CORLEY v. DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
Case Details
- Citation
- 246 Mich. App. 15
- Judge(s)
- Before: Neff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Jansen, JJ.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
Court of Appeals reversed summary disposition on plaintiff's sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims, finding they presented cognizable claims of sex discrimination under Michigan's Civil Rights Act based on adverse employment actions stemming from a former intimate relationship with her supervisor. Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's disparate treatment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract claims.
Excerpt
CORLEY v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION Docket No. 218528. Submitted January 9, 2001, at Detroit. Decided May 15, 2001, at 9:05 A.M. Leave to appeal sought. Patricia M. Corley brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the Detroit Board of Education, Joseph Smith, and Barbara Finch, alleging discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., breach of contract, and intentional infliction of • emotional distress. The court, Wendy M. Baxter, J., granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, finding, in part, that the alleged adverse employment action against the plaintiff that was based on the plaintiff’s former intimate relationship with Smith, her supervisor, did not present a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the act. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held: 1. Adverse employment action against an employee based on the employee’s former intimate relationship with the employee’s supervisor presents a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the act. The court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants with regard to the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim. That part of the court’s order must be reversed and the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. 2. The plaintiff established sufficient facts for her claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment to survive a motion for summary disposition. 3. The plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts to support her theories of intentional sex discrimination or disparate treatment. Summary disposition of those claims of sex discrimination was proper and must be affirmed. 4. Reasonable minds could not find that the defendants’ conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The court did not err in dismissing the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 5. The court properly dismissed the breach of contract claim, which alleged an implied contract, on the basis that the claim concerned subject matter expressly covered by the plaintiff’s union contract. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Civil Rights — Sex Discrimination — Adverse Employment Actions. Alleged adverse employment action against an employee that is based on the employee’s former intimate relationship with the employee’s supervisor presents a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (MCL 37.2101 et seg.). Ernest L. Jarrett, for the plaintiff. Plunkett & Cooney, PC. (by Christine D. Oldani, Kenneth L. Lewis, and Venessa Peterson Williams'), for the defendants. Before: Neff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Jansen, JJ. Neff, P.J. Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants on her claims of sex discrimination, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, following the termination of her adult education job with defendant Detroit Board of Education. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. i This appeal presents an issue of first impression regarding whether alleged adverse employment action against an employee based on the employee’s former intimate relationship with the employee’s supervisor presents a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (cra), MCL 37.2101 et seq. We conclude that it does, and, therefore, summary disposition of plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim in favor of defendants was improper. However, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendants regarding plaintiff’s other claims of sex discrimination and her claims of breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. n Plaintiff was employed by defendant Detroit Board of Education as a full-time counselor at Cass Technical High School and, following a divorce in 1991, she took an additional part-time position in the adult education program at the Golightly Vocational Center operated by the board. An intimate, romantic relationship developed between plaintiff and her supervisor at Golightly, defendant Joseph Smith, that lasted nearly four years, but ended in 1995, when Smith became involved with defendant Barbara Finch, another Golightly administrator, whom he married in the spring of 1996. Because of plaintiffs past intimate relationship with Smith, problems arose at Golightly between plaintiff, Smith, and Finch. Following the 1995-96 school year, Smith informed plaintiff that her counseling job at Golightly would not be continued. Following the termination of her adult education position, plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination in violation of the CRA, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In her claims, plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, sexual harassment, disparate treatment, and the unlawful termination of her employment because of her gender and her prior relationship with defendant Smith. The trial court initially granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants with regard to all claims except the breach of contract claim against the board and Smith. The court subsequently granted summary disposition in favor of the board and Smith regarding plaintiffs breach of contract claim, concluding that it was barred by the applicable collective bargaining agreement. m This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary disposition de novo as a question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). The trial court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10). motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). We consider all relevant documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; Ardt, supra. