WILCOXON v. MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Case Details
- Citation
- 235 Mich. App. 347
- Judge(s)
- Before: Hood, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Whitbeck, JJ.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- summary judgment
- State
- Michigan
- Circuit
- 6th Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of 3M, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish either a mixed-motive or pretextual theory of discrimination. The court found the transfer was not an adverse employment action and that the plaintiff failed to identify similarly situated employees treated differently regarding her termination.
Excerpt
WILCOXON v MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY Docket No. 204431. Submitted April 7, 1999, at Detroit. Decided April 23, 1999, at 9:15 am. Leave to appeal sought. Dallias E. Wilcoxon brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company (3M) and two 3M employees, alleging race and sex discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.\ MSA 3.548(101) et seq., and other claims. The court, Deborah A. Thomas, J., in response to the defendants’ first motion for summary disposition, found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated any of the criteria necessary to show that her transfer from one position to another had been an adverse employment action. The court determined that the only issue left pertained to the plaintiff’s separation from 3M. The court dismissed the claim that was based on the alleged wrongful transfer and dismissed one of the individual defendants from the action. In response to the defendants’ second motion for summary disposition, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to show that, with regard to her termination from employment, the plaintiff was treated differently from other employees similarly situated, the basis for such treatment was discriminatory, that 3M’s stated reason for the discharge from employment was a pretext, and that the reason for the discharge was based on a factor that violated the laws of the state. The court entered an order that dismissed the action in its entirety. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. The claim regarding the transfer is a disparate treatment claim under MCL 37.2202(l)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(l)(a ). Regardless of the approach the plaintiff employed to establish her claim, she had to prove that she suffered an adverse employment action. 2. In order for an employment action to be adverse for purposes of a discrimination action, the action must be materially adverse in that it is more than mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities and there must be some objective basis for demonstrating that the action is adverse. The employee’s subjective impressions regarding the desirability of one position over another are not controlling. 3. The plaintiff failed to make any showing that her transfer was a materially adverse employment action, other than advancing her own subjective views. The court properly dismissed the claim with regard to the transfer. 4. There is no dispute that the plaintiff’s termination from employment qualifies as an adverse employment action. The plaintiff could have established that claim under a mixed motive theory or a pretextual theory. 5. The plaintiff, a black female, falls into two protected classes contemplated by the Civil Rights Act and, thus, meets the first element of the test applicable to actions under the mixed motive theory. She meets the second element because her termination from employment is an adverse employment action. The plaintiff therefore had to prove that the defendants were predisposed to discriminate against members of the protected class, the third element, and that the defendants actually acted on the predisposition in terminating the plaintiff’s employment, the last element. 6. The occurrences of which the plaintiff complains, if believed, would not require a conclusion that the defendants acted with discriminatory animus. The plaintiff’s claim cannot be proved under the mixed motive theory. 7. The plaintiff meets the first three elements of the test applicable to actions under the pretextual theory because she is a member of a protected class who suffered an adverse employment action and was qualified for the job. Therefore, the plaintiff had to show that she suffered the adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, the last element. 8. The court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to show that similarly situated male or white employees were not terminated from employment under like circumstances. Summary disposition was properly granted with regard to the pretextual theory of proof. The court properly granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants with regard to the rest of the plaintiff’s claims, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. Affirmed. 1. Civil Rights — Master and Servant — Employment Discrimination — Disparate Treatment — Adverse Employment Actions. A necessarily included element of an action alleging disparate treatment of an employee by an employer in violation of subsection 202(l)(a) of the Civil Rights Act is a demonstration that the employee suffered an adverse employment action; for an employment action to be adverse for purposes of a discrimination action, the action must be materially adverse in that it is more than mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities and there must be some objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse; the employee’s subjective impressions regarding the desirability of one position over another are not controlling in determining whether a change of positions is adverse (MCL 37.2202[l][a]; MSA 3.548[202][l][aD. 2. Civil Rights — Master and Servant — Employment Discrimination — Disparate Treatment — Mixed Motive Evidentiary Method — Elements. The elements of an action under subsection 202(l)(a) of the Civil Rights Act alleging disparate treatment in employment and proceeding under the “mixed motive” evidentiary method are the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, an adverse employment action, a showing that the defendant was predisposed to discriminating against members of the plaintiff’s protected class, and a showing that the defendant actually acted on that predisposition in visiting the adverse employment action on the plaintiff (MCL 37.2202[l][a]; MSA 3.548[202][l][a]). 