ELEZOVIC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Case Details
- Citation
- 472 Mich. 408
- Judge(s)
- Corrigan, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Taylor, C.J.; Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
Michigan Supreme Court held that a supervisor may be individually liable under the Michigan Civil Rights Act for sexual harassment, overruling prior precedent, but affirmed the directed verdict against the employer (Ford) for lack of notice and against the supervisor on the underlying merits.
Excerpt
ELEZOVIC v FORD MOTOR COMPANY Docket No. 125166. Argued December 8, 2004 (Calendar No. 4). Decided June 1, 2005. Lula and Joseph Elezovic brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Ford Motor Company and Daniel R Bennett, seeking, under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.210 et seq., damages for alleged sexual harassment resulting from a hostile work environment. The plaintiffs alleged that Bennett, a supervisor at the Ford plant where Lula Elezovic (plaintiff) worked, exposed himself to the plaintiff, requested oral sex, and repeatedly engaged in other sexually offensive conduct. The court, Kathleen Macdonald, J., granted the defendants’ joint motion in limine to exclude evidence of Bennett’s prior criminal misdemeanor conviction of indecent exposure, which involved conduct that did not occur on Ford property and did not involve Ford employees. The court later granted directed verdicts in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, Jansen, EJ., and Neff, J. (Kelly, J., concurring), affirmed. 259 Mich App 187 (2003). The Court of Appeals held that it was bound to follow the decision in Jager v Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, 252 Mich App 464 (2002), that a supervisor engaging in activity prohibited by the CRA may not be held individually liable for violating a plaintiffs civil rights. The Court stated that, were it not bound by MCR 7.215(J)(1) to follow Jager, it would reach the opposite result. The Court also found that Ford did not have sufficient notice of the alleged harassment. The plaintiff appealed. 470 Mich 892 (2004). In an opinion by Chief Justice Taylor, joined by Justices Corrigan, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held: An agent of an employer may be held individually liable under the CRA. Ford did not have sufficient reasonable notice of the alleged harassment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case must be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings regarding Bennett. 1. The CRA defines an “employer” as a “person,” which is defined to include a corporation. The CRA also states that an “employer” includes an “agent of that person.” The Legislature, by including “agent” within the definition of “employer” did not intend to only provide vicarious liability for the agent’s employer, but also created individual liability for an employer’s agent. Bennett may be sued individually under the CRA. 2. Federal decisions construing Title VII of the federal civil rights act and holding that there is no individual liability under the federal act should not be followed because it would lead to a result contrary to the text of the CRA. The history of amendments of the CRA does not preclude a finding of individual liability on the part of an agent of an employer. 3. The fact that the plaintiff told two low-level supervisors, in confidence, that Bennett had exposed himself did not constitute reasonable notice to Ford. Letters sent to Ford by the plaintiffs psychologist and attorney mentioning “harassment” or “hostile environment” were insufficient to give Ford reasonable notice of sexual harassment, given the plaintiffs prior complaints against Bennett that were not sexual in nature. A reasonable employer would not, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, have been on notice of a substantial probability that sexual harassment was occurring. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding evidence of Bennett’s prior indecent exposure conviction. The conviction had been expunged before the trial in this matter and under MCL 780.623(5) the evidence was not admissible. The trial court did not err in holding that the prejudice to Ford that would result from the evidence would substantially outweigh any probative value it might have. 5. The opinion in Jager must be overruled. The part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the directed verdict in favor of Ford must be affirmed and the part of the judgment that affirmed the directed verdict in favor of Bennett must be reversed. The matter must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Bennett and consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelly, concurring in part and dissenting in part, dissented from the opinion of the majority with regard to the issues whether the CRA provides for individual liability against an agent of an employer and whether sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to decide whether Ford had notice of the alleged sexual harassment. The CRA does not provide for individual liability against an agent of an employer, and the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the notice issue. The majority reached the correct result in this case when it determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the alleged sexual harasser’s expunged indecent exposure conviction. Justice Weaver, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurred in the majority’s conclusions that the trial court’s ruling on the defendants’ motion in limine was not an abuse of discretion and that the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence of Bennett’s expunged conviction should be affirmed. She dissents, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the CBA provides for individual liability against an agent of an employer and from its conclusion that Ford was entitled to a directed verdict because the plaintiff failed to establish that Ford had notice of the sexual harassment. The Legislature included the word “agent” in the definition of “employer” to denote respondeat superior liability, not individual liability. The conclusion of the Cotut of Appeals that there is no individual liability under the act should be affirmed. The opinion in Jager v Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, should not be overruled. Considering all the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, there are factual questions about which reasonable jurors could differ regarding whether Ford had notice of the sexual harassment. Therefore, the directed verdict in favor of Ford with regard to the question of notice should be reversed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Civil Rights — Workplace Sexual Harassment — Supervisors. An