HOLDEN v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY; WEISS v. JEWISH HOME FOR THE AGED
Case Details
- Citation
- 439 Mich. 257
- Judge(s)
- Cavanagh, C.J., and Brickley, Boyle, Riley, Griffin, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.j
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
In two consolidated workers' compensation cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Workers' Compensation Appellate Commission did not exceed its authority in reversing magistrates' decisions. In Holden v. Ford Motor Company, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the WCAC's award of death benefits for a cardiac episode at work. In Weiss v. Jewish Home for the Aged, the Court affirmed the WCAC's modification to an open award of disability benefits for a work-related back injury.
Excerpt
HOLDEN v FORD MOTOR COMPANY WEISS v JEWISH HOME FOR THE AGED Docket Nos. 90345, 90144. Argued November 6, 1991 (Calendar Nos. 8-9). Decided April 21, 1992. Rehearing denied in Weiss, post, 1241. Emaline F. Holden sought workers’ compensation death benefits after her husband, Carl Holden, a Ford employee, died at work. Following a hearing, at which the plaintiff’s experts testified that Carl Holden died of a job-related myocardial infarction and the defendant testified that his death resulted from an arrhythmia unrelated to the job, the magistrate denied benefits on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite nexus between the claimed injury to the heart and work. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, acknowledging the limited scope of administrative appellate review, concluded that because the magistrate had failed to find whether the deceased sustained cardiac damage it was incumbent on the wcac to do so, found the requisite relationship between the cardiac damage and the deceased’s work, and ruled the death compensable. The Court of Appeals, Reilly, P.J., and Gillis and Cynar, JJ., reversed in an opinion per curiam (Docket No. 118813). The claimant appeals. Vera Weiss sought workers’ disability compensation benefits for a work-related injury to her back arising out of her employment as a registered nurse for the Jewish Home for the Aged. Following a hearing, at which conflicting evidence was presented regarding her ability to return to work, the magistrate found that she had been temporarily disabled and entered a closed award of benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, acknowledging the limited scope of administrative appellate review, concluded that the magistrate’s finding was unsupported by substantial evidence and modified the decision to provide an open award of benefits. The Court of Appeals, Danhof, C.J., and Murphy and T. M. Burns, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 115339). The defendant appeals. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Levin, the Supreme Court held: The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, on appellate review, did not exceed its authority in reversing the decisions of the magistrates and in awarding benefits. 1. 1985 PA 103 eliminated review de novo by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in workers’ compensation cases, beginning October 1, 1986. Findings of fact by a workers’ compensation magistrate are now considered conclusive, on administrative appellate review by the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. The findings of fact made by the wcac, not the findings of the magistrate, are to be conclusive on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud, if there is any evidence to support them. The standard for judicial review was not changed by 1985 PA 103. 2. The substantial evidence standard, like the standard for judicial appellate review, is rooted in Const 1963, art 6, § 28, which provides that administrative agency decisions subject to judicial review following a hearing are to be minimally reviewed to determine whether they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Review of the evidence by the wcac must include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review. The wcac may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the magistrate as its order and opinion. 3. The question on judicial appellate review is whether the wcac acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than review de novo in finding that magistrate’s decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. To judge whether it acted properly, consideration is given to the issues of credibility regarding live witnesses determined by the magistrate, the evidence considered and ignored, the care taken, and the reasoning and analysis of the magistrate and the wcac, with due deference given to the administrative expertise of both the wcac and the magistrate. Recognition that the wcac brings the administrative expertise of more than one person, may be appropriate depending on the factual or legal issue. A carefully constructed opinion by the wcac enables appellate courts to determine whether it duly recognized and observed the limitations on its reviewing function contemplated by the substantial evidence standard. A reviewing court should ordinarily defer to the collective judgment of the wcac unless it is manifest that it exceeded its reviewing power. 4. In these cases, the wcac panels did not exceed the legislatively prescribed reviewing function. Both panels, after acknowledging that their review of the magistrates’ decisions were limited by the "substantial evidence on the whole record” standard, gave adequate reasons, grounded in the records, for reversing the fact finding of the magistrates. Holden, reversed. Weiss, affirmed. 185 Mich App 305; 460 NW2d 316 (1990) reversed. 185 Mich App 687; 462 NW2d 821 (1990) affirmed. Thomas J. Bertino (.Daryl Royal, of counsel) for the plaintiff in Holden. Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O’Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. (by A. Donald Kadushin and Granner S. Ries), for the plaintiff in Weiss. John M. Thomas for the defendant in Holden. Murray R. Feldman (Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Listman & Chuhran, P.C., by Martin L. Critchell, of counsel) for the defendant in Weiss. Amici Curiae: Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, and Caleb B. Martin, Jr., and Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney General. Mark Granzotto, Monica Farris Linkner, and Charles P. Burbach for the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association. Levin, J. The question presented concerns the scope of administrative appellate review by the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission of a decision of a magistrate, and the scope of judicial appellate review on leave granted by the Court of Appeals or this Court. We conclude that the wcac did not, on administrative appellate review, exceed its authority in reversing the decisions of the magistrates and in awarding benefits, and that the Court of Appeals panel in Holden erred in reversing, and the panel in Weiss did not err in affirming, the wcac. I Before the reforms enacted in 1985, hearings in workers’ compensation cases were conducted by a referee, also referred to as an administrative law judge, with de novo review by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. Judicial review was obtainable on application, not as of right, in the Court of Appeals and this Court. In an effort to address the large number of backlogged appeals, the Department of Labor considered proposals for changes in the administrative appellate review process. In 1980, the Lesinski Report, summarizing the results of the department’s Workers’ Compensation Adjudication Project, proposed that decisions of a magistrate be made conclusive "unless fraudulently obtain[ed] or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” No procedural reform legislation was, however, enacted. In 1984, Theodore J. St. Antoine, the Governor’s Special Counsel on Workers’ Compensation, recommended significant changes in the decision-making process. Like the Lesinski Report, St. Antoine recommended that de novo review of the hearing officer’s decision be eliminated. He proposed that the question, on administrative appellate review, should be whether the decision of the hearing officer is supported by "substantial . . . evidence on the whole record.” He said that this standard was "deliberately designed to allow the Appeal Board a bit more latitude” than it would have had under the "great weight of the evidence” standard proposed in the Lesinski Report. St. Antoine said this would enable the reviewing panel to "remedy any serious misstep by [a hearing officer] in assessing the evidence and making factual findings.” St. Antoine’s proposals were in general adopted by the Legislature when it enacted 1985 PA 103. Magistrates replaced referees, and the wcac replaced the wcab. A Under Act 103, beginning October 1, 1986, de novo review was eliminated. Henceforth, findings of fact by a workers’ compensation magistrate were to be considered conclusive, on administrative appellate review by the wcac, if supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.” MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3). This substantial evidence standard provides for administrative appellate review more deferential to the hearing officer’s decision than de novo review, but for more searching review by the wcac than judicial review under the "any evidence standard.” The constitution provides for such limited judicial review: Findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law. [Const 1963, art 6, § 28.] Act 103 did not change the standard for judicial review of final decisions in workers’ compensation proceedings. The Legislature had provided, under former law, that it was the findings of fact made by the wcab that were to be conclusive on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud. Act 103 provides that the findings of fact made by the wcac, not the findings of the magistrate, are to be conclusive, on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud. The Legislature, by employing the language of the constitution in stating that the fact finding of the wcac is final subject to limited judicial review, made clear that judicial review by the Court of Appeals or this Court of a wcac decision is to be of the findings of fact made by the wcac and not the findings of fact made by the magistrate. And the findings of fact made by the wcac are conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them. As under prior law, judicial review is obtainable on application, not as of right, to the Court of Appeals and this Court. B The substantial evidence standard, like the standard for judicial appellate review, is rooted in Const 1963, art 6, § 28, which provides that administrative agency decisions subject to judicial review following a hearing shall be minimally reviewed to determine whether the decision is "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.” (Emphasis added.) As originally introduced in the Senate, the 1985 legislation would not have defined what constitutes "substantial evidence on the whole record.” The House Substitute, which became Act 103, retained the "substantial evidence on the whole record” standard, but added definitions of "substantial evidence” and "whole record” taken from MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich 116; 223 NW2d 283 (1974), where this Court considered the meaning of "substantial evidence” in the context of judicial review of findings of fact by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission pursuant to the labor mediation act. The House Substitute also added language, again taken from Detroit Symphony, providing that the wcac’s review of a magistrate’s decision should include both a "qualitative and a quantitative” analysis of the evidence to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review. As enacted, the "substantial evidence on the whole record” standard largely parallels the description of substantial evidence in MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra. The statute provides that findings of fact made by a magistrate shall be considered "conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material, and substantive evidence on the whole record”: —" '[Substantial evidence’ means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.” (Emphasis added.) —" '[W]hole record’ means the entire record of the hearing including all of the evidence in favor and all the evidence against a certain determination.” (Emphasis added.) —Wcac review of the evidence "shall include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence and ensure a full, thorough, and fair review thereof.” (Emphasis added.) —The wcac "may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the worker’s compensation magistrate as the order and opinion of the commission.” (Emphasis added.) In apparent recognition of the difference between judicial appellate review of an administrative agency’s decision, and administrative appellate review by the wcac of a magistrate’s decision, the Legislature did not enact, as part of the substantial evidence standard for workers’ compensation administrative appellate review purposes, the merc language that review by the wcac is to be "undertaken with considerable sensitivity” to provide "due deference to administrative expertise” and to avoid displacing a "choice between two reasonably differing views.” MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, supra, p 124. C The question on judicial appellate review is, in each case, whether the wcac acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than