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is proper only when there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is proper when “the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no- factual development could establish the claim and justify recovery.” Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 258; 586 NW2d 103 (1998). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), this Court does not act as a factfinder, but, instead, accepts all well-pleaded facts as true. Radtke, supra at 373. Statutory construction is also a question of law, requiring review de novo. Haworth, Inc v Wickes Mfg Co, 210 Mich App 222, 227; 532 NW2d 903 (1995). A Under Michigan law, freedom from discrimination in employment because of a person’s sex is a civil right. MCL 37.2102; Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 309; 614 NW2d 910 (2000). Subsection 202(1)(a) of the cra provides that an employer may not “discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . sex . . . .” MCL 37.2202(1)(a). Discrimination because of a person’s sex includes sexual harassment of the person. MCL 37.2103(i); Chambers, supra at 309. The CRA defines sexual harassment to include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions: :|: * * (ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment.... (hi) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment, ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment. [MCL 37.2103(i)(i), (ii), (iii).] To establish a claim of harassment under subsection 103(i)(n), generally termed “quid pro quo” harassment, an employee must show “(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment.” [Chambers, supra at 310-311, quoting Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 708-709; 545 NW2d 596 (1996).] To establish an harassment claim under subsection 103(i)(m), referred to as “hostile work environment” harassment, an employee must prove (1) the employee belonged to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of sex; (3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; (4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in fact did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) respondeat superior. [Chambers, supra at 311, quoting Radtke, supra at 382-383.] In her complaint, plaintiff set forth claims of both “sexual harassment” (presumably quid pro quo sexual harassment) and “hostile work environment.” On the evidence presented, we conclude that plaintiff established sufficient facts for her claim to survive a motion for summary disposition under either theory. B The threshold issue for a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment is that submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct was “a factor in decisions affecting [the plaintiffs] employment . . . .” MCL 37.2103(i)(n); Chambers, supra at 317. Because it is undisputed that plaintiffs employment at Golightly was terminated, and because plaintiff averred various actions by Smith and Finch affecting plaintiffs job at Golightly, plaintiff has established a genuine issue concerning whether the alleged adverse actions were factors in decisions affecting her employment. Thus, we first consider whether plaintiff established a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under subsection 103(i)(w). Plaintiff argues that defendants’ adverse actions against her constituted sexual harassment because they were rooted in the reactions of Smith and Finch to a past consensual intimate relationship between plaintiff and Smith, who was plaintiff’s supervisor and a department head at Golightly. In her complaint, plaintiff averred that after their breakup, Smith confronted her at work with thinly veiled threats either expressly or implicitly warning her that she would lose her job unless she promised to do nothing to adversely affect his subsequent relationship with Finch. Further, Smith repeatedly raised the issue in the form of threats throughout the school year, despite plaintiff’s reassurances that she had no intention of interfering with Smith’s relationship with Finch. Plaintiff, an evening-school counselor, further averred that defendant Finch, a day-school administrator at Golightly, was aware of the former relationship between Smith and plaintiff, and that Finch, through conduct and indirect communications, exhibited hostility toward plaintiff and made her displeasure with plaintiff’s regular presence at the school known to plaintiff. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that Finch, through Smith, interceded in the directing of plaintiff’s employment to impose work conditions specific to plaintiff, such as assigning her a particular desk in the counseling center within Finch’s area of responsibility, thus preventing plaintiff from working away from Finch. No one else was given an assigned seat. In Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 322; 628 NW2d 63 (2001), this Court recently held that the cra does not “prohibit conduct based on romantic jealousy,” and therefore no claim of sex discrimination could be made where the male plaintiff alleged that his male supervisor subjected him to adverse employment actions because they were both pursuing a romance with the same female employee. However, Barrett can be distinguished from this case in that the defendants’ conduct in Barrett did not emanate from a prior sexual/romantic relationship between the plaintiff and his supervisor and there was no claim or evidence that the plaintiff was required to submit to sexual harassment as a condition of employment. Id. at 319, 323. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants targeted her for persistent and hostile communications and other adverse actions because they disliked her continued presence in the workplace as Smith’s former paramour may reasonably be considered allegations of conduct or communication “of a sexual nature,” MCL 37.2103(i)(i), in that they emanated from the romantic/sexual relationship between plaintiff and Smith. Similarly, plaintiff’s allegation that she suffered adverse employment actions and was discharged for reasons stemming from her status as Smith’s former girlfriend may reasonably be considered an allegation that plaintiff’s employment was terminated because of her “submission” to Smith’s prior romantic/sexual advances. The Civil Rights Act is a “remedial statute” of “manifest breadth and comprehensive nature . . . .” Eide v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 36; 427 NW2d 488 (1988). “[R]emediai statutes are to be liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy.” Id. at 34. The provisions of the cra covering sexual harassment in the workplace should be read to broadly protect an employee against adverse employment action taken by an employer acting in furtherance of personal animosity toward the employee as the result of the employer’s sexual advances. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of fact concerning whether she was subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment. c With regard to plaintiff’s claim of a hostile work environment, we conclude on the same facts that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for that claim to survive a motion for summary disposition. Our reasoning with regard to quid pro quo harassment applies similarly to establish that plaintiff belonged to a protected group, was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of her sex, and that the conduct or communication was unwelcome. See Radtke, supra at 383-385 (analyzing the first three elements of a claim of hostile work environment). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as a female, former girlfriend of her supervisor, plaintiff was the object of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication, in the form of remarks and offensive actions by Smith and Finch. She informed Smith that she considered his actions to be harassment and told him to cease threatening her; plaintiff also expressed her resentment to Finch for complaining about plaintiff. With respect to the fourth element of a claim of hostile work environment, plaintiff presented evidence to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the conduct or communication substantially interfered with her employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. “[W]hether a hostile work environment existed shall be determined by whether a reasonable person, in the totality of circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.” Id. at 394. Plaintiff was subjected to threats, numerous offensive remarks, adverse working conditions, and ultimately replaced as a counselor because of her past relationship with her supervisor. Finally, plaintiff presented evidence to establish the element of respondeat superior. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that Smith telephoned plaintiff at Cass Technical on the day she was to return to work at Golightly and told her that she was being replaced by another counselor, although her counterpart, a Ms. Watts, was not being replaced. Plaintiff received no other notice that her position at Golightly, which she had had for the past five years, was terminated. On that same day, plaintiff contacted Dr. Lucille Peoples, the Golightly adult education director, concerning the termination of her employment and whether there was any problem with her work, but plaintiff was not thereafter assigned to a counseling position. Mindful of the standards by which a court must view the evidence in deciding a motion for summary disposition, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, MCR 2.116(C)(8), and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, MCR 2.116(C)(10), we conclude that summary disposition of plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims was improper. We find no error in the summary dismissal of plaintiff’s other claims of sex discrimination. We conclude that plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts to support her theories of intentional sex discrimination or disparate treatment. See Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 181, n 31; 579 NW2d 906 (1998) (disparate treatment requires evidence that a female plaintiff was treated differently than a similarly situated male employee); Schultes v Naylor, 195 Mich App 640, 646; 491 NW2d 240 (1992) (intentional discrimination requires a showing that the defendant was predisposed to discriminate against persons in the affected class). IV We also find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract. We conclude that reasonable minds could not differ that the complained-of conduct was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 234; 551 NW2d 206 (1996). We also conclude that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs implied contract claim on the ground that it concerned subject matter expressly covered by her union contract. Wallace v Recorder’s Court of Detroit, 207 Mich App 443, 446-447; 525 NW2d 481 (1994). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff also characterizes these actions as discrimination based on marital status, contending that her status as a single mother was a factor in her harassment because Smith knew that she could not afford to lose her job. However, plaintiff presents only cursory argument on this claim, and we find plaintiffs argument too tenuous to form a basis for relief.
