David B. Miller vs. Labor Relations Commission

Stephen Trychon vs. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. No. 15-P-1316. Suffolk. May 16, 2016. September 15, 2016. Present: Agnes, Massing, & Kinder, JJ. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. Practice. Civil. Motion to dismiss. Employment. Termination, Retaliation. A Superior Court judge erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint charging the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) with violations of G. L. c. 149, § 185, the Massachusetts public employee whistleblower statute, where the plaintiff, a former managerial employee of the MBTA, alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show that he had engaged in protected activities (i.e., reporting contract fraud, unsafe track conditions, and the high incidence of eye injuries among employees), and that those activities played a substantial or motivating part in the MBTA’s decision to terminate his employment. [254-260] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 11, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J. Kevin G. Powers for the plaintiff. Jeffrey A. Dretler for the defendant. Agnes, J. In this appeal, we must determine the legal sufficiency of Stephen Trychon’s complaint charging the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) with violations of G. L. c. 149, § 185, the Massachusetts public employee whistle-blower statute (whistleblower statute). A Superior Court judge allowed the MBTA’s motion, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974), to dismiss the complaint. We conclude that Trychon has stated a plausible claim for relief. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment. 1. Standard of review. We review the order dismissing the complaint de novo, accepting the truth of all factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in Trychon’s favor. See Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 754 (2014). A complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if the factual allegations “plausibly suggest” an entitlement to relief, raising the right to relief “above the speculative level.” Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014), quoting from Iannacchino, supra. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974). The factual content is sufficient if it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and “it. . . raise[s] a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence [of the alleged misconduct].” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 712 (2012), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In conducting the “context-specific” inquiry required by the plausibility standard, we must “draw on [our] judicial experience and common sense.” Lopez, supra, quoting from Ashcroft, supra at 679. “The critical question is whether the claim, viewed holistically, is made plausible by ‘the cumulative effect of the factual allegations’ contained in the complaint.” A.G. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 2013), quoting from Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). 2. Background. We recite the allegations of Trychon’s complaint, along with reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those allegations. Although merely allegations, we must accept them as true for the purposes of reviewing the dismissal of a complaint. See Harrington, supra. Trychon’s employment. The holder of a master’s degree in business administration, Trychon worked in various management positions for the MBTA from his date of hire on March 30, 2009, until April 10, 2013. During that time period, he was promoted twice and received excellent performance reviews. His job duties and responsibilities grew over time. Trychon alleges that he made it his mission to eliminate the causes of the MBTA’s $180 million debt. For example, Trychon brought in consultants to review the MBTA’s station cleaning program, working with them on creating new, more cost-effective contract specifications. As a result of his efforts, Trychon asserts that he saved taxpayers $18 million over a five-year period. According to Trychon, with the exception of his direct superior, Michael Turcotte, MBTA management was not interested in changing the “culture of waste and inefficiency.” Contract fraud investigation. Assigned by Turcotte on or about February 10, 2011, to investigate possible contract fraud, Trychon alleges he uncovered two improprieties at the MBTA: the illegal extensions of expired contracts and the practice of dividing large contracts and purchases into smaller ones to avoid the necessity of management approval. Trychon reported his findings to Turcotte and to Jonathan Davis, the then acting general manager of the MBTA (GM) and former head of the procurement department. An official fraud investigation revealed that the root cause of the fraud was the procurement department. As a result of the investigation, at least one employee was fired. Informed by the investigating accountant that the evidence of fraud in the procurement department “ran very deep” and that many more employees would be implicated if the investigation continued, Davis stopped the investigation. Eyewear policy. In or about May, 2011, Trychon noticed a significant number of eye injuries sustained by MBTA employees. As a result of an investigation, Trychon drafted and implemented a new eyewear policy that required all E & M employees performing potentially hazardous duties to wear protective equipment. After Trychon and Turcotte discovered general disregard of that policy by E & M employees during a department-wide safety audit, a directive was issued requiring all E & M managers to conduct daily safety inspections and to file daily reports. On or about January 25, 2012, an employee who reported to Patrick Kineavy, the director of MOW, was disciplined for refusing to put on the required eyewear as instructed by Trychon. When Trychon observed continuing noncompliance with the policy among Kineavy’s group, Kineavy received a written warning, was placed on a thirty-day corrective action plan, and was required to document and report his safety-compliance inspections. When asked to produce proof of his safety-compliance inspections, Kineavy was unable to do so, and later provided Trychon with twelve allegedly fabricated safety observations. In or about April, 2012, Trychon wrote a memorandum to Turcotte recommending that Kineavy be removed from his director duties. Acting GM Davis and MBTA human resources director William Perez rejected that recommendation independently submitted to them by Turcotte. Kineavy’s safety-compliance reporting duties were switched from Trychon to Turcotte. In August, 2012, Turcotte sought in writing Kineavy’s termination based upon Kineavy’s verbal threat, failure to enforce the eyewear policy, fraudulent reporting, and continued poor performance reviews. State Secretary of Transportation Richard Davey and acting GM Davis stepped in and created a new job for Kineavy with minimal responsibilities and better pay. They also switched Kineavy’s reporting duties to Sean McCarthy, “an old South Boston buddy of [Kineavy].” Suspected time fraud. The complaint further alleges that “[i]t was reported” to Trychon and Turcotte that “very close friends” of Kineavy and Matthew McGuire, the deputy director of MOW, did not punch in for work by hand scanner as required by MBTA policy, but were still being paid. Trychon determined that a supervisor in SMI “was taping or was allowing his