Kevin Harrison vs. NetCentric Corporation & others
Case Details
- Citation
- 433 Mass. 465
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- summary judgment
- State
- Massachusetts
- Circuit
- 1st Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination, and interference with contractual relations. The court held that Delaware law (not Massachusetts law) governed the fiduciary duty claim, and Delaware does not impose heightened fiduciary duties on close corporation shareholders. The court also held that unvested shares constitute compensation contingent on future employment, not earned compensation, and the clear contractual terms permitted repurchase upon termination.
Excerpt
Kevin Harrison vs. NetCentric Corporation & others. Middlesex. December 4, 2000. March 14, 2001. Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, & Cowin, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Fiduciary. Corporation, Close corporation, Stock. Conflict of Laws. Contract, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Interference with contractual relations. The law of Delaware was applicable to a claim by a minority shareholder of a close corporation for breach of fiduciary duty; and where Delaware’s law did not impose a heightened fiduciary duty on shareholders of a close corporation, the corporation and stockholders were entitled to summary judgment on such a claim. [468-472] The clear and unambiguous provisions of a stock agreement and an employee noncompetition agreement, providing that the corporation had the right to buy back the employee’s unvested shares at the original purchase price if the employee ceased to be employed by the corporation “for any reason . . . with or without cause,” did not support a former employee’s claim that the close corporation breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it discharged him and made a demand to repurchase the employee’s unvested shares, where there was no evidence that the unvested shares represented compensation earned but not yet paid. [472-476] No evidence supported a claim by a shareholder and former employee of a close corporation that defendant directors of the corporation interfered with his at-will employment contract; in any event, the employment agreement provided that the employee could be terminated “for any reason or no reason.” [476-479] The clear and unambiguous provisions of a stock agreement and an employee noncompetition agreement required the employee to tender his unvested shares in the close corporation when the corporation exercised its right under the agreement to repurchase the employee’s shares upon the termination of his employment. [479-480] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 30, 1996. The case was heard by Judith Fabricant, J., on a motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. C. Max Perlman {Robert E. Sullivan with him) for the plaintiff. John G. Fabiano {Douglas J. Nash with him) for the defendants. Cynthia L. Amara & Loretta M. Smith, for Associated Industries of Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Northbridge Venture Partners, L.P.; Matrix Partners; Sean O’Sullivan; Edward Anderson; Tim Barrows; Robert Goldman; and Robert Ryan. Cowin, J. The plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer, NetCentric Corporation (NetCentric); its chief executive officer, Sean O’Sullivan (O’Sullivan); four of its directors; and two venture capital firms that invested in NetCentric (collectively, the defendants). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty; breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; wrongfully terminated his employment; and intentionally interfered with his contractual relations. All of the plaintiff’s claims stem from his termination as an officer of Net-Centric and the company’s attempt to repurchase from him certain shares of his stock pursuant to a stock restriction agreement (stock agreement). The plaintiff also seeks a declaration that NetCentric has no right to repurchase the stock for the stated price of $0.001 a share. The defendants asserted a counterclaim for specific enforcement of the purchase option provision of the stock agreement. A Superior Court judge allowed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all the plaintiff’s claims, and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim. The plaintiff appealed from the grant of summary judgment, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 1. Background. We summarize the undisputed material facts. See Annese Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Newton, 431 Mass. 763, 764 (2000). In 1994, the plaintiff, O’Sullivan, and his brother, Donal O’Sullivan (Donal) (collectively, the founders), discussed forming a business entity to develop a medium for delivering facsimile transmissions across the world by way of the internet. The founders agreed to a stock ownership arrangement whereby O’Sullivan would receive approximately 4.5 million shares, the plaintiff 2.9 million shares, and Donal 1.5 million shares. In need of financing, they obtained capital investment from Matrix Partners (Matrix) and Northbridge Venture Partners, L.P. (Northbridge). They incorporated NetCentric the following year under Delaware law and established offices in Massachusetts. O’Sullivan was named the chief executive officer and a director. At some point, he became the chairman of the board as well. The plaintiff served initially as the company’s president, and later as its vice-president of sales and marketing, and as a director. Matrix and Northbridge received preferred stock and each appointed a director: Tim Barrows on behalf of Matrix, and Edward Anderson on behalf of Northbridge. Robert Goldman and Robert Ryan were named as outside directors. The plaintiff executed a stock agreement and an employee noncompetition, nondisclosure, and developments agreement (noncompetition agreement). His stock agreement, executed May 16, 1995, provided that he would purchase 2,944,842 shares of stock in NetCentric at $0,001 a share. Forty per cent of the shares (1,177,938) would vest on May 1, 1996, and an additional five per cent (147,242) would vest each succeeding quarter, until all the shares were vested. According to the agreement, if the plaintiff ceased to be employed by NetCentric “for any reason . . . with or without cause,” the company had the right to buy back his unvested shares at the original purchase price. All the plaintiff’s unvested shares would vest immediately, pursuant to an acceleration clause, should NetCentric merge with, or be acquired by, another company. Both the plaintiff’s stock agreement and his noncompetition agreement contained clauses providing that the agreements did not give the plaintiff any right to be retained