Similar Rulings
CORLEY v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION Docket No. 119773. Decided June 17, 2004. On application by the defendants for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals relating to sexual harassment claims and reinstated the circuit court order granting summary disposition for the defendants. Patricia M. Corley brought a civil rights action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the Detroit Board of Education, Joseph Smith (the plaintiffs former supervisor), and Barbara Finch (the plaintiffs former coworker), claiming a hostile work environment and adverse employment actions suffered as a consequence of the plaintiffs romantic relationship with Smith, who later had a romantic relationship with Finch. The court, Wendy M. Baxter, J., granted summary disposition for the defendants. The Court of Appeals, Neff, EJ., and Holbrook, Jr., and Jansen, JJ., reversed, determining that the alleged persistent and hostile communications could reasonably be considered communications of a sexual nature because of the past relationship between the plaintiff and Smith, and that the alleged threats, offensive remarks, and adverse working conditions established sufficient evidence of sexual harassment. 246 Mich App 15 (2001). The defendants sought leave to appeal. In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held.-. The plaintiff failed to establish that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or conduct or communication of a sexual nature. MCL 37.2103(i). She therefore failed to meet the threshold requirements for establishing sexual harassment under a hostile work environment theory or quid pro quo theory. The plaintiffs allegations that Smith warned her not to interfere with his relationship with Finch, and threatened her with consequences if she did, concerned hostile, but not sexual, matters. Allegations of Finch’s conversations about the plaintiff and Finch’s relocation of the plaintiffs work station conveyed nothing more than enmity between romantic rivals, not conduct or communication of a sexual nature. Reversed; circuit court order reinstated. Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelly, dissenting, stated that the issue in this case is sufficiently closely drawn and jurisprudentially significant that the Supreme Court and the parties would benefit from full briefing and argument, instead of the case being settled by an opinion per curiam after a perfunctory fifteen minutes of oral argument on the application seeking leave to appeal. Civil Rights — Sexual Harassment — Pleading. A plaintiff in a civil rights action for sexual harassment must plead, as a threshold matter, unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or conduct or communication of a sexual nature (MCL 37.2301[i]). Plunkett & Cooney, PC. (by Christine D. Oldani and Kenneth L. Lewis), for the defendants. PER CURIAM. In this sexual harassment action, plaintiff claims to have suffered an adverse employment action as a consequence of a prior romantic relationship with one of the defendants, MCL 37.2103(i) (ii), and a hostile work environment, MCL 37.2103(i) (iii). We conclude that plaintiffs complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show sexual harassment under either theory and, therefore, fails as a matter of law. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision pertaining to plaintiffs sexual harassment claims and reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary disposition for defendants. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff and defendant Joseph Smith were employed by the Detroit Board of Education to work in its adult education program at the Golightly Vocational Center. Plaintiff was employed part-time as a counselor, and defendant Smith was her supervisor. During the course of their employment, plaintiff and Smith became romantically involved in a relationship that lasted three or four years. The relationship ended when Smith started dating another employee, defendant Barbara Finch. Plaintiff alleges that after Smith and Finch became involved, defendant Smith repeatedly threatened plaintiff with adverse employment action if she said or did anything that interfered with his relationship with Finch. Plaintiff also alleges that Finch taunted, embarrassed, and humiliated her by causing plaintiffs work station to be moved and by engaging in “catty” conversations with others that were about plaintiff and intended to be overheard by her. According to plaintiff, the alleged harassment culminated when she was discharged at the conclusion of the 1995-1996 school year. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming sexual harassment, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Regarding the sexual harassment claim, plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to two species of harassment prohibited by the Michigan Civil Rights Act: a hostile working environment, MCL 37.2103(i)(iii), and quid pro quo sexual harassment, MCL 37.2103(i)(ii). Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), the circuit court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, ruling that plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition regarding the sexual harassment claims, reasoning that the alleged persistent and hostile communications could reasonably be considered communications of a sexual nature because defendants “disliked” plaintiffs “continued presence in the workplace as Smith’s former paramour.” Furthermore, the Court determined that plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence of quid pro quo sexual harassment because she suffered adverse employment actions as a result of “her ‘submission’ to Smith’s prior” romantic overtures. The panel additionally reasoned that the alleged threats, offensive remarks, and adverse working conditions established sufficient evidence of a hostile work environment. Defendants seek leave to appeal to this Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo the resolution of a summary disposition motion. A motion “under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of the pleadings alone.” “The purpose of such a motion is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion should be granted if no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” “A motion under MCR 2.116(0(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” In evaluating such a motion, a court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. III. ANALYSIS We turn initially to whether plaintiff alleges facts sufficient under MCR 2.116(0(10) to