3. Civil Rights — Master and Servant — Employment Discrimination — Disparate Treatment •— Pretextual Evidentiary Method — Elements. The elements of an action under subsection 202(l)(a) of the Civil Rights Act alleging disparate treatment in employment and proceeding under the “pretextual” evidentiary method are the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, and showings that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, the plaintiff was qualified for the position, and the plaintiff suffered the adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination; circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination when the plaintiff was treated differently than persons of a different class for the same or similar conduct; being qualified for a job, for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, requires minimal qualification only; to create an inference of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove that all the relevant factors were nearly identical to those of a differently treated person (MCL 37.2202[l][a]; MSA 3.548[202][l][a]). Dallias E. Wilcoxon, in propria persona. Barris, Sott, Derm & Driker, P.L.L.C. (by Sharon Woods and Claudia D. Orr), for the defendants. Before: Hood, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Whitbeck, JJ. Whitbeck, J. Plaintiff-appellant Dallias E. Wilcoxon contests the dismissal, by summary disposition, of her claims of unlawful race and sex discrimination in her former employment. The trial court dismissed portions of Wilcoxon’s complaint relating to a transfer on the basis of her failure to produce any objective evidence that the transfer was an adverse employment action. Just before trial, the trial court dismissed the remainder of Wilcoxon’s action, primarily on the basis of her inability to identify any similarly situated members of another class who were treated differently. Wilcoxon now appeals as of right. We affirm. I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Wilcoxon, a black female with a master’s degree in Public Administration and a law degree, began working in the govemment/community affairs department of the outdoor advertising subsidiary of defendantappellee Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company (3M National) in 1989 as the first minority or female in that capacity. From 1990 through 1992, she received promotions, raises, and above-average performance evaluations. However, these evaluations noted a need for her to improve her working relationship with field management. As the govemment/community affairs manager in 3M National’s Detroit area offices, Wilcoxon monitored legislative and regulatory matters affecting outdoor advertising (i.e., billboards) in the northeastern portion of the United States and worked to improve or preserve her employer’s position in that regard. Additionally, Wilcoxon provided information regarding these matters as necessary to support field managers who procured and marketed the available billboard space. During Wilcoxon’s tenure with 3M National, she experienced difficulty dealing with defendant-appellee David Horton, who was the market manager and, later, district manager of the marketing department for the same territory, and at least one other market manager. Although Horton was not Wilcoxon’s superior and Wilcoxon concedes that people in general found Horton difficult to work with, Wilcoxon attributed her problems relating to field management to racism and sexism. By Horton’s account, however, Wilcoxon was difficult to talk to and her attitude was both condescending and offensive as perceived by him and staff members who complained to him. Defendant-appellee Edward Kenevan became Wilcoxon’s direct supervisor in May 1992. The following March, Kenevan gave Wilcoxon a below-average performance appraisal, ostensibly on the basis of her poor relationship with field management and an insufficient familiarity with the industry. In the section of the evaluation for comments by the next level of supervision, Kenevan’s own supervisor observed that Wilcoxon had always been professional in his presence and that perhaps she needed a new challenge in another department. According to Kenevan, he decided to transfer Wilcoxon to the newly created position of public service/community affairs manager, in order to take advantage of her strengths, while minimizing her role in her areas of weakness. In this new position, which Wilcoxon was charged with developing, Wilcoxon was to oversee 3M National’s public service and charitable activities nationwide. Wilcoxon resisted the transfer, which did not entail any loss of pay or benefits, but apparently was not afforded a choice in the matter. Her replacement, whom she helped train for a month or two, was a white male. Although Wilcoxon continued to work out of the Detroit area offices for seven months, her new supervisor, John Provost, made it clear that eventually Wilcoxon would have to relocate to Chicago. In January 1994, Wilcoxon went on sick leave and applied for short-term disability benefits, which she initially began receiving. Her physician described her symptoms as headache, stress/anxiety, and chest pain. Consistent with company policy, Wilcoxon’s application for short-term disability benefits was submitted to physicians retained by 3M’s benefits department for review. The reviewing physicians found nothing disabling about Wilcoxon’s condition and reported this to 3M’s benefits department personnel, who in turn advised Wilcoxon that continued benefits would be denied and that she should return to work by February 28, 1994. Wilcoxon appealed within the sixty days allotted for that purpose and forwarded additional documentation to the reviewing physicians who, again, found nothing disabling about Wilcoxon’s condition. Disability benefits were again denied. Thereafter, Provost informed Wilcoxon that if she did not return to work by April 18, 1994, she would be presumed to have resigned. Wilcoxon did not return to work by that date and was thereafter notified that she was no longer employed at 3M National. In June 1994, Wilcoxon filed a complaint alleging race and sex discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. According to Wilcoxon, she was (1) provided less training than white males in similar employment positions, (2) provided less support staff than similarly situated white males, (3) undermined by defendants’ employees while attempting to accomplish necessary employment functions, (4) denied reimbursement for continuing education courses, while similarly situated white males enjoyed such a benefit, and (5) demoted and replaced by a white male. In February 1996, defendants filed their first motion for summary disposition. Defendants argued that Wilcoxon could not maintain race or sex discrimination claims because her transfer did not constitute an adverse employment action, since she suffered no loss in pay or benefits. Furthermore, defendants asserted a legitimate business reason for both Wilcoxon’s transfer and her termination from employment. Defendants maintain that Wilcoxon was unable to produce any evidence that she was treated any differently than white or male employees who refused to return to work following