de novo review in finding that the magistrate’s decision was or was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In judging, on judicial appellate review, whether the wcac acted .properly, this Court and the Court of Appeals begin with the words of the Legislature. This Court and the Court of Appeals consider whether there are issues of credibility of live witnesses to be determined by the magistrate, the evidence considered and ignored by the magistrate and the wcac, the care taken by the magistrate and the wcac, and the reasoning and analysis of the magistrate and the wcac. We agree with the Court of Appeals in Weiss that the stringent constitutional and statutory limitations on judicial appellate review suggest that some latitude must be given the wcac, should it find that the magistrate’s findings of fact are not supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record,” if there is to be any effective appellate review, administrative or judicial, at all. And that if the appellate courts were not to allow such latitude to the wcac, they would find that they were increasingly called upon to perform the appellate reviewing function so that there would be effective appellate review at some level. Due deference should be given to the administrative expertise of the wcac, as well as to the administrative expertise of the magistrate. Recognition that a wcac panel brings to the table the administrative expertise of more than one person may, depending on the factual or legal issue, be appropriate. A carefully constructed opinion by the wcac enables the Court of Appeals and this Court to determine whether the wcac duly recognized and observed the limitations on its reviewing function contemplated by the substantial evidence standard. If the opinion is carefully constructed, a reviewing court should ordinarily defer to the collective judgment of the wcac unless it is manifest that it exceeded its reviewing power. We do not now offer a judicial standard in exegesis of the legislatively stated standard. If it appears on judicial appellate review that the wcac carefully examined the record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the magistrate, did not "misapprehend or grossly misapply” the substantial evidence standard, and gave an adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the magistrate, the judicial tendency should be to deny leave to appeal or, if it is granted, to affirm, in recognition that the Legislature provided for administrative appellate review by the seven-member wcac of decisions of thirty magistrates, and bestowed on the wcac final fact-finding responsibility subject to constitutionally limited judicial review. II In Holden, the magistrate denied death benefits to the widow of a Ford employee who suffered a cardiac episode at work, and died shortly thereafter. The wcac reversed the magistrate, and was in turn reversed by the Court of Appeals which reinstated the magistrate’s decision. A Carl Holden managed food service operations in three dining rooms and four cafeterias for Ford Motor Company. He oversaw the cafeteria and dining rooms in Ford’s Renaissance Center facility and managed dining facilities in four other metropolitan Detroit locations. In addition to overseeing daily lunch preparation and service for over 1,000 Ford executives and employees, Holden was responsible for executive dinners and company-sponsored parties. Holden’s supervisor testified that Holden was very conscientious. On July 11, 1986, Holden arrived around 8:30 a.m. at his office in the Renaissance Center. First cook Daniel Micallef testified that he was in Holden’s office when he arrived. Holden took off his coat and "made like a sigh.” Holden did not look well and "[h]is color was like a gray, grayish color.” Holden said that "he had just took [sic] the stairs and he wasn’t feeling well. His hands were clammy and his chest hurt.” Micallef left Holden sitting in his chair. He returned shortly thereafter to speak to Holden. Holden was lying on his desk, gasping for air. Emergency medical personnel were called; Holden was taken to the hospital, where he died within an hour. Holden was assigned a parking space in Renaissance Center "m” lot. To reach the elevators, Holden had to climb three flights of approximately ten stairs each. While Holden could have parked in another lot, this too would have required him to climb three flights of stairs to reach an elevator. Dr. Werner Spitz, then the Wayne County Medical Examiner, board certified in pathology and forensic pathology, and plaintiff’s expert witness, testified that Holden suffered a myocardial infarction caused by job-related stress and precipitated by stair climbing. Dr. Donald L. Newman, board certified in family practice and Holden’s personal physician, testified on the basis of his review of records, including Spitz’ autopsy report, the death certificate, a job description and witness statements. Newman opined that Holden suffered a myocardial infarction precipitated by stair climbing. Dr. Robert A. Gerisch, board certified in internal medicine and specializing in cardiology, testified for Ford. He said that he had examined the tissue slides from the autopsy, hospital records, Spitz’ deposition testimony and Holden’s job description. He opined, on the basis of his examination of the tissue slides and the record of an ekg taken at the hospital shortly before Holden died, that Holden did not suffer a myocardial infarction. Gerisch said that the tissue slides did not evidence scarring that would indicate either a recent or an old myocardial infarction. He also testified, however, that the characteristic scarring that occurs after a myocardial infarction is not reflected in the heart muscle tissue for six to eight hours after the infarction occurs. He added that the ekg indicated "an acute infarction type of pattern or ischemia which, if it persists, could develop into an infarction.” Gerisch opined that, given the condition of Holden’s heart, there was a one hundred percent probability that he would eventually suffer a myocardial infarction, but that he actually died of ischemia that brought on arrhythmia. He said that the heart was depleted of all oxygen by the ischemia, caused by narrowed arteries, which brought about the arrhythmia which, corrected only temporarily at the hospital, resulted in Holden’s death. B The magistrate found that the claimant failed to establish the requisite nexus between the claimed injury to the heart and work. The magistrate found that there was almost no testimony concerning specific episodes of job stress that might be related to Holden’s death. He rejected testimony that Holden was a worrier as "grossly speculative and without foundation.” He reviewed Micallef’s testimony and concluded th
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