establish a claim of sexual harassment actionable under either a quid pro quo theory or a hostile work environment theory, MCL 37.2103(i)(ii), (iii). “Sexual harassment” is defined in MCL 37.2103(i) as: [UJnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions: (ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. (iii) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment. Thus, as a threshold matter, plaintiff must allege facts showing that she was subjected to “unwelcome sexual advances,” “requests for sexual favors,” or “conduct or communication of a sexual nature” before she can establish actionable sexual harassment under a hostile work environment theory or a quid pro quo theory. MCL 37.2103(i). Plaintiff does not contend that defendants made either unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors. We thus turn to the third element of MCL 37.2103(i) to determine if she was subjected to “conduct or communication of a sexual nature.” “Sexual nature” is not defined in the statute. Where a term is not defined in the statute, we will review its ordinary dictionary meaning for guidance. “Sexual” is defined, in part, as “of or pertaining to sex” or “occurring between or involving the sexes: sexual relations” “Nature” is defined as a “native or inherent characteristic.” Utilizing these two commonly understood definitions, we conclude that actionable sexual harassment requires conduct or communication that inherently pertains to sex. The conduct and communication alleged by plaintiff do not meet this definition. Plaintiff contends that defendant Smith repeatedly warned plaintiff not to interfere with his relationship with Finch and threatened her with consequences if she did. The Court of Appeals, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, concluded that the threats could constitute unwelcome sexual communications because they stemmed from Smith’s past intimate relationship with plaintiff. 'We disagree. After their intimate relationship ended, their working relationship became difficult, but defendant Smith’s alleged threats that he would fire plaintiff if she interfered with his new relationship were not inherently sexual in nature. Verbal or physical conduct or communication that is not sexual in nature is not sexual harassment. For this reason, we conclude that plaintiff cannot meet the threshold requirement to establish either a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim or hostile work environment sexual harassment claim against defendant Smith. Regarding defendant Finch, plaintiff alleges that Finch contributed to a hostile work environment by engaging in “catty” conversations about plaintiff and by causing plaintiffs work station to be relocated. As discussed above, plaintiff must establish that the asserted conduct or communication were of a sexual nature. That is, that Finch’s conduct or communication inherently pertained to sex. Here, the asserted communication by Finch conveyed nothing more than Finch’s personal animosity towards plaintiff. MCL 37.2103(i) does not forbid the communication of enmity between romantic rivals, even if the predicate for the dislike is sexual competition, as long as the conduct or communication is not inherently sexual. In summary, what may have been sexual in this case did not involve harassment, while what did involve harassment was not sexual. It cannot be said by any understanding of the language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to “sexual harassment.” Thus, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement to establish sexual harassment by Finch because this connection between sex and the alleged conduct and communication is missing. IV CONCLUSION Plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of law because she has not established evidence of conduct or communication of a “sexual nature” as required to support a claim of sexual harassment. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to plaintiffs sexual harassment claims and reinstate the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition for defendants under MCR 2.116(0(10). Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, Taylor, Young, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred. . Plaintiff simultaneously held full-time employment with the Detroit Board of Education. The facts relevant to this case involve only plaintiffs part-time employment at Golightly. Defendants Smith and Finch have since married. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition regarding breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 246 Mich App 15, 25-26; 632 NW2d 147 (2001). Plaintiff did not appeal those rulings. 246 Mich App 22. 246 Mich App 23. Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 193; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129-130; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Id. at 118-120. Cox v Bd ofHosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 18; 651 NW2d 356 (2002). Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1990). Id. See Haynie v Dep’t of State Police, 468 Mich 302, 312; 664 NW2d 129 (2003); see also Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 321; 628 NW2d 63 (2001) (reiterating that the Civil Rights Act is not so broad as to bar all conduct that is in any way related to sex). Haynie, supra at 310. Because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we need not decide the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8). CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. While the majority sees fit to dispose of this case by an opinion per curiam after a perfunctory fifteen minutes of oral argument on the application, I believe that defendant’s application for leave should be granted and this case should be decided only after full briefing and argument. The Court of Appeals opinion in this case is published. Further, the issue presented is jurispruden-tially significant and is more closely drawn than the majority would have the reader believe. I am unclear whether the result reached by the majority is correct. Additionally, I am troubled by the majority’s quick resort to the dictionary, without any consideration of the purpose or principles underlying Michigan’s Civil Rights Act and without any examination of the federal cases that have considered this issue. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent because this Court, and the parties, would be better served by granting defendant’s application for leave. KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
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