a disability leave. Defendants contended that, because Wilcoxon was unable to establish that 3M National’s reasons were a mere pretext for discrimination, Wilcoxon’s race and sex discrimination claims must fail. Finally, defendants claimed that Horton could not be individually liable for the alleged discrimination because Horton did not qualify as an agent of 3M National. In November 1996, the trial court issued its ruling from the bench. First, the trial court found that Wilcoxon had not demonstrated any of the criteria necessary to show that her transfer had been an adverse employment action. Second, the trial court declined to decide whether Wilcoxon had resigned or had been constructively discharged by intolerable discriminatory conditions inasmuch as “there are several questions of fact that must be resolved.” Third, the trial court found that the question whether there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs transfer was an issue for the finder of fact. Fourth, the trial court addressed whether Horton, who was not Wilcoxon’s supervisor but who exercised control over her worksite, could be held personally liable for Wilcoxon’s claims. The trial court stated, “even viewing it in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff” there was not a “sufficient legal basis upon which to hold Mr. Horton personally liable.” According to the trial court, because Wilcoxon’s transfer was not an adverse employment action, the only issue left was with regard to Wilcoxon’s ultimate separation from 3M National. By a subsequent order, the trial court deemed the transfer not to be an adverse employment action and dismissed Wilcoxon’s claims based on that action; the trial court dismissed Horton from the action as well. In April 1997, defendants brought three motions in limine to (1) preclude, on the basis of the trial court’s prior ruling, Wilcoxon from characterizing her transfer as a demotion, (2) preclude Wilcoxon from mentioning discreet incidents of allegedly unfavorable treatment unless she laid a foundation by showing that at some point she was discriminated against by being treated differently than similarly situated white or male employees, and (3) preclude Wilcoxon from mentioning acts that preceded the filing of her complaint by more than three years. During a hearing regarding these motions, it was revealed that Wilcoxon had yet to identify another individual who had been treated differently when the individual failed to return to work from medical leave. In response, the trial court adjourned trial to a date that would allow sufficient time for defendants to bring another motion for summary disposition. In May 1997, defendants brought their second motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendants argued that it was incumbent on Wilcoxon to show that “but for” her race or sex, she would not have been discharged. Moreover, defendants argued that because defendants asserted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment separation, Wilcoxon would also have to establish that this was a pretext. Defendants asserted that, because Wilcoxon had not come forward with any evidence of either disparate treatment or pretext concerning her termination from employment, summary disposition in favor of defendants was proper. Defendants supported this motion by, among other things, the affidavits of Barbara Warner, supervisor of 3M’s health care and disability program, and Provost. Warner averred that in performing her duties she made the ultimate decision to deny Wilcoxon benefits while unaware of Wilcoxon’s race, and race or sex was not used in the decision. Warner also averred that Wilcoxon’s employment status was not within the scope of her decision. Provost averred that, as Wilcoxon’s supervisor at the time, after learning that Wilcoxon was ineligible for disability leave, he notified her that she must return to work by April 18, 1994, or she would be considered as having resigned. When Wilcoxon did not so return, Provost stated that he terminated her employment. In response to defendant’s motion, Wilcoxon named a white female office supervisor, a white male sales representative, two other white males, and a white female as similarly situated employees who were not discharged when their illnesses caused their extended absences from work. Further, Wilcoxon argued that a race or sex discrimination case can be established either by showing disparate treatment or by showing intentional discrimination. Wilcoxon contended that she had established a case of intentional discrimination by showing that defendants were predisposed to discriminate against women or blacks and had acted on that disposition in terminating her employment. At a June 1997 hearing regarding this motion, defendants argued that they conducted a last-minute record search with regard to the supposedly similarly situated people identified in Wilcoxon’s brief. According to defendants, two individuals could not be found, there was no record of disability leaves for two more, and the other (who had been on extended leave after a complicated pregnancy) had, unlike Wilcoxon, voluntarily returned to work at the expiration of her leave. Moreover, defendants argued, the decisionmaker with regard to Wilcoxon’s disability leave did not know Wilcoxon’s race and Wilcoxon had conceded that the decisionmaker with regard to the termination of Wilcoxon’s employment had never discriminated against her. The trial court issued the following ruling: Discovery in this matter has been closed, witness lists have been filed and there’s no opportunity that these five individuals were made witnesses in this matter. The individual who made the decision with regard to the termination, would be the individual in the personnel office. Who would send out the communication, the questioned returned date that the decision-maker determines whether or not to terminate. For failure to return to work, which is the matter that remains before this Court. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to show that somehow she was treated differently than other employees similarly situated. And that the basis for such treatment was discriminatory. She does not have either the individuals who were treated differently than herself, nor has she been able to establish that the employer[’]s stated reason for the discharge was a pretext. And that there was any evidence to establish that the reason for discharge was based on a factor which violated the laws of [this] state, established to protect those individuals who have historically been treated unfairly because of race. The trial court entered an order the same day that dismissed Wilcoxon’s action in its entirety with prejudice. Wilcoxon timely appealed as of right. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regar
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