LANDIN v. HEALTHSOURCE SAGINAW, INC
Case Details
- Citation
- 305 Mich. App. 519
- Judge(s)
- Before: JANSEN, EJ., and K. E KELLY and SERVITTO, JJ.; JANSEN, EJ., and K. F. Kelly, J., concurred with Servitto, J.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
- Circuit
- 6th Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
Plaintiff, a licensed practical nurse, prevailed at trial on a wrongful discharge claim based on public policy after reporting patient safety concerns. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of summary disposition, directed verdict, and post-trial motions, upholding the jury's verdict in plaintiff's favor.
Excerpt
LANDIN v HEALTHSOURCE SAGINAW, INC Docket No. 309258. Submitted February 4, 2014, at Detroit. Decided June 3, 2014, at 9:05 a.m. Leave to appeal sought. Roberto Landin, a licensed practical nurse, brought an action in the Saginaw Circuit Court against his former employer, Healthsource Saginaw, Inc., alleging wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy. Plaintiff claimed that his employment was terminated because he reported negligence by a coworker to a supervisor. He alleged that the coworker’s negligence had directly led to the death of a patient. The court, Janet M. Boes, J., denied defendant’s motions for summary disposition, holding that Michigan law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy exhibited by MCL 333.20176a(l)(a). The matter proceeded to trial and the jury reached a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appealed the denial of its motions for summary disposition, a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur. Defendant also alleged error with regard to the court’s rulings on several discovery and evidentiary issues. The Court of Appeals held: 1. Michigan law generally presumes that employment relationships are terminable at the will of either party. There is an exception to the at-will employment doctrine based on the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable. The three public policy exceptions that have been recognized entail an employee’s exercising a right guaranteed by law, executing a duty required by law, or refraining from violating the law. The three exceptions concern (1) explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty, (2) where the alleged reason for the discharge was the failure or refusal of the employee to violate a law in the course of employment, and (3) where the reason for the discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment. 2. Courts may only derive public policy from objective sources. 3. The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motions for summary disposition because the statutory basis for plaintiffs public policy claim, MCL 333.20176a, could support a public-policy-based wrongful discharge claim. 4. The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition that alleged that plaintiffs claim fell within the provisions of the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.362, and was subject to the exclusive remedies provided by that act. Because plaintiff did not allege a violation of the Public Health Code, the provision of the Public Health Code providing protection under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act for certain persons who report a violation of Article 17 of the Public Health Code or a rule promulgated under Article 17 was not applicable. 5. The trial court properly determined that a question of fact existed for the jury regarding whether there was a causal connection between plaintiffs protected activity and the termination of his employment. A question of fact existed regarding the reasons for the termination. 6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to return certain confidential medical records of nonparties. Given the circumstances, the court’s grant of a protective order and the redaction of patient names was appropriate. 7. The fact that front pay damages may be speculative should not exonerate a wrongdoer from liability. The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s claim that front pay damages should be disallowed as being unduly speculative. 8. The trial court appropriately submitted the issue of mitigation of damages to the jury The issue was one of fact for the jury to decide. 9. Because a question of fact existed on the issue, the trial court did not err by submitting to the jury the issue whether, regardless of what had transpired before plaintiffs discharge, defendant would have fired plaintiff in any event when it learned that he had removed and copied confidential patient records. 10. The trial court properly held that evidence concerning plaintiffs coworker’s actions, testimony from witnesses regarding the deceased patient’s medical records, and the argument by plaintiffs counsel regarding whether plaintiffs coworker should have been dismissed was relevant and admissible. Evidence of the coworker’s performance history was also relevant. 11. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain evidence offered by defendant that allegedly absolved the coworker. The trial court properly determined that the evidence was irrelevant. 12. The trial court did not err by admitting testimony that plaintiffs supervisor allegedly falsified documents. 13. Defendant, by expressing satisfaction with the jury instructions given by the trial court, waived any error resulting from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for an instruction concerning the measure of damages as it related to health insurance. 14. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. Defendant failed to establish that remittitur was warranted with respect to the award for emotional damages. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for remittitur. 15. The jury’s verdict regarding plaintiffs economic loss was not excessive and was supported by the evidence. 16. The jury’s verdict was not based on unfair and prejudicial evidence. Affirmed. Hurlburt, Tsiros & Allweil, PC (by Mandel I. All-weil), for plaintiff. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC (by Richard W. Warren and M. Misbah Shahid), for defendant. Before: JANSEN, EJ., and K. E KELLY and SERVITTO, JJ. SERVITTO, J. Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of its motions for summary disposition. Defendant also appeals the trial court’s rulings on several discovery and evidentiary issues and its denial of defendant’s motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur. We affirm. Plaintiff is a licensed practical nurse. He began working for defendant, a nonprofit community hospital, in March 2001 as an at-will employee and his employment was terminated in April 2006. Plaintiff asserts that he was terminated because he reported negligence by a coworker, which negligence he believed directly led to the death of a patient, to a supervisor. Plaintiff alleged that after he reported the believed negligence, he was retaliated against by defendant and the retaliation ultimately culminated in his termination. In his complaint against defendant, plaintiff alleged wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Defendant initially moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that plaintiffs public policy claim was preempted by § 2 of the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.362. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant later moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that plaintiff had identified no public policy on which his claim was grounded and that plaintiff could not and did not identify any law or policy under which his claim could survive. The trial court again denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The trial court did not initially identify any specific law or public policy that would support plaintiffs cause of action but, in an October 13, 2011, opinion and order, the trial court stated that it was holding, as matter of law, that “Michigan law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy exhibited by MCL 333.20176a(l)(a)....” Defendant thereafter filed a renewed emergency motion for summary disposition based primarily on its assertion that the statute cited by the trial court provided no basis for plaintiffs public policy claim. The trial court again denied the motion and the matter proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which the jury reached a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by failing to apply the proper analysis and law to defendant’s second and third motions for summary disposition and thereafter committed error requiring reversal by denying defendant’s motions. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 202; 731 NW2d 41 (2007). A motion under “MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be granted.” Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Summary disposition under subrule (C)(8) is appropriate “if no factual development could justify the plaintiffs claim for relief.” Id. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under (C)(10), a reviewing court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996); MCR 2.116(G)(5). If the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto, 451 Mich at 362-363. Michigan law generally presumes that employment relationships are terminable at the will of either party. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 163; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). There is, however, an exception to the at-will employment doctrine “based on the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable.” Suchodolski v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982). In Suchodolski, the plaintiff began working for Michigan Consolidated Gas Company in September 1972 as a senior auditor and was discharged in January 1976. He sued his former employer in 1978, stating various theories of recovery in a six-count complaint. Relevant to the instant action, the plaintiff alleged that during his employment he discovered and reported poor internal management of the defendant corporation, that he was fired for attempting to report and correct questionable management procedures, and that his firing was retaliatory and against the public policy of Michigan. Id. at 693-694. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant with regard to all six of the counts and the Court of Appeals affirmed with regard to five of the counts, including the count relevant to this action. Our Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of Appeals, opined that the only grounds that have been recognized as so violative of public policy that they serve as an exception to the general rule of at-will employment are: (1) explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty (e.g., the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2701; the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.362; the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1602), (2) where the alleged reason for the discharge was the failure or refusal of the employee to violate a law in the course of employment (e.g., refusal to falsify pollution reports; refusal to give false testimony before a legislative committee; refusal to participate in a price-fixing scheme), and (3) where the reason for the discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment (e.g., retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims). Suchodolski, 412 Mich at 695-696. The Supreme Court determined that the matter before it involved only a corporate management dispute and that the dispute lacked “the kind of violation of a clearly mandated public policy that would support an action for retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 696. “Our Supreme Court’s enumeration [in Suchodolski] of ‘public policies’ that might forbid termination of at-will employees was not phrased as if it was an exhaustive list.” Kimmelman v Heather Downs Mgt Ltd, 278 Mich App 569, 573; 753 NW2d 265 (2008). This does not mean, however, that trial courts have unfettered discretion or authority to determine what may constitute sound public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. As observed in Terrien v Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 66-67; 648 NW2d 602 (2002): In defining “public policy,” it is clear to us that this term must be more than a different nomenclature for describing the personal preferences of individual judges, for the proper exercise of the judicial power is to determine from objective legal sources what public policy is, and not to simply assert what such policy ought to be on the basis of the subjective views of individual judges. .. . In identifying