as an employee of NetCentric and that each agreement represented the entire agreement between the parties and superseded all prior agreements and understandings relating to the same subject matter. In addition, the agreements contained a choice of law provision, providing that they “shall be construed, interpreted and enforced in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” In June, 1996, Donal’s employment was terminated, and the company exercised its right pursuant to Donal’s stock agreement to buy back his unvested shares. In September, 1996, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated. At that time, forty-five per cent of the plaintiff’s shares (1,325,180) had vested; the remaining fifty-five per cent (1,619,662) had not vested. A month later, NetCentric notified the plaintiff in writing that it was exercising its right pursuant to the stock agreement to buy back the plaintiff’s unvested shares. The plaintiff has refused to tender the shares to the company. During and after the time that Donal and the plaintiff were fired, NetCentric was in the process of hiring additional staff. New employees often were offered stock options in the company, issued from the employee stock option pool (pool), as part of their compensation packages. Some employee-shareholders expressed concern that this practice of authorizing new shares from the corporate treasury for issuance to new hires would dilute the value of their shares. Existing shares would not be diluted, however, if NetCentric acquired outstanding shares and offered those to new employees. After Donal was fired, the number of shares in the pool was increased by the same number that NetCentric had repurchased from him. Within one month after the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, NetCentric hired a president and two vice-presidents, one of whom replaced the plaintiff as vice-president of sales. All three new employees were granted stock options, totaling 1,812,500 shares. 2. Standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and, where' viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974); O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 431 Mass. 201, 203 (2000). 3. Breach of fiduciary duty. Initially, we must resolve a choice of law question. As a minority shareholder in a close corporation, the plaintiff maintains that the defendants owed him a duty of good faith and loyalty and that they breached this duty by terminating his employment in order to repurchase his unvested shares. This claim is based on Massachusetts law, which provides that shareholders in a close corporation owe each other the duty of “utmost good faith and loyalty.” Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-849 (1976) (majority shareholders breached fiduciary duty by taking adverse employment actions against minority shareholder in order to pressure him into selling his shares at less than fair value); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 593 (1975) (failure to offer to purchase minority shareholder’s shares at same price as offered to another shareholder was breach of fiduciary duty). The defendants claim, however, that Massachusetts law is of no avail to the plaintiff, as Massachusetts law is inapplicable to his fiduciary duty claim; NetCentric is a Delaware corporation, Delaware law applies, and Delaware law does not impose the . heightened fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty on shareholders in a close corporation. See Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996) (noting that Delaware has not adopted duty of utmost good faith and loyalty established in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., supra); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-1381 (Del. 1993) (declining “to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority investors”). Instead, under Delaware law, minority shareholders can protect themselves by contract (i.e., negotiate for protection in stock agreements or employment contracts) before investing in the corporation. Additionally, founding shareholders can elect to incorporate the company as a statutory close corporation under Delaware law, which provides special relief to shareholders of such corporations. To avoid the imposition of “conflicting demands,” “only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs — matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 224 (1997), quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). Traditionally, we have applied the law of the State of incorporation in matters relating to the internal affairs of a corporation (including both closely and widely held corporations), such as the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders. See Wasserman v. National Gypsum Co., 335 Mass. 240, 242 (1957); Beacon Wool Corp. v. Johnson, 331 Mass. 274, 279 (1954); Edwards v. International Pavement Co., 227 Mass. 206, 212-213 (1917). The plaintiff claims that we abandoned this “one-factor test” in Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 511 (1997), in favor of a “functional approach” that applies the law of the State with the most “significant relatiónship” to the particular issue. In the Demoulas case, we recognized a recent trend in our cases applying the functional approach to resolving choice of law questions. See id., and cases cited. See also Nile v. Nile, 432 Mass. 390, 401 (2000) (breach of contract); Kahn v. Royal Ins. Co, 429 Mass. 572, 572-573 (1999) (statutes of limitations); Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., All Mass. 643, 646 (1994) (statutes of repose); Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 631 (1985) (Statutes of Frauds). We followed this functional approach in the Demoulas case because the company involved was formed originally in Delaware but later merged into a Massachusetts corporation. We applied Massachusetts law to conduct that occurred both when the company was a Delaware corporation and later when it was a Massachusetts corporation because, in the “particular circumstances” of that case, we concluded that this State had a more significant relationship to the issues presented. See id. at 511. We determined that “[ajpplying two different sets of State laws to the activities of a corporation whose existence was, for all practical purposes, continuous throughout the period, would be a cumbersome and unnecessarily formalistic exercise.” Id. The Demoulas case was an exceptional one, as it concerned a company that had changed its State of incorporation as well as conduct that spanned both periods; thus, we conducted a functional analysis to determine which State had the more significant contacts. Nothing in our decision, however, suggested that we were overruling our long-standing