agent of an employer may be held individually hable under the Civil Rights Act for sexually harassing an employee in the workplace (MCL 37.2101 et seq.). Mark Granzotto, EC. (by Mark Granzotto), and Edwards & Jennings, EC. (by Alice B. Jennings), for the plaintiff. Kienbaum Opperwall Hardy & Eelton, P.L.C. (by Elizabeth Hardy and Julia Turner Baumhart) {Patricia J. Boyle, of counsel), for the defendants. Amici Curiae: . Scheff & Washington, EC. (by George B. Washington and Miranda K.S. Massie), for Justine Maldonado, Milissa McClements, and Pamela Perez. Carol Hogan for Michigan Conference of the National Organization for Women. TAYLOR, C.J. At issue in this case is (1) whether the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA) provides a cause of action against an individual agent of an employer and (2) whether plaintiffs employer, Ford Motor Company, was entitled to a directed verdict in plaintiffs sexual harassment lawsuit against it. We hold that an agent may be individually sued under § 37.2202(1) (a) of the CRA. Thus, we overrule Jager v Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, 252 Mich App 464, 485; 652 NW2d 503 (2002), because it held to the contrary, and reverse the Court of Appeals judgment in favor of Daniel Bennett that followed Jager. We also hold, consistently with the lower courts, that Ford was entitled to a directed verdict. Thus, we affirm the trial court and Court of Appeals judgments in favor of Ford. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in November 1999 pursuant to the CRA against Ford Motor Company and Daniel Bennett, a supervisor at Ford’s Wixom assembly plant where she worked. As relevant here, her claim was that she had been sexually harassed as a result of a hostile work environment. The CRA allows such a lawsuit against an employer. Plaintiffs lawsuit named Bennett as an individual defendant consistently with the then-controlling case of Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785; 369 NW2d 223 (1985), which held that individual supervisors could be liable under the CRA. Regarding the specifics in her complaint, plaintiff alleged that, while she was on the job in the summer of 1995, Bennett exposed himself to her while masturbating and requested she perform oral sex. Further, she claimed that after that he repeatedly continued to harass her by grabbing, rubbing, and touching his groin and licking his lips and making sexually related comments. Before trial, defendants filed a joint motion in limine to exclude from evidence an unrelated, prior criminal misdemeanor conviction of Bennett for indecent exposure. Defendants pointed out that the incident did not occur on Ford property and involved non-Ford employees. Plaintiff, however, argued that the indecent exposure conviction was evidence of a scheme or plan Bennett had of exposing himself to women and that it provided notice to Ford that Bennett engaged in inappropriate sexual acts. The trial court ruled that the indecent exposure conviction was inadmissible with regard to Bennett under MRE 404(b)(1) because it was not offered for any purpose other than to show that he had a propensity to expose himself. The court also held it was inadmissible with regard to Ford pursuant to MRE 403 because any probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The case was tried before a jury for three weeks. Plaintiff testified consistently with the allegations in her complaint against Bennett. While it was uncontested that she had not filed a formal written complaint of sexual harassment pursuant to Ford’s anti-harassment policy, plaintiff attempted to establish that Ford was otherwise aware, or on notice, of the sexual harassment for several reasons. She claimed that she told two first-line supervisors (friends of hers who were under Bennett in the chain of command) that Bennett had exposed himself to her, but admitted that she had pledged them to secrecy. She also introduced two letters her psychologist had written to the Wixom plant physician, one indicating that in his view plaintiff was descending into mental illness “[d]ue to the harassment she perceived from Mr. Bennett” and a second stating that plaintiff continued “to feel uncomfortable with Dan Bennett.” These letters were offered with a third letter from the same psychologist to the Wixom plant manager regarding complaints against a different coworker in which it was said “there has been harassment going on for the past year and a half at her Wixom plant job.” Also introduced was testimony from an employee to a Ford Labor Relations Department representative to the effect that the employee would remain on medical leave until someone did something about the situation between plaintiff and Bennett. Finally, reference was made to a letter from plaintiffs attorney (her son-in-law) to the Ford Labor Relations Department in which he asserted he might take legal action “to insure that our client [plaintiff] is not subjected to working in a hostile environment.” At the close of plaintiffs proofs, defendants filed a joint motion for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff had not presented a prima facie case against them. Ford emphasized that plaintiff had not established that it had notice of the alleged sexual harassment by Bennett and, thus, it could not be held liable for any improper acts by him. The trial court took the joint motion under advisement, with defendants continuing to present their cases to the jury. Bennett testified that he had not sexually harassed the plaintiff and that her claims were false. Ford presented evidence showing that the only time plaintiff had ever filed a sexual harassment complaint was in 1991, involving a UAW committeeman, and that none of the several grievances and complaints plaintiff filed against Bennett had mentioned sexual harassment. Rather, with regard to Bennett, her complaints concerned having her shift changed from days to afternoons and disputes regarding overtime. She also filed a complaint alleging that a female coworker had physically threatened her. Upon the close of defendants’ proofs, the trial court granted directed verdicts to the defendants. The trial court held that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment with regard to either defendant and, in particular, found that Ford could not be liable because it had no notice of Bennett’s alleged harassment. Plaintiff, asserting that she had established a prima facie case against Bennett and Ford, appealed to the Court of Appeals. That Court, however, affirmed the orders of the trial court in a published opinion. In ruling for Bennett, the majority in Elezovic relied on the then-recent holding in Jager, supra at 485, that “a supervisor engaging in activity prohibited by the CRA may not be held individually liable for violating