Doe v. Green

The language of the Virginia wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, specifically lists wages and salaries, but it does not expressly apply to commissions, and its context does not support an interpretation that extends the statute's protections to commissions. Resting its contrary conclusion on the remedial purpose of the statute, past decisions interpreting the term "wages" in other contexts, and an interpretation by an administrative agency contained in a field manual, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Code § 40.1-29 did not apply to commissions. However, neither the plain meaning of the terms "wages" or "commissions," nor the use of the term wages in the context of Code § 40.1-29, suggests that the use of that term sweeps in the concept of "commissions," and contentions to the contrary, while compelling, are properly addressed to the legislature. Therefore, the most plausible reading of Code § 40.1-29 is that the General Assembly did not intend for the wage theft statute to apply to commissions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

In an interlocutory appeal brought by medical staffing companies concerning a physician-plaintiff's claim against them under the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Act, Code § 40.1-27.3, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of their plea in bar to that claim because the alleged retaliatory action taken against the plaintiff -- removing her from the work schedule in March of 2021 -- took place more than one year prior to her filing suit on April 1, 2022. The fact that she only later discovered her injury to be greater than she first realized as a result of a June 2, 2021, termination letter confirming that the termination of her employment was effective as of March 3, 2021, is immaterial to when she first sustained that injury. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.