). “When viewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact.” This Court also reviews constitutional issues de novo on appeal. B. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT As noted above, Weishuhn alleged a violation of the Civil Rights Act. One purpose of that act is “to eradicate particular forms of discrimination in the workplace.” The act provides in pertinent part that “a person shall not... [Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act.” C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof!.]” The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. “[T]he state and federal provisions of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution!] are subject to similar interpretation.” The Establishment Clause guarantees governmental neutrality with respect to religion and guards against excessive governmental entanglement with religion. And the Free Exercise Clause generally prohibits governmental regulation of religious beliefs. D. THE CONTOURS OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION The ministerial exception has its roots in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom and, generally, it “bars any inquiry into a religious organization’s underlying motivation for [a] contested employment decision.” More specifically, the ministerial exception “precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees[.]” Federal courts have held that the ministerial exception bars employment-discrimination claims under the federal Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and common-law claims. Courts applying the ministerial exception to employment-discrimination claims base such application on a religious “institution’s constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of... employees.” And one state supreme court has described the ministerial exception as a “nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled” exception to federal civil rights laws. We note that “[w]ith respect to questions of federal law, this Court is not bound by precedent from federal courts except the United States Supreme Court.” “However, where the United States Supreme Court has not resolved an issue, a state court may choose among conflicting lower federal court decisions... to adopt the rule it determines to be most appropriate.” And, in applying the ministerial exception to state civil rights laws, one state appellate court has noted that “there is ... no reason why an exemption carved by the courts from federal civil rights laws should not also apply to their state analogs.” However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that “[t]he ministerial exception does not insulate wholesale the religious employer from the operation of federal anti-discrimination statutes.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that the ministerial exception “requires federal courts to determine only whether the resolution of the plaintiffs claim would limit a church’s right to choose who will perform particular spiritual functions.” The Third Circuit then continued as follows: [W]e agree with the implied findings of our sister circuits that Congress would prefer a tailored exception to Title VII than a complete invalidation of the statute. Finally, our remedy is limited: It does not apply to all employment decisions by religious institutions, nor does it apply to all claims by ministers. It applies only to claims involving a religious institution’s choice as to who will perform spiritual functions.[] Therefore, “[w]hile the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, its contours are not unlimited and its application in a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.” As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has succinctly stated, the ministerial exception applies when (1) the employer is a religious institution, and (2) the employee is a ministerial employee. When the employer’s “ ‘mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics,’ ” this satisfies the first prong. Thus, courts have held that “religiously affiliated schools, corporations, and hospitals . . . come within the meaning of a ‘religious institution’ ” for purposes of the ministerial exception. Under the second prong, the scope of the ministerial exception depends on the individual’s position. The Sixth Circuit previously “applied the ministerial exception only to ordained ministers”; however, it later extended the exception to a nonordained plaintiff who fulfilled a pastoral role in a hospital. Therefore, rather than focusing on the fact of ordination, the function of an individual’s employment position has generally been dispositive of the question whether that position was “ministerial.” Accordingly, the ministerial exception applies when “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship ... ,” Under those circumstances, the employee is considered clergy. Indeed, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut stressed the primacy of the employee’s religious duties and responsibilities: Courts are required to examine the duties and responsibilities of the particular employee and examine whether they are ministerial or secular in nature. It is only when the Court concludes that the employee had primarily religious duties and responsibilities that the employment decision made by the religiously-affiliated institution is barred from review by the Free Exercise Clause.[] In McClure v Salvation Army, the plaintiff commenced an action alleging retaliation by the defendant Salvation Army after the plaintiff initiated a gender-discrimination claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first stated that the Salvation Army was a church and that the plaintiff, as a denominated officer, was one of the Salvation Army’s clergy. The court then concluded that the First Amendment exempted the Salvation Army from federal civil rights laws under the circumstances, because its “ministers” were “the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.” Other jurisdictions have consistently applied the ministerial exception in cases where the plaintiffs’ positions were inherently or exclusively religious, as in the case of clergy members and the like. Additionally, courts have applied the ministerial exception to cases where the plaintiffs’ functions were essentially liturgical, that is, related to worship. Yet other courts have also applied the ministerial exception to cases where the plaintiffs’ functions were inextricably intertwined with a religious institution’s doctrine and where the plaintiffs’ positions entailed proselytizing on the defendant church’s behalf. But foreign jurisdictions have not extended the ministerial exception to cases where the plaintiffs’ positions have no connection with the religious institution’s doctrinal mission. E. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND THE TEACHING FUNCTIONS (1) CASES APPLYING FIRST AMENDMENT RATIONALE We first note that there are cases in which courts have concluded that the ministerial exception applied to teachers, but then disposed of those cases on a broader First Amendment rationale. For example, in Stately v Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc, although the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found that the plaintiff filled a ministerial position, it ultimately concluded that her claim must fail under Establishment Clause grounds because her claim “would result in excessive entanglement both procedurally and substantively.” Similarly, in Curay-Cramer v Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware concluded that the ministerial exception applied to the plaintiff, who taught English and religion classes, but ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs case on application of the Free Exercise Clause. And in Powell v Stafford, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado also concluded that the ministerial exception applied to a theology teacher at a Catholic high school but, instead of barring the plaintiffs claim on the basis of the ministerial exception, the court then provided an analysis under the Free Exercise Clause, concluding that “the balance of values does not favor the government’s interference with the [defendant’s] decision as to the appropriate individual to teach its theology” classes. (2) CASES CONSTRUING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION However, there are a number of cases in which the courts have directly applied the ministerial exception to teachers. For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm v Catholic Univ of America, it was clear that the ministerial exception applied to a nun teaching canon law. And the Fourth Circuit has applied the ministerial exception to a director of music ministry and part-time musi
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