policy of applying the law of the State of incorporation to internal corporate affairs. See id. (explicitly stating that we need not address whether we should continue to follow the State of incorporation principle). Today, we adhere to and reaffirm our policy that the State of incorporation dictates the choice of law regarding the internal affairs of a corporation. Our decision accords with that of a majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., supra at 224 (“States normally look to the State of a business’ incorporation for the law that provides the relevant corporate governance general standard of care”); R.W. Southgate & D.W. Glazer, Massachusetts Corporation Law and Practice § 16.5[d], at 541-542 n.102 (Supp. 1998, 1999), and cases cited. Similarly, our policy is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 (1971), which provides that the rights and liabilities of a corporation are generally determined by the law of the State of incorporation. See Model Business Corporation Act § 15.05(c) official comment (1998) (“Section 15.05[c] preserves the judicially developed doctrine that internal corporate affairs are governed by the state of incorporation even when the corporation’s business and assets are located primarily in other states”). This rule furthers the interests of “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, ease in the application of the law to be applied and, at least on occasion, protection of the justified expectations of the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 comment g, at 311. All three founders, including the plaintiff, deliberately chose to incorporate in Delaware. By so doing, they “ determine [d] the body of law that [would] govern the internal affairs of the corporation and the conduct of their directors. . . . The corporation and its shareholders rightfully expect that the laws under which they have chosen to do business will be applied.” Hart v. General Motors Corp., 129 A.D. 2d 179, 184-185 (N.Y. 1987). The unusual circumstances involved in the Demoulas case are not present in the case before us. We apply the general rule that the law of the State of incorporation governs claims concerning the internal affairs of a corporation, including the treatment of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. As NetCentric is, and always has been, a Delaware corporation, Delaware law applies to the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty. Because Delaware law does not impose a heightened fiduciary duty on shareholders in a close corporation, see Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, supra at 39; Nixon v. Blackwell, supra at 1380-1381, the standard on which the plaintiff bases his cause of action, summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants on this claim. 4. Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiff next claims that the defendants violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in all Massachusetts contracts, including contracts for employment at will. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-105 (1977). The Fortune case and its progeny provide that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee is terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed. See id. See also Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 304 (1982); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 672 (1981) (Gram 7); Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc., 108 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1997). The plaintiff argues that the defendants terminated his employment in bad faith because they were trying to prevent his remaining shares from vesting; that his unvested shares represent compensation previously earned; and that he was unlawfully deprived of this compensation by the defendants’ attempt to repurchase his unvested shares. In support of his contention, the plaintiff relies on the fact that he accepted a salary substantially lower than he had received in recent years because of the equity he received in NetCentric and because he expected he would be retained at least until his stock had fully vested. He also cites the fact that other employees received only stock options, while the founders received shares up front, and that all shares would immediately vest under the acceleration clause in his stock agreement should NetCentric merge with, or be acquired by, another company, a benefit granted only to the founders. The plaintiff claims that the unvested shares could not be considered payment for future services because they could have vested at any time in the event of a NetCentric merger. The defendants did not deprive the plaintiff of any income that he reasonably earned or to which he was entitled. His shares vested over time only if he continued to be employed; thus, the unvested shares are not earned compensation for past services, but compensation contingent on his continued employment. The plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is belied by the terms of his stock agreement. Under the agreement, the plaintiff’s shares were to vest each quarter that he remained a NetCentric employee until they had fully vested. Should the plaintiff cease working for NetCentric for any reason, his right to any unvested shares would terminate immediately, and the company could repurchase the shares at the original purchase price. The longer the plaintiff was employed by NetCentric, the more vested shares he would earn. At the time the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, forty-five per cent of his shares had vested. He had not yet earned the remaining fifty-five per cent. These unvested shares were contingent on the plaintiff providing future services for NetCentric, unless NetCentric merged with, or was acquired by, another company. See Sargent v. Tanaska, Inc., supra at 8-9 (terms “vested” and “unvested” not automatically controlling, but periodic vesting schedule can define line between past and future services). The plaintiff seeks support from Cataldo v. Zuckerman, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 731, 741 (1985), quoting Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 391 Mass. 333, 334 (1984) (Gram II), in which the Appeals Court held that an employee’s unvested interest in real estate development projects “was sufficiently an ‘identifiable, future benefit . . . reflective of past services.’ ” The court concluded that the employee’s interest in future projects was a “continuing inducement” to work for his employer and constituted “compensation for that continuing work.” Id. at 740 (“Actual realization by Cataldo of the value of any share of the developer’s equity was for th
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