BRIGHTWELL v. FIFTH THIRD BANK OF MICHIGAN; CHAMPION v. FIFTH THIRD BANK OF MICHIGAN
Case Details
- Citation
- 487 Mich. 151
- Judge(s)
- CAVANAGH, MARKMAN, and HATHAWAY, JJ., concurred with Kelly, C.J.; Corrigan, J., concurred with Young, J.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that venue for employment discrimination claims under the Civil Rights Act is proper in the county where the employee worked and the employment relationship was severed, not solely where the discriminatory decision was made. The cases were remanded to Wayne County Circuit Court for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' underlying discrimination claims.
Excerpt
BRIGHTWELL v FIFTH THIRD BANK OF MICHIGAN CHAMPION v FIFTH THIRD BANK OF MICHIGAN Docket Nos. 138920 and 138921. Argued January 12,2010 (Calendar No. 5). Decided July 30, 2010. Brandon Brightwell brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Fifth Third Bank of Michigan, alleging that it had terminated his employment in violation of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. Brightwell worked in Wayne County. Citing MCL 37.2801, the CRA venue statute, defendant moved for a change of venue to Oakland County, where defendant made the decision to terminate Brightwell’s employment. The court, Prentis Edwards, J., denied the motion, and defendant sought leave to appeal. Sharon Champion brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Fifth Third Bank of Michigan, alleging that it had terminated her employment in violation of the CRA. Champion worked in Wayne County. Again citing MCL 37.2801, defendant moved for a change of venue to Oakland County, where it had made the decision to terminate Champion’s employment. The court, Warfield Moore, Jr., J., denied the motion, and defendant sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s applications and consolidated the appeals. In three separate unpublished opinions, issued April 9, 2009 (Docket Nos. 280820 and 281005), the Court of Appeals, Bandstra, J. (Talbot, PJ., concurring and Gleicher, J., dissenting), reversed, concluding that venue was proper only in Oakland County, where defendant made the decisions to terminate plaintiffs’ employment. In reaching this conclusion, the lead opinion and the concurrence relied on Barnes v Int’l Business Machines Corp, 212 Mich App 223 (1995). The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ applications for leave to appeal. 485 Mich 902 (2009). In an opinion by Chief Justice Kelly, joined by Justices Cavanagh, Markman, and Hathaway, the Supreme Court held-. For purposes of venue under MCL 37.2801(2), a violation of the CRA in the employment context occurs when the discriminatory decision is made and the adverse employment actions are implemented. The CRA violation in a case alleging discharge from employment is the severance of the employment relationship. The decisions and actions constituting that violation are implemented when the employee is no longer entitled to enter the workplace and perform the responsibilities of employment. 1. MCL 37.2801(2) provides that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the CRA may bring the action in the circuit court of the county where the alleged violation occurred or the county where the defendant resides or has its principal place of business. 2. Plaintiffs alleged violations of MCL 37.2202(1), which in part prohibits employers from taking various adverse employment actions because of the employee’s religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. A violation of that statute, therefore, is equally dependent on an adverse employment action (in these cases the act of discharging from employment) and an improper motive for taking that action (a decision to discriminate because of a protected status). Thus, a violation of the CRA occurs when the discriminatory decision is made and adverse employment actions are implemented. Barnes is overruled to the extent that it held otherwise. 3. The adverse employment actions in these cases occurred where plaintiffs’ places of employment were located. Plaintiffs worked in Wayne County, and defendant’s allegedly unlawful actions in severing their employment relationships precluded plaintiffs from continuing to do so. Each plaintiffs employment relationship with defendant was based and severed in Wayne Couniy. Thus, the CRA violations occurred in Wayne County and venue was proper there. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the trial courts should have granted defendant’s motions for a change of venue. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on plaintiffs’ claims. Justice Young, joined by Justice Corrigan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority that venue is proper under the CRA in the places where the allegedly discriminatory decision was made and implemented, but dissented from the majority’s analysis regarding when the implementation occurs. A CRA violation occurs with the convergence of a prohibited act and a discriminatory intent, and a violation only occurs when an improper discriminatory intent is actually communicated within the context of the adverse employment action. Once an adverse employment action is actually communicated, a CRA violation has occurred and the plaintiffs claim becomes actionable, making venue proper only in those place(s) where the violation (the convergence of the act and the intent) occurred. The communication of the discriminatory decision does not cause some future CRA violation, one that only occurs when the employee is actually prevented from returning to work or performing that work. The time when a person is fired is inextricably linked to the places where the person is fired, given that the locations at the time the discharge occurs establish venue in those places. Further, the place where an employee physically works does not automatically establish an independently proper venue when a CRA violation does not occur there. Justice Weaver, dissenting, would not have granted leave to appeal in this case because she was not persuaded that the Court of Appeals erred and because there was no material injustice. Civil Rights — Employment Discrimination — Venue—Adverse Employment Actions. A plaintiff may bring an action alleging a violation of the Civil Rights Act in the circuit court of the county where the alleged violation occurred; a violation in the employment context occurs when the discriminatory decision is made and the adverse employment actions are implemented; the violation of the act in a case alleging discharge from employment is the severance of the employment relationship, and the decisions and actions constituting that violation are implemented, and thus occur, when the employee is no longer entitled to enter the workplace and perform the responsibilities of employment (MCL 37.2202[1], 37.2801[2]). Thomas E. Marshall, EC. (by Thomas E. Marshall), for Brandon Brightwell and Sharon Champion. Butzel Long (by Daniel B. Tukel and Michael E Smith) for Fifth Third Bank of Michigan. Amici Curiae: EardleyLaw Offices, EC. (by Eugenie B. Eardley), for the Michigan Association for Justice. Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (by Matthew T. Nelson, Gregory M. Kilby, and Amanda M. Fielder) for Michigan Trial Defense Counsel, Inc. KELLY, C.J. In these consolidated cases, we must determine the proper interpretation of the venue statute in the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Specifically, we are asked to decide whether venue was proper in Wayne County under MCL 37.2801(2). Plaintiffs filed their suits in Wayne County, alleging that defendant terminated their employment in violation of the CRA. The Court of Appeals, relying on its decision in Barnes v Int’l Business Machines Corp, concluded that venue was proper only in Oakland County, where defendant made the decisions to terminate plaintiffs’ employment. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts’ orders denying defendant’s motions to change venue to Oakland County. We disagree with the Barnes decision and overrule it. In the cases before us, part of the alleged discrimination occurred in Wayne County, where plaintiffs worked and where the allegedly discriminatory actions were implemented. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand these cases to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings on plaintiffs’ claims. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs are African-Americans formerly employed by defendant. They worked for defendant at banking centers in Wayne County. On or around May 17, 2007, defendant terminated their employment for alleged misconduct. Plaintiff Sharon Champion learned of her dismissal through a telephone call from defendant’s office in Oakland County to her home in Wayne County. The parties dispute where plaintiff Brandon Brightwell received notice of his dismissal. Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in Wayne County, each alleging that defendant had terminated their employment for reasons of racial discrimination in violation of the CRA. Defendant moved in both lawsuits to change venue to Oakland County. It supported the motions with an affidavit from Michael Andrzejewski, an employee relations consultant who worked in defendant’s Southfield regional office in Oakland County. Andrzejewksi averred in his affidavit that he was personally involved in the final decisions to terminate plaintiffs’ employment and that those decisions were made in the Southfield regional office. Defendant claimed that because it made the decisions in Oakland County, venue was proper only there. Both trial courts declined to change venue. Defendant sought interlocutory appeals in both cases. The Court of Appeals granted both applications for leave to appeal, consolidated the appeals, and reversed the trial courts’ rulings in a divided decision. Relying on Barnes, the lead opinion concluded that “the appropriate venue for a CRA cause of action. .. depends on where the defendant’s violation occurred, not where the plaintiff was injured.” It noted that “[t]his Court has held that the alleged violation of the CRA is the action which gives rise to liability under the act, i.e., the corporate decision affecting the plaintiffs employment.” The Court of Appeals concurrence agreed that “venue is appropriate where the CRA was violated through the use of improper characteristics in making an employment decision.” It criticized the dissenting opinion’s discussion of the statutory tort venue provision, MCL 600.1629, as interpreted in our decision in Dimmitt & Owens Fin, Inc v Deloitte & Touche (ISC), LLC. The Court of Appeals dissent argued that the employment decisions constituted only a “potential violation” of the CRA and that it was the actual discharges that constituted the adverse employment actions. The dissent would have held that venue was proper in Wayne County. Plaintiffs sought review in this Court, and we granted their applications for leave to appeal. ANALYSIS An appellate court uses the clearly erroneous standard to review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to change venue. Statutory interpretation involves questions of law that are reviewed de novo. The relevant statutory provision, MCL 37.2801, provides in part: (1) A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both. (2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business. As always, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. These cases involve only the first clause of subsection (2), which makes venue proper “in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred.” In Barnes, the Court of Appeals held, without citation or analysis, that the “violations alleged are adverse employment decisions” and that “the place of corporate decision making is an appropriate venue.” Judge WHITE concurred separately, opining that “[discrimination also ‘occurs’ in the county where the decision is implemented and the discrimination is inflicted.” She rejected the majority’s implication that “venue of a civil rights action is proper only in the county where the discriminatory decision is made.” The question of where venue properly lies for a lawsuit brought under the CRA turns on the meaning of the phrase “where the alleged violation occurred” found in MCL 37.2801(2). “Violation” is defined in part as “1. the act of violating or the state of being violated. 