BARRETT v. KIRTLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE
Case Details
- Citation
- 245 Mich. App. 306
- Judge(s)
- Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
- Circuit
- 6th Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
On appeal, the court affirmed the jury's verdict finding breach of contract with $750 in damages, but reversed the retaliation verdict ($99,960 in damages and $46,500 in attorney fees), finding insufficient causal connection between protected activity and termination.
Excerpt
BARRETT v KIRTLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE Docket No. 217040. Submitted October 17, 2000, at Lansing. Decided April 10, 2001, at 9:00 AM. Leave to appeal sought. Brent Barrett brought an action in the Roscommon Circuit Court against Kirtland Community College, alleging, among other things, breach of contract and retaliation that violated the Civil Rights Act (cra), MCL 37.2101 et seq., after his employment at the college was terminated. The plaintiff presented evidence at a jury trial that his employment was terminated before the expiration of a one-year employment contract and after he lodged with the president of the college and with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights complaints concerning his treatment by an immediate supervisor who discovered that the plaintiff was romantically involved with a college employee in whom the supervisor had expressed a romantic interest. The defendant presented evidence that the plaintiff was discharged for insubordination and for abandoning his position. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the claims of breach of contract and retaliation under the cra. Damages were awarded to the plaintiff by the jury on the retaliation claim and, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, by the trial court, Michael J. Matuzak, X, on the breach of contract claim. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and awarded costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff with respect to the retaliation claim. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held: The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the claim of retaliation, but did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial with respect to the claim of breach of contract. The judgment for the plaintiff on the retaliation claim must be reversed and the award of attorney fees and costs in connection with that claim must be vacated. On remand, the trial court shall enter a judgment for the defendant with respect to the retaliation claim. 1. A plaintiff seeking to establish unlawful employment-related retaliation under subsection 701(a) of the CRA, MCL 37.2701(a), must show, among other things, that the plaintiff’s participation in activity protected by the cra was a significant factor in the adverse employment action taken by the defendant. Here, although the plaintiffs filings of complaints with the Department of Civil Rights constituted protected activity, the plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between the filings and the termination of his employment in view of evidence indicating that, before the plaintiff filed the complaints, the president of the college had already considered and recommended to the board of trustees that the plaintiff be fired for not accepting direction and responsibility and for having a poor attitude. 2. The plaintiff, in complaining to the president of the college about the supervisor’s treatment of the plaintiff based on romantic jealously, did not make a charge under the CRA or oppose a violation of the CRA such that the plaintiff can establish that the defendant retaliated against him for making a charge or opposing a violation. The plaintiff did not make a charge under the cra because he did not raise a specter of a claim of unlawful gender discrimination or sexual harassment by the supervisor when he complained of the way tire supervisor treated him after the supervisor learned of the plaintiff’s romantic involvement with the college employee. The plaintiff did not oppose a violation of the CRA in complaining about the supervisor’s treatment because that treatment, being devoid of gender-based discrimination or sexual harassment, did not constitute “discrimination because of sex” under the cra. 3. The defendant, in reporting to the police that the plaintiff had taken items owned by the college after his employment was terminated, did not retaliate against the plaintiff for filing complaints with the Department of Civil Rights. A causal connection between the plaintiffs filing of complaints and the defendant’s reporting to the police is lacking because the plaintiff acknowledged that he took college-owned property and because of the defendant’s interest in recovering its properly. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of several incidents of the plaintiff’s work-related misconduct. The decision to exclude such evidence was not palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic, given that the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence would be a waste of time and would likely confuse the jurors because the evidence that was admitted included enough evidence of the plaintiff’s conduct to allow the jury to infer that the plaintiff was fired for poor job performance and insubordination. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 1. Civil Eights — Civil Rights Act — Employment — Retaliation. A plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment-related retaliation under the Civil Rights Act must show that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, that this was known by the defendant, that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiffs participation in protected activity was a significant factor in the defendant’s adverse employment action (MCL 37.2701[a]). 2. Civil Rights — Civil Rights Act — Employment — Discrimination Because op Sex. Employment discrimination because of sex, as proscribed by the Civil Rights Act, is limited to instances of gender-based discrimination or instances where the employee is required to submit to sexually-based harassment (MCL 37.2103[i], 37.2201[d], 37.2202[1]). Robert J. Krwpka and Michael J. Forster, for the plaintiff. Thrun, Maatsch and Nordberg, P.C. (by Martha J. Marcero and Roy H. Henley), for the defendant. Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ. Zahra, J. Defendant Kirtland Community College (kcc) appeals as of right from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) or a new trial. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS Plaintiff was hired by KCC in February 1992 as part-time cultural events coordinator. In September 1992, plaintiff signed a one-year contract to serve as KCC’s full-time coordinator of cultural events/activities. In September 1993, plaintiff signed another one-year contract to remain in that position. That second contract was to expire on September 17, 1994. Plaintiff’s duties as full-time coordinator of cultural events/ activities included planning performances at kcc’s theater, running the theater’s box office, contracting with performers, producing shows at the theater, and completing accounting duties with respect to the performances. Plaintiff’s coordinator position was not a faculty position. Defendant Cary Vajda was KCC’s dean of student services and plaintiff’s immediate supervisor at all times pertinent to this case. Defendant Katherine Grosser was kcc’s dean of business services and defendant Dorothy Franke was president of kcc during plaintiff’s employment. In October 1993, Vajda asked KCC employee Allison Goshom on a date. Vajda did not know Goshom was romantically involved with plaintiff at the time he asked her out. Plaintiff claimed that the quality of his working relationship with Vajda declined once Vajda discovered the nature of Goshom’s relationship with plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff filed three complaints with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (mdcr), charging gender discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act (cra), MCL 37.2101 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered psychological and physical problems as a result of continual adverse treatment by Vajda. Those problems prompted plaintiff to take a personal leave from his job in May 1994 and a later unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (fmla), 29 USC 2601 et seq. During the time plaintiff was on leave, the coordinator of cultural events/activities position was reconfigured by KCC administrators into a faculty position. Plaintiff applied for the new position, but was not hired. On September 13, 1994 (four days before the expiration of his employment contract), plaintiff returned from his leave and was discharged by Franke after a short meeting. In a letter Franke wrote to plaintiff on the date of his discharge, she stated that plaintiffs “[c]ontinued insubordination” and his “[abandonment of position” were the reasons for his discharge. Franke specified that plaintiffs insubordination included failing to return keys to KCC facilities despite being directed to do so on four separate occasions and refusing to provide proof of attendance at a meeting for which plaintiff sought travel expenses. Franke further specified that plaintiff abandoned his position by failing to return to work after his doctor indicated he was able to return on September 6, 1994, and by failing to notify KCC personnel to discuss returning to his job. In October 1995, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging breach of employment contract, violation of the fmla, gender discrimination under the CRA, retaliation under the CRA, and defamation. Plaintiffs retaliation, breach of contract, and FMLA claims went to trial. The jury found no violation of the fmla. However, the jury found that KCC retaliated against plaintiff and assessed damages of $99,960 in regard to that claim. The jury also found that KCC breached plaintiffs employment contract. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the trial court assessed damages in connection with the breach of contract verdict, determining damages in the amount of $750. Kcc brought a motion for jnov or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that there was no evidence of a causal link between protected activity by plaintiff and adverse actions taken by kcc, nor evidence that plaintiff was terminated without just cause or that his employment contract was otherwise breached. The trial court denied kcc’s motion. Thereafter, the court assessed $46,500 in attorney fees and $986 in costs with respect to the retaliation claim. H. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF MCL 37.2701(A) On appeal, kcc argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for jnov with respect to plaintiffs retaliation claim. We agree. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for jnov is reviewed de novo. Attard v Citizens Ins Co of America, 237 Mich App 311, 321; 602 NW2d 633 (1999); Farm Credit Services of Michigan’s Heartland, PCA v Weldon, 232 Mich App 662, 672; 591 NW2d 438 (1998). In reviewing a decision on a motion for jnov, this Court must view the testimony and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 204; 580 NW2d 876 (1998). If reasonable jurors honestly could have reached different conclusions, the jury verdict must stand. Central Cartage Co v Fewl-ess, 232 Mich App 517, 524; 591 NW2d 422 (1998). Only if the evidence fails to establish a claim as a matter of law is jnov appropriate. Forge, supra. The CRA provides, in part: An employer shall not do any of the following: (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. (b) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way that deprives or tends to deprive the employee or applicant of an employment opportunity, or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. [MCL 37.2202(l)(a) and (b).] The cra also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for pursuing rights under the CRA, stating: Two or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not: (a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act. [MCL 37.2701(a).] 1. claims of pretermination retaliation In the trial court, plaintiff asserted that his job was reconfigured and he was eventually discharged in retaliation for complaining to Franke about Vajda’s adverse treatment of him and for filing complaints with the mdcr. On appeal, kcc claims that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity under the CRA that could be said to have led to any adverse employment action. We read the CRA in light of the primary goal of judicial interpretation, which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 386; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Cherry Growers, Inc v Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd, 240 Mich App 153, 166; 610 NW2d 613 (2000). We may not speculate about the probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words expressed in the statute. In re Schnell, 214 Mich App 304, 310; 543 NW2d 11 (1995). If a statute provides its own glossary, the terms must be applied as expressly defined. Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). When reasonable minds may differ with respect to the meaning of a statute, the courts must look to the object of the statute and the harm it is designed to remedy and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute. Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). In interpreting provisions of the CRA, we are guided by federal court interpretations of the counterpart federal statute. Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 313; 614 NW2d 910 (2000); see title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq. While we are not bound by federal precedent based on title VII, those precedents analogous to questions presented under the CRA are persuasive and will be afforded substantial consideration by this Court. DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 437; 566 NW2d 661 (1997), citing McCalla v Ellis, 180 Mich App 372, 377-378; 446 NW2d 904 (1989). However, we are always primarily obligated when interpreting Michigan law to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Michigan Legislature. Chambers, supra at 314. Therefore, while we may look for guidance in federal interpretations of similar laws, we must not defer to federal interpretations when doing so would be inconsistent with any portion of our Legislature’s enactment. Id.-, Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462, 472-473; 606 NW2d 398 (1999). This Court has interpreted the retaliation provision of the CRA, MCL 37.2701(a), to require that a plaintiff prove a prima face case by showing: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) that this was known by the defendant, (3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. [Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 568-569; 619 NW2d 182 (2000), citing DeFlaviis, supra at 436.] To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that his participation in activity protected by the CRA was a “significant factor” in the employer’s adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link between the two. Jacklyn v Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp, 176 F3d 921, 929 (CA 6, 1999); Polk v Yellow Freight System, Inc, 801 F2d 190, 199 (CA 6, 1986). (a) RETALIATION BASED ON THE FILING OF FORMAL COMPLAINTS WITH THE MDCR In the present case, plaintiff’s conduct of filing complaints with the mdcr on March 11, 1994, May 12, 1994, and September 16, 1994, charging gender discrimination and retaliation was “protected activity” for purposes of a retaliation claim. See MCL 37.2701(a) (prohibiting retaliation “because the person has . . . filed a complaint . . . under this act”). These complaints became known to KCC. Subsequently, plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Thus, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the first three elements of his claim of retaliation. In order for plaintiff to prevail on his retaliation claim, he must establish causation. The record is void of any evidence of causation with respect to the MDCR complaints. The undisputed evidence establishes that Franke considered discharging plaintiff and had definitely decided not to renew plaintiff’s contract before plaintiff filed any of the three complaints. Plaintiff did not dispute Franke’s trial testimony that she was the only KCC administrator with authority to discharge employees. A memo written by Franke, dated March 3, 1994, and sent to KCC’s board of trustees, stated that plaintiff was having problems accepting direction and responsibility and had a generally “poor attitude.” Franke specified: “If all this spells ‘fire’ to you, it does to me, also. ... I can tell you for sure that I won’t be recommending renewal for his contract which ends in September.” Given the content of that memo, plaintiffs filing of the MDCR complaints commencing on Maxch 11, 1994, cannot be said to have been a “significant factor” in Franke’s decision not to renew plaintiff’s contract or to discharge plaintiff. See Jacklyn, supra, and Polk, supra. Consequently, those filings cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim. Meyer, supra. (b) RETALIATION BASED ON AN ORAL COMPLAINT The relevant question, therefore, is whether plaintiff engaged in any protected activity before Franke’s drafting of the March 3, 1994, memo. Plaintiff presented evidence that soon after Vajda became aware of his relationship with Goshom, Vajda severed direct communication with him, created new employment policies pertaining only to him, and enforced old policies that were not previously enforced with respect to other employees. Plaintiff claims that he disclosed Vajda’s adverse treatment to Franke during a meeting in January 1994. He contends that Franke’s failure to put a stop to Vajda’s adverse treatment of him was, itself, an adverse employment action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of the CRA without establishing that he engaged in activity protected under the act. Meyer, supra. MCL 37.2701(a) specifically defines the type of activity protected under the cra. As it relates to this action, the cra specifically prohibits retaliation or discrimination because “the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge . . . under this act.” Applying MCL 37.2701(a) to the facts of this case, we must determine whether plaintiff’s oral complaint to Franke in January 1994 amounted to a charge made under the CRA or opposition to a violation of the CRA. We conclude that it did not. (i) PLAINTIFF DID NOT MAKE A CHARGE UNDER THE CRA Plaintiff did not take any action that could be construed as a “charge” under tae act. An employee need not specifically cite the CRA when making a charge under the act. However, the employee must do more than generally assert unfair treatment. See Mitan v Neiman Marcus, 240 Mich App 679, 682; 613 NW2d 415 (2000) (holding complaints amounting to generic claims of “job discrimination” did not qualify as a charge made under the Persons with Disabilities Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq.'). The employee’s charge must clearly convey to an objective employer that the employee is raising the specter of a claim of unlawful discrimination pursuant to the CRA. McLe
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