name to be taped” on time sheets without properly verifying that the employees had actually reported for work. Trychon decided to conduct a full investigation of E & M to determine the extent of the practice. News of the investigation leaked, and the original records of Kineavy and McGuire were stolen. Unsafe track conditions. Trychon claims that, pursuant to State regulation, the MBTA is required to “update and create new track standards every two (2) years.” In or about August, 2012, Try-chon discovered that the last updates were made in 2008. Trychon directed Kineavy and McGuire to bring the MBTA into regulatory compliance as soon as possible. To that end, Trychon approved the hiring of a highly-regarded, independent track inspector, HNTB. The report issued by HNTB warned the MBTA of alarming safety conditions needing correction that dated back to HNTB’s previous inspection in 2006. Neither Kineavy nor McGuire had addressed the unsafe track conditions since 2006. McGuire steered the report to himself and did not disclose it to Trychon. A concerned member of McGuire’s staff provided copies of the HNTB report to Trychon, who in turn passed copies on to Tur-cotte and to his subordinates, directors Joseph McNall and Andrew Baker. Asked by Turcotte why he had hidden the results of the report, McGuire allegedly became enraged and accused Turcotte and Trychon of “having an agenda” against him and Kineavy. When Turcotte requested that Perez “relieve [McGuire] of his duties,” Perez stated that he would transfer McGuire to the MBTA’s safety department. McGuire informed his boss, Baker, that “[b]ig changes are coming, and he (McGuire) is not going anywhere.” Baker reported the comment to Trychon and to Turcotte. Adverse employment actions. The complaint also alleges that following Turcotte’s “functional[ ] demotion],” on March 1, 2013, by the new GM, Beverly Scott, Turcotte resigned. On April 9, 2013, Trychon received an unsigned card that stated, “ ‘Good luck.’ ‘Enjoy your layoff!’ and ‘Fuck off.’ ” On the following day, Perez informed Trychon that he was laid off. At the time, Trychon had not yet completed his investigation of the suspected time fraud. 3. Discussion. In general, G. L. c. 149, § 185, protects public employees from retaliation by their employers for disclosing to a supervisor or public body workplace activities, policies, or practices that the employee reasonably believes violate the law, or pose a risk to public health, safety, or the environment. There is little decisional law by our appellate courts construing § 185’s provisions. In contrast, the Federal courts have had the opportunity to construe and apply § 185 on a number of occasions. While we are required to make our own judgment about the intent of the Legislature in adopting the statute, and are not bound by interpretations reached by Federal courts, we regard those decisions as persuasive authority and, in this case, find them to be instructive. See Fidler v. E. M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 545 (1985). There are three elements to a whistleblower claim brought under G. L. c. 149, § 185. The plaintiff-employee must prove that (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) participation in that activity played a substantial or motivating part in the retaliatory action; and (3) damages resulted. See Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 943 (1st Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Freetown, 479 F. Supp. 2d 227, 241 (D. Mass. 2007). The plausibility standard, as clarified by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, does not require the pleading of specific facts to establish each element of the prima facie case. See Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that “prima facie [case] is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard”). The prima facie elements, however, are relevant “background against which a plausibility determination should be made.” Ibid. a. Protected activity. Only certain acts are protected by § 185, including, as relevant in this case, disclosures (or threatened disclosures) to a supervisor of and objections to an employer’s activity, policy, or practice that the employee reasonably believes violates the law or poses a risk for public health or safety. See G. L. c. 149, § 185, (3). We construe the allegations of the complaint as resting on both statutory subsections. Trychon has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show that he engaged in one or more activities protected by § 185. First, following his investigation into alleged contract fraud, he reported two practices (the extension of expired contracts and the splitting of contracts) that he reasonably could have believed violated the public bidding law. See G. L. c. 149, § 44J(1), (3). Compare Romero v. UHS of Westwood Pembroke, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 541 & n.3 (2008). Second, even if he was mistaken about the track inspection and maintenance laws, Trychon reasonably could have believed, based on HNTB’s 2012 report and on common sense, that the MBTA’s failure to correct the alarming track conditions for six years posed a risk to the public safety within the meaning of § 185. His disclosures to Turcotte of the updated HNTB report, the nonfea-sance by Kineavy and McGuire, and the alleged cover-up by McGuire qualified as protected activity for purposes of pleading his § 185 claim. We agree with the MBTA that the phrase “a risk to public health, safety or the environment,” as it appears in § 185, means a risk to public health, public safety, or the environment. However, drawing on our judicial experience and common sense, we are not persuaded by the MBTA’s further argument that Try-chon’s disclosures to his supervisors about the high incidence of eye injuries among employees, and the failure of certain managers to enforce the MBTA’s policy designed to reduce the number of such injuries is not, as a matter of law, a disclosure relating to the public health or public safety. Disclosures relating to workplace activities, policies, or practices that have a significant impact upon the cost of public employment, including healthcare costs, may diminish the availability of limited public funds for other pressing public needs, including public needs relating to health and safety, and therefore may be protected under the whistleblower statute. The MBTA is dependent upon public funding from the Commonwealth and its cities and towns to sustain its operations. See, e.g., St. 2015, c. 46, § 2E (line items 1595-6368 and 1595-6369 of the general appropriations law for fiscal year 2016, transferring public funds to accounts earmarked to support the operation of the MBTA). One operational cost of the MBTA is the payment of benefits to employees injured on the job because the MBTA is a self-insurer. See McCarthy’s Case, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 541, 541, 545-546 (2006). To the extent that the MBTA uses taxpayer dollars to compensate its injured employees, it diminishes the availability of those funds to be used for other purposes relating to public health and public safety. At this early stage of the proceedings, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that Trychon has not stated a plausible claim for relief with regard to the MBTA’s eye injury policy. On the other hand, the allegations relating to the suspected time fraud were too vague to support an inference that Trychon qualified for protected whistleblower status. An unnamed