the boundaries of public policy, we believe that the focus of the judiciary must ultimately be upon the policies that, in fact, have been adopted by the public through our various legal processes, and are reflected in our state and federal constitutions, our statutes, and the common law. See Twin City Pipe Line Co v Harding Glass Co, 283 US 353, 357; 51 S Ct 476; 75 L Ed 1112 (1931). The public policy of Michigan is not merely the equivalent of the personal preferences of a majority of this Court; rather, such a policy must ultimately be clearly rooted in the law. There is no other proper means of ascertaining what constitutes our public policy. Consistent with this observation, the Terrien Court noted that as a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts, id. at 67, and found instructive the United States Supreme Court’s mandate: “ ‘Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. As the term “public policy” is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereign to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy.’ ” Id. at 68, quoting Muschany v United States, 324 US 49, 66; 65 S Ct 442; 89 L Ed 744 (1945). Thus, courts may only derive public policy from objective sources. Kimmelman, 278 Mich App at 573. Notably, the three public policy exceptions recognized in Suchodolski entail an employee’s exercising a right guaranteed by law, executing a duty required by law, or refraining from violating the law. Id. These three recognized circumstances remain the only three recognized exceptions and the list of exceptions has not been expanded. While the Suchodolski Court’s enumeration of public policies that might forbid termination of at-will employees may not have been phrased as if it were an exhaustive list {id. at 573), our courts have yet to find a situation meriting extension beyond the three circumstances detailed in Suchodolski. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to apply Suchodolski. In denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court detailed the rule in Michigan concerning at-will employment and also stated that plaintiffs claim against defendant was based on an exception to the rule, as stated in Suchodolski. The trial court further explicitly stated the three specific exceptions set forth in Suchodolski, indicating its familiarity with and intention to evaluate the claims under such exceptions. The trial court noted that plaintiff relied on MCL 333.17201, MCL 600.2922, and MCL 750.321 as the statutory bases for his claim. Noting an unfortunate dearth of published binding caselaw on the precise issue “whether a termination of a medical professional’s employment violates public policy where the claimant can prove that the firing was in response to an internal complaint relative to concerns about patient safety,” the trial court then indicated that it was going to have to make its own “judgment call” and relied on out-of-state cases to conclude: “The life and health of hospital patients depend upon the skill and competency of the professional medical staff— physicians, registered nurses, and licensed practical nurses, like plaintiff Landin and Nurse Johnson. To hold that Landin has no claim against the Defendant, is in essence, to hold that no good deed shall go unpunished. That cannot be the law. The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.” The trial court did not, in fact, articulate whether plaintiffs claim fell under any of the specified exceptions of Suchodolski, nor did it initially identify any objective source from which to hold that plaintiff had a public policy claim, such as a particular statute (including any of those it cited as relied on by plaintiff). Because courts may only derive public policy from objective sources, Kimmelman, 278 Mich App at 573, and controlling law has as yet only identified three groups of public policy exceptions that serve as the basis for wrongful termination claims, the trial court erred by initially failing to apply controlling Michigan law and instead simply looking to cases outside our jurisdiction and to their factual similarity to justify its ruling. However, in an opinion issued only one month later, the trial court stated that it was holding, as matter of law, that “Michigan law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy exhibited by MCL 333.20176a(l)(a).” At that time, then, the trial court set forth an objective basis for plaintiffs public policy claim. While it still did not indicate which of the exceptions cited in Suchodolski that plaintiffs claim fell within, plaintiff has not alleged that the reason for his discharge was his failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment— exception (2) under Suchodolski. Thus, we presume that the trial court found plaintiffs claim “for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy exhibited by MCL 333.20176a(l)(a)” fell within exception (1) or (3). MCL 333.20176a concerns health facilities and agencies and provides, in part: (1) A health facility or agency shall not discharge or discipline, threaten to discharge or discipline, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee or an individual acting on behalf of the employee does either or both of the following: (a) In good faith reports or intends to report, verbally or in writing, the malpractice of a health professional or a violation of this article, article 7, article 8, or article 15 or a rule promulgated under this article, article 7, article 8, or article 15. In order to serve as a basis for plaintiffs complaint, plaintiff must establish that the above statute meets exception (1) in Suchodolski, in that it contains an explicit legislative statement prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty, or exception (3), when the reason for the discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by well-established legislative enactment. Suchodolski, 412 Mich at 695-696. As to exception (1), MCL 333.20176a contains an explicit legislative statement prohibiting discharge or discipline of an employee for specified conduct. It could also be argued that the specified conduct was that of acting in accordance with a statutory right or duty. Exception (1) has been found to apply to the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq. Su
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