2. a breach or infringement, as of a law or promise.” Plaintiffs alleged that defendant violated MCL 37.2202(1), which provides in part: An employer shall not do any of the following: (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. A “violation” of MCL 37.2202, therefore, is equally dependent on an adverse employment action (in these cases the act of “discharging]”) and an improper motive for taking that action (a decision to discriminate “because of” a protected status). We believe it logically follows that a violation of the CRA “occur[s]” when the discriminatory decision is made and adverse employment actions are implemented. Thus, we agree with Judge White’s concurrence in Barnes, which is also consistent with other courts’ interpretations of similar venue provisions. The majority in Barnes erred by restricting what constitutes a violation of the CRA to “adverse employment decisions.” Relying heavily on Barnes, the Court of Appeals lead and concurring opinions here reached the same erroneous conclusion. We overrule Barnes because it restricted the analysis of a violation of the CRA to the adverse employment decision. Barnes is inconsistent with MCL 37.2202(l)(a) and the meaning of “violation” and “occurred” in MCL 37.2801. However, this determination does not fully resolve the issue before us. A remaining question is: What specific actions constitute the unlawful discharge that establishes the CRA violation? Venue in these cases was clearly proper in Oakland County because it is undisputed that defendant resides in Oakland County. However, plaintiffs filed suit in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial courts erred by denying defendant’s motions to change venue to Oakland County because venue did not properly lie in Wayne County. Therefore, we must determine whether a CRA violation occurred in Wayne County that would provide a basis for venue in that location as well. Defendant asserts that, even if Barnes is overruled, venue is proper only in Oakland County because that is where defendant completed several actions necessary to effectuate each plaintiffs discharge. For example, it removed plaintiffs from its payroll system at its Oakland County office. Plaintiffs counter that the only action that was relevant was the communication of the discharge decisions to them. We reject both parties’ arguments. It would be arbitrary to consider any of the suggested actions entirely dispositive of where the CRA violation occurred. Discrimination claims often involve numerous actions concerning employers’ practices. Moreover, often it is unclear where the actions occurred that the parties claim are dispositive. Indeed, these cases provide a good illustration of the problem. If the location where the employment decision was communicated to a plaintiff is solely dispositive, a court must still determine where that decision was “communicated.” Finally, under this approach, defendants could unilaterally control venue by completing administrative tasks related to terminating a plaintiffs employment in their choice of locales. Or they could order an employee to report to a location in the venue they desire and fire the employee there. We believe these are not results that the Legislature intended in enacting the CRA. We conclude that the adverse employment actions in these cases occurred where plaintiffs’ place of employment was located. That is where most relevant actions involving the employer-employee relationship occur. Moreover, it is the severing of the employment relationship that is the truly adverse employment action. This action happens when the employee is no longer entitled to enter his or her place of work and perform the responsibilities of employment. As Judge WHITE observed, it is also at this point that the allegedly unlawful discharge is fully “implemented and the discrimination is inflicted.” Applying that logic to these cases, we note that plaintiffs worked in Wayne County. Because defendant’s allegedly unlawful actions precluded plaintiffs from continuing to do so, the CRA violations occurred in Wayne County. The concurrence/dissent erroneously limits the occurrence of a violation solely to the place where a discriminatory decision is communicated to an employee. In doing so, it attaches too much significance to where the disclosure of the allegedly discriminatory discharge occurs. Indeed, the essence of the concurrence/dissent’s conclusion is found in its statement that “it can only be the actual communication, which itself implements a discriminatory decision, that amounts to the actual ‘discharge’ ... ,” Our reaction to this assertion is to ask: Why is this inherently so? The concurrence/dissent offers no persuasive analysis to support its conclusion that the CRA violation must occur where the discharge is communicated. The right being violated under the CRA is not the right to be free from communication of adverse employment actions. Rather, it is the right to be free from actions that actually separate the employee from gainful employment for discriminatory reasons. The justices joining the concurrence/dissent convey an incorrect interpretation of this opinion when they write “that scarcely one in a thousand people would believe that a person is not ‘discharged’ from employment at the moment an employer says to the employee: ‘You’re fired.’ ” In a world where snappy soundbites often distort the facts, this statement fits well and has face appeal. In truth, we justices do not disagree that “You’re fired” means “You are discharged from your employment.” Rather, this case addresses a quite different question, which is: If you are fired, in what location are you entitled to bring suit? It is true that the actus reus and the mens rea of a CRA violation converge when a defendant communicates a discriminatory decision to an employee. But while that convergence causes the CRA violation, it does not settle the issue of what constitutes discharging the employee: the communication of the discriminatory decision or removing the employee’s right to work at his or her place of employment. Decisions from other jurisdictions involving similar statutes have generally taken a more nuanced approach in evaluating where an employment discrimination violation occurs. Other jurisdictions have consistently analyzed similar statutory language as including “ ‘the place where the decisions and actions concerning the employment practices occurred.’ ” We believe that it is the severance of the employment relationship that constitutes the actual discharge, not the mere communication of an adverse employment decision. The concurrence/dissent’s definition of “discharge” provides greater support for our interpretation. To “relieve of obligation,” “deprive of. . . employment,” or “dismiss from service” involves many decisions and actions. One is the communication of the dismissal to the employee, which the concurrence/dissent concludes is the basis for a CRA violation. However, it is not the communication of the discharge that violates the CRA, it is the actual discharge of the employee from his or her employment. This act occurs where the employee works because the employer has discharged the employee by removing his or her ability to work in that location. The concurrence/dissent’s determination of when a CRA violation occurs leads it to assert that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius undermines our conclusion. However, this argument is premised on the concurrence/dissent’s erroneous construction of the term “discharge” and of the language “where the alleged violation occurred” in MCL 37.2801(2). S
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