third party reported the violation of the hand scanner policy to Trychon and to Turcotte. Trychon, it was alleged, took two actions: he determined that a particular supervisor in SMI was not verifying employee time and he commenced an “E&M-wide” investigation. While a reasonable inference of fraudulent time reporting involving Kineavy and McGuire could be drawn, these sparse facts do not support an inference that before his layoff, Trychon engaged in any protected activity as to the suspected time fraud. No disclosure of, or threat to disclose, suspected time fraud to a supervisor may reasonably be inferred from these facts. See Estock v. Westfield, 806 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The [whistleblower] statute prohibits retaliatory conduct on the part of an employer, not preventative conduct”). Although Trychon’s allegations concerning his conduct with respect to the suspected time fraud do not amount to protected activity, his other allegations of whistleblowing at this stage of the litigation are sufficient to withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim. b. Causation. We conclude that Trychon’s complaint, viewed as a whole, sufficiently alleged a causal connection between the protected activities and a retaliatory layoff to satisfy the plausibility standard. At the time of his discharge, Trychon’s trajectory was on the rise. He had evidently proven himself to be an effective and dedicated public employee, saving taxpayers millions of dollars, identifying fraudulent contracts, and exposing alarming track conditions that posed a risk to public safety. He had been promoted twice, and the scope of his job responsibilities was expanding. Generally, unless adverse conditions require a different course of action, employers who follow sound business practice do not select employees with excellent performance records for termination. Likewise, employers who follow sound business practice do not ordinarily transfer, shield, or reward employees whose poor performance or wrongful acts warrant termination, as the MBTA allegedly did according to the complaint. Trychon alleged adequate facts plausibly suggesting retaliatory animus harbored by MBTA management. The narrative of the complaint suggests a continuing pattern of opposition and hostility to Trychon, and to his mainstay Turcotte, over an extended period of time. Trychon claims that Kineavy and McGuire disregarded his directives, left fraudulent reports in his mailbox, hid HNTB’s alarming inspection report, and stole original records to thwart his time fraud investigation. Kineavy allegedly threatened to “fix” Turcotte “for good,” while McGuire accused Trychon and Turcotte of having a personal agenda against him and Kineavy. The retaliatory animus supposedly extended to the upper echelons of management. One could reasonably infer that acting GM Davis did not appreciate Trychon’s embarrassing disclosure of wrongdoing in a department that he personally had overseen, and that he wanted Trychon and his spotlight gone. After having shelved the investigation to avoid the implication of more employees in the contract fraud, Davis evidently supported the insubordinate and hostile Kineavy over Trychon and Turcotte. Indeed, it could be inferred that Davis, supported by Secretary Davey, rewarded Kineavy with an objectively better job for his opposition. The complaint alleges that the consequence of McGuire’s six years of nonfeasance as to track safety and his nondisclosure of the disturbing HNTB report was a planned transfer to the safety department. The treatment afforded to Kineavy and to McGuire plausibly suggested that they had influence far higher than their subordinate positions in the organizational chart. In short, for pleading purposes, the hostile acts and statements by Kineavy and McGuire, the unnatural protection afforded those individuals, and acting GM Davis’s suppression of the official contract fraud investigation initiated because of Trychon permit a plausible inference that Trychon’s protected activities played a substantial or motivating part in the decision to terminate him. Given the continuing pattern of opposition faced by Trychon, the temporal gap between Trychon’s protected conduct and his termination was not so attenuated as to fail to meet the plausibility standard. Trychon did not identify the individual who made the final decision to discharge him. Where, as here, it could reasonably be inferred that Davis and managers under his protection influenced that decision, the omission did not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. See Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 598-600 (2004). In the alternative, the MBTA urges us to affirm the judgment based on the “normal job duties” exclusion. That doctrine limits employer liability where the employee’s disclosure to a supervisor occurred as part of

Plymouth Public Schools vs. Education Association of Plymouth & Carver & another. No. 15-P-906. Plymouth. April 11, 2016. June 30, 2016. Present: Cypher, Katzmann, & Massing, JJ. School and School Committee. Professional teacher status. Maternity leave. Arbitration, Termination of employment. Arbitration. Arbitrable question. School committee. Public Employment. Paid leave. Termination. Family & Medical Leave Act. In a civil action brought by a school district seeking, inter alia, a stay of arbitration following its tender of a notice of nonrenewal to a teacher who had taught in the district’s schools over the course of five consecutive years, but who had twice taken maternity leave permitted under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., a Superior Court judge erred in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, where, given the strong public policy favoring arbitration, the preference for arbitration expressed in the Education Reform Act of 1993, and this court’s prior decisions, the question of the teacher’s status as a professional teacher must be decided by an arbitrator. [646-649] This court did not reach public policy arguments in a case involving the question of professional teacher status, where the issues were not ripe for review. [649-650] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 18, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert J. Kane, J., and the case was heard by Frank M. Gaziano, J., on motions for summary judgment. Matthew D. Jones (Ashley F. Call also present) for the defendants. Michael J. Long for the plaintiff. Kristen Bilbo. Massing, J. Defendant Kristen Bilbo taught in the plaintiff Plymouth Public Schools (district) over the course of five consecutive school years. She took maternity leave during two of them. The district tendered a notice of nonrenewal at the end of the fifth year. Bilbo asserts that her service, interrupted only by her leave permitted under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (FMLA), entitles her to professional teacher status, giving her rights including arbitration of her dismissal. The district contends that Bilbo is not entitled professional teacher status or arbitration because she did not serve three consecutive full years. We conclude that whether Bilbo has attained professional teacher status is for the arbitrator to decide. Background, Bilbo worked full-time as a special education teacher at Plymouth North High School starting on March 10, 2008, through the end of the school year in June, 2013. She took maternity leave during her first and fourth full years as a teacher, for sixty days in 2009 and for