a plaintiffs civil rights.” The Jager Court had reached its conclusion by relying largely on federal court holdings that under Title VII of the federal civil rights act, the federal analogue to our CRA, there is no individual liability. While it was obligatory that the majority, in Elezovic follow Jager pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1), the majority indicated at the same time that, but for that court rule, it would have reached the opposite result. It was the majority’s view that Jager was wrongly decided simply because it was not consistent with the actual language of our CRA, which it concluded made agents individually liable. Moreover, it believed Jager was inconsistent with Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297; 614 NW2d 910 (2000), which it read as recognizing that an individual may be held liable for sexual harassment under the CRA. With regard to the directed verdict for Ford, the Court -of Appeals rejected plaintiffs claim that her evidence regarding notice had been sufficient to enable her to reach the jury. The Court held that plaintiffs report of Bennett’s conduct to her supervisors did not constitute actual notice to Ford because of her request at the same time that this information not be conveyed to their supervisor or other appropriate persons. Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 259 Mich App 187, 194; 673 NW2d 776 (2003). As for the letters that had been sent to Ford, the Court of Appeals concluded that these also did not provide notice because, importantly, none of them referred to sexual conduct. The Court held that this fact, when viewed in the context that plaintiffs previous harassment complaints had not been sexual in nature, but were explicitly nonsexual concerning Bennett and others (with the exception of the 1991 complaint against a UAW committeeman that plaintiff did not rely on as part of her case), meant Ford would not reasonably have been put on notice. Id. at 195. Finally, the Court also affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence regarding Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction. It was the Court’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to establish that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose because Bennett’s act of indecent exposure outside the workplace was not sufficiently similar to sexually harassing an employee in the workplace to establish a common plan, scheme, or system. Id. at 206. The Court further concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion, concerning defendant Ford, in holding that the probative value of this evidence would have been substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 207-208. Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to include among the issues briefed whether a supervisor engaging in activity prohibited by the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., may be held individually liable for violating a plaintiffs civil rights. 470 Mich 892 (2004). II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review de novo the question whether our CRA authorizes a cause of action against an individual agent for workplace sexual harassment because it is a question of law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand), 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003). In reviewing the statute, if its language is clear, we conclude that the Legislature must have intended the meaning expressed, and the statute is enforced as written. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). We also review de novo a trial court’s ruling regarding a motion for a directed verdict, viewing the evidence and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003); Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 707-708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Finally, the decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). III. INDIVIDUAL AGENT LIABILITY UNDER THE CRA The CRA prohibits an employer from discriminating on account of sex, which includes sexual harassment. MCL 37.2202(l)(a); MCL 37.2103(i) (“Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment.”). As previously set forth, the statute expressly defines an “employer” as a “person,” which is defined under MCL 37.2103(g) to include a corporation, and also states that an “employer” includes an “agent of that person.” MCL 37.2201(a). This statutory language uncontroversially means that Ford Motor Company is an “employer” under the CRA. What is contested is whether an agent of the corporation is also subject to individual liability. Bennett and Ford have argued that the statutory definition of “employer,” which includes an “agent of that person,” should not be read as providing individual liability because (1) inclusion of the term “agent” in the statutory definition of “employer” operates solely to confer vicarious liability on the employer, (2) federal courts of appeals have all held that Title VII — the analogous federal sexual discrimination statute with its similar definition of “employer” — does not allow individual liability, and (3) the amendment history of our CRA suggests a different intention on the part of the Legislature. Regarding the first of these arguments, that this statute should not be read to expand the class of potential defendants to include agents, defendants assert that Chambers, supra at 310, supports this narrowing conclusion because it held that the inclusion of an “agent” within the definition of an “employer” in MCL 37.2201(a) served to confer vicarious liability on the agent’s employer. We disagree with this analysis. While Chambers held that this language establishes vicarious liability, our discussion did not limit it to that function. The reason is that, when a statute says “employer” means “a person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent of that person,” it must, if the words are going to be read sensibly, mean that the Legislature intended to make the agent tantamount to the employer so that the agent unmistakably is also subject to suit along with the employer. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, when we said in Chambers, supra at 320, that categorizing a given pattern of misconduct allows the Court “to determine whether the sexual harasser’s employer, in addition to the sexual harasser himself, is to be held responsible for the misconduct,” we believe we said as much. (Emphasis in original.) Accordingly, we reject the argument that including “agent” within the definition of “employer” serves only to provide vicarious liability for the agent’s employer and we conclude that it also serves to create individual liability for an employer’s agent. With respect to defendants’ second argum
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