fifty-six days in 2012. Bilbo’s leave was authorized under the FMLA. She was paid during both absences using accumulated sick time and a sick-leave bank available under the governing collective bargaining agreement. Toward the end of her fifth year of teaching, by letter dated May 31, 2013, the district provided Bilbo with notice that she would not be reappointed to a teaching position for the next school year. The letter explained, “You are not being appointed to a teaching position based upon the recommendations of your supervising principal and program manager and the concerns about continuity of instruction and the education of our students.” Asserting that she possessed professional teacher status by virtue of her five consecutive school years of service, Bilbo, through the defendant Education Association of Plymouth and Carver (union), timely petitioned the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education (commissioner) for arbitration of her status. The district opposed her request, arguing that she lacked professional teacher status and was therefore ineligible for arbitration. The commissioner on January 9, 2014, forwarded Bilbo’s petition to the American Arbitration Association, noting that “before addressing the merits of the dispute, the arbitrator should first address the question of arbitrability raised by the [district].” On February 18, 2014, the district filed the instant complaint in the Superior Court against Bilbo and the union, together with a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to stay the arbitration. After a hearing, a judge denied the preliminary injunction motion on March 4, 2014, reasoning that G. L. c. 71, § 42, and our decision in Turner v. School Comm. of Dedham, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 354 (1996), mandated “that arbitration be the sole method used to resolve disputes concerning teacher termination in this Commonwealth, including disputes in which a teacher’s status as a professional teacher is questioned.” Bilbo and the union next moved to dismiss the complaint. While the motion to dismiss was pending, the parties proceeded to arbitration, submitting the matter to the arbitrator in the form of a joint statement of facts and legal memoranda in lieu of a formal hearing. Before the arbitrator issued a decision, however, a second judge denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the question of Bilbo’s professional teacher status was for the court and not the arbitrator to decide. The arbitrator agreed not to issue his decision pending final resolution of the litigation. On December 17, 2014, the parties simultaneously filed cross motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, a third judge allowed the district’s motion and denied Bilbo’s and the union’s motion. Judgment entered for the district, declaring that Bilbo did not have professional teacher status at the time the district notified her of nonrenewal and that the nonrenewal did not violate the FMLA or the Massachusetts parental leave statute, G. L. c. 149, § 105D. The judgment also ordered a permanent stay of the arbitration. Bilbo and the union timely appealed from the judgment. Arbitration of professional teacher status. The first issue before us — and the only issue we reach — is whether the question of Bilbo’s professional teacher status is for an arbitrator or a judge to decide. As the judge who denied the district’s motion to preliminarily enjoin arbitration aptly noted, there is a “chicken and the egg nature” to this question. A teacher who teaches for three consecutive school years in a public school district of the Commonwealth and is not tendered written notice of nonrenewal by June 15 of the third year is entitled to “professional teacher status” under G. L. c. 71, § 41. Professional teacher status confers certain rights, including a degree of protection from dismissal, the right to seek review of a dismissal decision through arbitration, and, in the case of layoffs, the right to “bump” teachers without such status. See G. L. c. 71, §42. If Bilbo’s five school years of service, interrupted only by maternity leave in year one and year four, entitled her to professional teacher status, then the district’s action amounted to a “dismissal” under § 42, triggering the procedural and substantive rights that accompany professional teacher status — including arbitration. If not, then the district’s action was simply a “nonrenewal” under § 41. See note 5, supra. “A dismissal is not the same as a nonrenewal of a contract.” Laurano v. Superintendent of Schs. of Saugus, 459 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2011), quoting from Downing v. Lowell, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 782 (2001). If Bilbo “was not dismissed from her position,” then “she was not entitled to the safeguards provided in G. L. c. 71, § 42,” Laurano, supra — including arbitration. Thus, the threshold question whether Bilbo has professional teacher status is determinative of whether she is entitled to arbitration of any dismissal. We have previously held that this question is within the scope of the arbitrator’s authority. The appeal in Turner v. School Comm. of Dedham, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 354 (1996), presented nearly the mirror image of the case now before us. After receiving notice that she was being laid off by the Dedham school where she taught, Pauline Turner filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking a declaration that she had professional teacher status and requesting an order that the school reinstate her and “bump” another teacher. Id. at 355. The school defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Turner’s sole remedy to challenge her dismissal was through arbitration under G. L. c. 71, § 42. Turner, supra. This court agreed, stating that the Education Reform Act of 1993, see St. 1993, c. 71, “t[ook] away the right of teachers to challenge their dismissal by filing an action in the Superior Court,” and instead “establish[ed] arbitration as the sole remedy for all dismissals.” Turner, supra at 357-358. Much like the district argues now, Turner argued then that the Legislature’s requirement of arbitration of dismissals did not prevent, as a threshold matter, “filing a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a declaration that he or she has attained professional teacher status.” Id. at 358. We rejected that argument: “We disagree with Turner’s argument because such an action would result in a Superior Court judge having to first make a declaration as to the status of the dismissed teacher, and then, if the judge declares that the teacher has acquired that status, the matter being remanded for arbitration as to his or her ‘bumping rights.’ We do not think that the Legislature intended to establish two successive forms of review in two different forums for dismissed teachers with professional status.” Ibid. Here, too, treating the question of Bilbo’s status separately from the propriety of her dismissal presents the risk of two successive forms of review in two different forums. The district makes a futile attempt to distinguish Turner by arguing that the concern with two successive forms of review is not present here because the only question to be determined is whether Bilbo enjoys professional teacher status. While it is true that a judicial determination that Bilbo does not have professional teacher status would be the end of the matter — she would not be entitled to arbitration of the grounds for her dismissal — the same was true in Turner. A judicial determination that Turner did not have professional teacher status would not have required a remand to determine her bumping rights. However, if a judge were to declare that Bilbo did have professional status, the merits of any dismissal decision would be for an arbitrator to review. The decision in Lyons v. School Comm. of Dedham, 440 Mass. 74 (2003), reinforces our decision in Turner. After this court affirmed the dismissal of Turner’s complaint, she and another Dedham teacher, Anne Lyons, had separate arbitration proceedings to determine their professional teacher status. Id. at 76. The arbitrators issued a joint decision, concluding that Turner and Lyons were not “teachers” within the meaning of G. L. c. 71, §§ 41 and 42, because their employment status as “Chapter I teachers” — hired under a federally funded program providing supplemental instruction to designated students in reading and mathematics — did not equate with the qualifications and characteristics of classroom teachers in the “Unit A” collective bargaining unit. Id. at 75-77. Lyons and Turner (again) filed a complaint in Superior Court, seeking to vacate the arbitrators’ decision and for a declaration that they were “teachers” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 77. A judge of the Superior Court vacated the arbitration award, ibid., which the Supreme Judicial Court reinstated. Id. at 82-83. The court rejected the argument that the determination of professional teacher status under G. L. c. 71, § 42, was outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrators and reserved for the courts. Id. at 79-82. Relying on School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 230 (2001) (Cordy, J., concurring) (“[T]he responsibility for interpreting the meaning of G. L. c. 71, § 42, and the scope of the arbitrator’s authority thereunder remains with the court”), Turner and Lyons argued that “the judiciary is responsible for independently determining whether [they] are teachers under G. L. c. 71, §§ 41 and 42.” Lyons, supra at 81. The court disagreed, observing that G. L. c. 71 “does not define ‘teacher’ in the context of delineating who is eligible for ‘professional teacher status,’ ” ibid., and concluding that “the arbitrators had the authority to determine whether Lyons and Turner were teachers,” id. at 82. As an arbitrator has the authority to determine whether a person “shall be considered a teacher” within the meaning of G. L. c. 71, §41, we perceive no reason why an arbitrator does not equally have the authority to determine whether a person “has served in the public schools of a school district for the three previous consecutive school years” within the meaning of the same sentence of the same statute. See note 2, supra. In addition, we have held that an arbitrator may properly consider a similar question: whether a lengthy break in service deprives a teacher of professional teacher status. In Goncalo v. School Comm. of Fall River, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 7-8 (2002), a tenured teacher stopped teaching after a dispute with school officials, which, she alleged, was related to her union activities. Nine years later, the school sent her a letter formally dismissing her as a teacher. Id. at 8. The teacher sought to arbitrate her dismissal, but the arbitrator declined to consider whether the school’s refusal to offer her a contract during those nine years was in continuing retaliation for her union activities, deciding instead that she was not entitled to arbitration because her break in service caused her to lose her professional teacher status. Id. at 8-9. We confirmed the arbitrator’s decision, concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority. Id. at 10-11. Given “the strong public policy favoring arbitration,” Lyons, 440 Mass. at 77, quoting from Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass. 1006, 1007 (1990), the preference for arbitration expressed in the Education Reform Act of 1993, and our prior decisions, we hold that the issue whether Bilbo has professional teacher status must be decided by an arbitrator. Additional considerations. Both parties contend that important public policy considerations require a determination in their favor on the issue of professional teacher status. Bilbo and the union contend that the FMLA forbids penalizing pregnant employees, or any other employee who takes FMLA-qualifying leave, by putting them in a worse position than if they had not taken leave. The district maintains that service time can be measured only in full-year increments, and that three uninterrupted years of review are necessary for schools to properly evaluate teachers and make staffing decisions for the next year. See G. L. c. 71, §41 (“A teacher without professional teacher status shall be notified in writing on or before June fifteenth whenever such person is not to be employed for the following school year” [emphasis supplied]). ‘“An arbitration award that offends public policy ‘is beyond the arbitrator’s powers and is therefore subject to vacation under G. L. c. 150C, § 11(a)(3).’ ” Lyons, 440 Mass. at 79, quoting from Massachusetts Hy. Dept. v. American Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 93, 420 Mass. 13, 16 (1995). However, ‘“because the public policy ‘doctrine allows courts to by-pass the normal heavy deference accorded to arbitration awards and potentially to ‘“judicialize” the arbitration process, the judiciary must be cautious about overruling an arbitration award on the ground that it conflicts with public policy.’ ” Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 430 Mass. 601, 604 (2000), quoting from E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Assn. of E. Chicago, 790 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986). Because of the view we take on the threshold question of arbitration, we decline to address the parties’ public policy arguments, which are in any event unripe at this juncture. Conclusion . The defendant Bilbo is entitled to arbitration of her professional teacher status and, if the arbitrator determines that she enjoys such status, ultimately of the merits of any dismissal. The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and a new judgment shall enter on all counts of the complaint and counterclaim consistent with this opinion. So ordered. “[A] teacher, school librarian, school adjustment counselor, school nurse, school social worker or school psychologist who has served in the public schools of a school district for the three previous consecutive school years shall be considered a teacher, and shall be entitled to professional teacher status as provided in section forty-two.” G. L. c. 71, § 41, as amended through St. 2006, c. 267. “A teacher with professional teacher status may seek review of a dismissal decision within thirty days after receiving notice of his dismissal by filing a petition for arbitration with the [Cjommissioner [of Elementary and Secondary Education].” G. L. c. 71, § 42, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44. We draw our statement of facts from the parties’ joint statement of uncontested facts and exhibits submitted with their' cross motions for summary judgment. The letter cited G. L. c. 71, § 41, a portion of which provides, “A teacher without professional teacher status shall be notified in writing on or before June fifteenth whenever such person is not to be employed for the following school year. Unless such notice is given as herein provided, a teacher without such status shall be deemed to be appointed for the following school year.” Id., as appealing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 43. Bilbo has not asserted the alternative means of obtaining professional teacher status: “The superintendent of [a] district, upon the recommendation of the principal, may award such status to any teacher who has served in the principal’s school for not less than one year or to a teacher who has obtained such status in any other public school district in the commonwealth.” G. L. c. 71, § 41, as amended by St. 1996, c. 450, § 127. The complaint’s three counts sought a stay of the arbitration, a declaration that Bilbo did not have professional teacher status, and a declaration that Bilbo’s nonrenewal by the district was proper. Bilbo and the union then filed an answer and a counterclaim in three counts: to compel arbitration, to confirm any award issued by the arbitrator, and for a declaration that arbitration is the exclusive forum for determining Bilbo’s professional teacher status. “A teacher with professional teacher status . . . shall not be dismissed except for inefficiency, incompetency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubordination or failure on the part of the teacher to satisfy teacher performance standards developed pursuant to section thirty-eight of this chapter or other just cause.” G. L. c. 71, § 42, as appealing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44. Moreover, school principals “must follow strict procedural and substantive provisions before firing a teacher with professional status.” School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 761 (2003). The plaintiff had achieved tenure under G. L. c. 71, § 41, as it read before passage of the Education Reform Act in 1993. Goncalo, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 9. A case interpreting the tenure statute prior to amendment by the Education Reform Act of 1993 held that “[t]he time spent on maternity leave [under G. L. c. 149, § 105D,] may not be counted towards the amount of time required for tenure,” but at the same time, that maternity leave “does not interrupt the consecutiveness of [the teacher’s] service except as to the period of time consumed by the leave.” Solomon v. School Comm. of Boston, 395 Mass. 12, 18-19 (1985). The court left open “the question whether such teacher must serve an entire additional year to compensate for the incomplet

Donna Vitali vs. Reit Management & Research, LLC. No. 14-P-1304. Suffolk. May 8, 2015. August 21, 2015. Present: Green, Milkey, & Maldonado, JJ. Labor, Overtime compensation, Wages. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. In a civil action arising from the plaintiff employee’s claim that she accrued overtime that was not credited by the defendant employer’s timekeeping system, the allowance of summary judgment in favor of the employer was erroneous, where the summary judgment record permitted findings that the employer was armed with at least constructive knowledge that employees were undertaking lunch time work that should have been credited toward overtime and assumed in its own favor that employees were not performing any such work except where they separately reported it through a process the plaintiff was never trained in or even told to use. [103-112] Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 13, 2012. The case was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, L, on a motion for summary judgment. Stephen S. Churchill for the plaintiff. Jennifer B. Furey (Paul F. Beckwith with her) for the defendant. Milkey, J. The plaintiff, Donna Vitali, worked as a bookkeeper for the defendant, Reit Management & Research, LLC (company), a property management firm. She was paid by the hour, and pursuant to both statute and company policy, she was to be paid overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate for any work done in excess of forty hours in a given week. See G. L. c. 151, § 1A. She brought the current action alleging that she accrued overtime that was not credited by the system the company had in place to keep track of employee hours. In a detailed and thoughtful decision, a Superior Court judge allowed the company’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that there are material facts in dispute, we reverse. Standard of review. Our review of the allowance of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 252-253 (2015). Disputed facts are to be read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case, Vitali. Id. at 250. “The moving party must affirmatively show that there is no real issue of fact, all doubts being resolved against the party moving for summary judgment.” Shawmut Worcester County Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 281 (1986) (quotation omitted). Evidence in the record is considered together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record. Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 119 (2010). Background. 1. The nature of the dispute. Vitali was scheduled to work from nine to five, five days per week, with a paid one-hour lunch break. Both sides agree that lunch breaks do not count toward overtime. They also agree that if an employee has to work during what otherwise would be a lunch break, the employee gets no extra pay for doing so (since she or he is already being paid for that time). However, such worked lunch time can be counted toward the forty-hour overtime threshold, thus potentially indirectly increasing the employee’s over-all compensation. Vitali claims that she regularly worked during her lunch breaks even though that time was not recorded in the particular timekeeping system that the company used during the relevant period. She brought this action pursuant to G. L. c. 151, § 1A, purportedly as a class action, seeking the extra compensation that would be due if she and others similarly situated were credited for such lunch time work. 2. The company’s timekeeping system. On February 15, 2010, the company implemented a new electronic timekeeping system. Under this system, which was known as Kronos, hourly employees were required to use their computer terminals to “punch in” when they first arrived on a given day, and to “punch out” when they left. At the center of this case is how the company, relying on Kronos, accounted for employee lunch breaks. As the company acknowledged, when Kronos was first implemented, it did not have the “functionality” to allow employees to punch out for lunch and to punch back in when they returned. The absence of that feature created a potential discrepancy between the hours that an employee “clocked” using Kronos and the time they actually worked. Thus, for example, if Vitali confined her work to the scheduled nine-to-five work day and took her allotted one-hour paid lunch breaks, she would clock forty hours even though she actually worked only thirty-five hours. As a result, if Vitali performed work outside of the ordinary nine-to-five work day, the time automatically would be captured as clocked hours, but any time she spent working during lunch would not similarly be reflected. Thus, regardless of whether Vitali worked through all (or part) of lunch or took her full allotted lunch break, her hours clocked in Kronos would be the same. 3. The company’s practice in calculating overtime. In light of the discrepancy between hours worked and hours clocked, the company adopted a practice of paying overtime to hourly employees only once they clocked forty-five hours for a given week unless the employees separately reported having to work in lieu of lunch. In other words, except to the extent that hourly employees separately recorded their lunch time work, the company assumed that they took their full one-hour lunch breaks. According to Melissa Juppe, the company’s payroll supervisor, the proper protocol for recording lunch time work in Kronos was for employees to access a “drop down” menu on their computer screen through which they could then input the time code “worked hours” for the relevant amount of time. In Juppe’s own words, employees “would have to log in and then once they’re on their timecard, they go to the day they didn’t take their lunch, they insert a row and the pay code column they’d do the drop down and there’s a code that says working hours, and they would record the time that they worked during their lunch.” The extent to which employees were informed of this procedure and instructed that they should use it is reserved for later discussion. 4. Vitali’s alleged lunch time work. The exigencies of the company’s property management responsibilities sometimes required employees to work beyond their scheduled hours. For those in Vitali’s position, the events that required extended work included mass lease terminations, “[mjonthly closes, quarter closes, conference calls for bad debt, [and] audits.” As noted, when hourly employees were required to work outside of the scheduled nine-to-five work day, Kronos automatically recorded such hours. In those weeks in which Kronos recorded Vitali as having clocked more than forty-five hours, she was paid overtime. For example, during the week of February 28, 2011, Kronos recorded that Vitali clocked 49.75 hours, and she was paid for four and three-quarters hours of overtime. According to Vitali, her work responsibilities also required her to work during her lunch breaks on average three to four times per week. The employees in her unit did not have specifically scheduled lunch breaks; instead, people took them “when they could.” Vitali “always” brought her lunch and “typically” ate it at her desk in her cubicle. While she was taking such breaks, people would bring her assignments that required prompt attention. Vitali provided numerous examples of specific individuals who would bring such assignments and the kinds of tasks that required her to do work during lunch. For example, she identified Carrie Noyes as someone who “would come to [her] with bank reconciliation items that she needed resolved right away for [the company’s comptroller and another high ranking manager].” Vitali also stated that she regularly observed others working during their lunch breaks, and she specifically identified such individuals. It is uncontested that Vitali never successfully used the Kronos drop down menu protocol to record the lunch time work she claims to have performed, and that she did not receive credit for any such work toward the accrual of overtime. Had she been credited for the work, she would have received some additional overtime compensation (in those weeks in which her total worked hours exceeded forty). 5. The judge’s ruling. The judge concluded that with respect to Vitali’s uncorroborated claims to having worked regularly during lunch, “her deposition testimony to this effect is sufficient to create a jury question on [this issue].” However, he went on to rule in the company’s favor on other grounds. Specifically, he concluded that Vitali had failed to produce evidence upon which reasonable jurors could conclude that the company knew or should have known that Vitali had engaged in uncredited overtime. In this regard, the judge deemed it critical that Vitali had failed to report her lunch time work in accordance with available procedures, even in the face of the company’s general policy against paying overtime except where employees had obtained prior approval. The judge also found it significant that — in contrast to some of the cases that Vitali had cited — there was no evidence here that the company had pressured Vitali not to report the hours for which she was seeking credit. Discussion. The payment of overtime is governed by G. L. c. 151, § 1A. That statute “was ‘intended to be essentially identical’ to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000).” Mullally v. Waste Mgmt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 531 (2008), quoting from Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 447 (2004). Accordingly, in interpreting the State law, we look to how the FLSA has been construed. See ibid. The case law has interpreted the FLSA in a manner that is highly protective of employee rights. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently observed, “[i]n service of the [FLSA’s] remedial and humanitarian goals, the [United States] Supreme Court consistently has interpreted the [FLSA] liberally and afforded its protections exceptionally broad coverage.” Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2008). Pursuant to the FLSA, an employee must prove both that he incurred unpaid overtime work, and that the employer “had actual or constructive knowledge that he was working overtime.” Prime Communications, Inc. v. Sylvester, 34 Mass. App. 708, 709 (1993). The knowledge inquiry requires an assessment of what the employer knew or should have known, and is to be made in view of the employer’s “duty ... to inquire into the conditions prevailing in his business.” Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 1969) (quotation omitted). In other words: “In reviewing the extent of an employer’s awareness, a court ‘need only inquire whether the circumstances . . . were such that the employer either had knowledge [of overtime hours being worked] or else had the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.’ ” Reich v. Department of Conservation & Natural Resources, 28 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 1994), quoting from Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, supra. To the extent that an employee has reported his hours in accordance with the employer’s mandated timekeeping procedures, the employer’s knowledge of those hours is not in doubt. Thus, the cases concerning an employer’s knowledge all involve employee claims for unreported hours. In such cases, any failure by the employee to use prescribed timekeeping procedures is obviously a point in the employer’s favor. However, that failure is not fatal to the employee’s claim if he or she is able to marshal other proof that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the unpaid overtime. See, e.g., Holzapfel v. Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 524 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[0]nce an employer knows or has reason to know that an employee is working overtime, it cannot deny compensation even where the employee fails to claim overtime hours”). Thus, even where the employer has expressly prohibited overtime work, if it had reason to believe that such work was being done, “the employer cannot sit back and accept the benefits without compensating for them.” Reich, supra at 1082, quoting from 29 C.F.R. § 785.13. Conversely, if the employee is unable to marshal proof that the employer knew or should have known of the overtime work, the employee cannot prevail. See Prime Communications, Inc., supra at 711, quoting from Forrester v. Roth’s I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1981) (no FLSA liability “where an employer has no knowledge that an employee is engaging in overtime work and that employee fails to notify the employer or deliberately prevents the employer from acquiring knowledge of the overtime work”). We are mindful that, in reviewing the summary judgment record, we must consider not only any direct evidence of the employer’s knowledge (actual or constructive), but also “all reasonable inferences” to be drawn from the evidence. Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. at 119. Indeed, an employer’s knowledge, like other “state of mind” inquiries, “is elusive and rarely is established by other than circumstantial evidence.” Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, 419 Mass. 437, 439 (1995). Questions such as knowledge and intent often “require[ ] the jury to weigh the credibility of conflicting explanations.” Id. at 440. Thus, the determination of what a person knows or should have known under a specific factual situation is typically ill-suited for resolution by summary judgment. Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 247-248 (1991). Turning to the application of these principles here, we first examine whether the record creates a factual dispute regarding whether the company knew or should have known that Vitali did not take her full lunch breaks. We then turn to whether there was sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record that the company knew or should have known that Vitali was not receiving credit for such time. There was ample evidence upon which jurors could conclude that the company generally was aware that many of its employees sometimes worked during their allotted lunch breaks. For example, as discussed further below, when Kronos was first rolled out, the company’s payroll department received multiple employee inquiries about how to record lunch time work. One of the company’s own affiants even stated that during the relevant period, she “typically worked through lunch” as a matter of mere personal preference. Indeed, the practice of employees working through lunch apparently became so pervasive that the company on several occasions had to remind employees that they were supposed to take at least a one-half hour lunch break. Other than those periodic reminders, there is no evidence that the company sought to limit its employees from working during their lunch breaks. This is hardly surprising given that work done during a lunch break costs the company no extra direct compensation (since the employees were already being paid for that time). , In addition, there was evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that the company knew, or had reason to know, that Vitali in particular did not take her full one-hour lunch breaks. Unlike the typical overtime case where the extra work the employee claims to have performed was done off site, the alleged work here was done at her cubicle desk in an office setting. It is uncontested that Vitali typically took lunch breaks at her desk, and the company concedes “that, at times, Ms. Vitali received various work-related assignments throughout her day” from her supervisor. The company has not actually challenged Vitali’s specific averments as to the pressing nature of the assignments that she claims prevented her from taking her full lunches. Especially given that the state of an employer’s knowledge is to be assessed in light of its duty to inquire into the attendant working conditions, there was ample evidence on which jurors reasonably could have concluded that the company at least had reason to know that Vitali sometimes performed work during her lunch breaks. There was also evidence, discussed infra, that the company had actual knowledge of at least one occasion on which Vitali worked through her lunch break. Seeking to avoid the implication that it had reason to know that Vitali was performing work during her lunch breaks, the company highlights that it had a sternly worded policy in place requiring all employees to obtain specific prior approval before working overtime. See Newton v. Henderson, 47 F.3d 746, 749-750 (5th Cir. 1995) (employee cannot thwart clearly enforced policy against working overtime). This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, the company has not shown that its policy requiring prior approval for overtime work had any application to employees performing work during their lunch breaks. Although lunch time work (like any other work done during the scheduled nine-to-five work day) counts toward the forty-hour threshold that needs to be crossed for overtime to be due, it does not itself constitute overtime. Thus, an hourly employee who worked through every lunch break would still not be entitled to any overtime unless she performed additional work outside of the normal nine-to-five work day. Notably, in reminding employees of the need to seek prior approval for overtime work, the written instructions that the company provided for using Kronos specifically equated “working overtime” with “coming in early or staying late.” The company was free to adopt a policy requiring employees to obtain prior approval before performing work on their lunch breaks; it simply did not do so. Second, there was evidence in the summary judgment record that the company’s policy of requiring specific prior approval for overtime was honored in the breach. For example, one of the company’s own affiants stated that her supervisor had given her “general blanket approval for overtime” when her department was “unusually busy.” Where an employer in practice fails to enforce a formal employment policy limiting overtime work, a jury could infer that the employer knew or should have known that employees were engaged in unauthorized overtime notwithstanding the existence of such a policy. See Reich, 28 F.3d at 1083 (recognizing that employer must do more than “simply continue to apprise [the employees]” of policy against working overtime). In addition, the company argues that even if it had reason to know that Vitali at times was not taking her full allotted lunch breaks, it still had no reason to know that she was not reporting this lunch time work. In making this argument, the company asserts that employees were well informed of the way in which hours worked during lunch were to be recorded in Kronos. The company maintains that it was fair and appropriate to assume that Vitali would have reported any lunch time work through the means that the company made available, especially where employees were required to attest to the accuracy of their recorded time. In short, the company contends that because Vitali failed to comply with reasonable reporting procedures, her case fails as a matter of law. See White v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp., 699 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Under the FLSA, if an employer establishes a reasonable process for an employee to report uncompensated work time the employer is not liable for nonpayment if the employee fails to follow the established process”). There are several problems with this argument. To begin with, “[t]he FLSA makes clear that employers, not employees, bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that employee time sheets are an accurate record of all hours worked by employees.” Skelton v. American Intercontinental Univ. Online, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Moreover, “an employer’s duty under the FLSA to maintain accurate records of its employees’ hours is non-delegable.” Kuebel