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Mark D. Powers v. Warwick Public Schools

RIApril 9, 2019No. 2016-6-M.P. (13-558)Cited 17 times
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Case Details

Judge(s)
Suttell, Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, Indeglia
Status — whether other courts must follow this ruling
Published
Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
appeal

Related Laws

No specific laws identified for this ruling.

Outcome

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Workers' Compensation Court's decision denying Mark Powers's challenge to his average weekly wage calculation, holding that work-sharing benefits should not be included in the calculation and upholding the lower courts' decisions.

Excerpt

On January 12, 2016, Mark Powers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review a Final Decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court, which was issued on December 23, 2015. That decree denied and dismissed Mr. Powers's appeal, in accordance with a written decision of the Appellate Division on December 16, 2015. This Court granted Mr. Powers's petition for a writ of certiorari. Before the Supreme Court, Mr. Powers contended that: (1) he "should not be estopped from arguing that he was a full-time employee working part-time hours simply because a stipulation was entered in the Workers' Compensation Court stating that he was a part-time employee" and (2) "the average weekly wage, as calculated pursuant to [G.L. 1956] § 28-33-20 for the purpose of determining workers' compensation benefits, must include monies received by an employee from the state for hours not worked, pursuant to an approved work-sharing program under [G.L. 1956] § 28-44-69." The Supreme Court held that Mr. Powers was bound by any factual statements contained in the stipulation filed with the Workers' Compensation Court but was not bound by any legal conclusion set forth in the stipulation. The Court further held that monies received pursuant to the work-sharing benefit provisions of § 28-44-69 should not be included in calculating an employee's average weekly wage for the purpose of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to § 28-33-20. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court.

What This Ruling Means

**What Happened:** Mark Powers, a Warwick Public Schools employee, challenged how his workers' compensation benefits were calculated. Specifically, he disagreed with how the court determined his "average weekly wage" – the amount used to calculate how much money he would receive while unable to work due to a workplace injury. Powers argued that work-sharing benefits he had received should be included when calculating this average weekly wage, which would have resulted in higher compensation payments. **What the Court Decided:** The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled against Powers. The court upheld lower court decisions that work-sharing benefits should not be included when calculating average weekly wages for workers' compensation purposes. This meant Powers would receive lower compensation payments than he had hoped for. **Why This Matters for Workers:** This ruling clarifies an important aspect of workers' compensation calculations in Rhode Island. Workers should understand that if they receive work-sharing benefits (payments when work hours are reduced), these benefits typically won't boost their workers' compensation calculations if they're later injured. This could mean lower payments during recovery periods, so workers should be aware of how their average weekly wage might be calculated if they file a workers' compensation claim.

This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.

Similar Rulings

Jane Doe v. Brown University
RIJun 2021

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendants, Brown University and two of its employees. In Superior Court, the plaintiff asserted claims under both the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in determining that her claims under RICRA were precluded by the prior dismissal of the plaintiff's federal Title IX claim. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in holding that section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not grant the plaintiff a private right of action. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff's claims under RICRA were predicated upon the defendants' alleged violations of Title IX, which had already been litigated in federal court. Further, the Supreme Court stated that the resolution of that issue in federal court was essential to the judgment on the merits and, therefore, issue preclusion barred the plaintiff's claim in Superior Court. The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff's claim that the defendants interfered with her contract with an educational institution was not actionable. Next, the Supreme Court examined the antidiscrimination clause contained in section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution and held that it was not self executing. Further, the Supreme Court held that principles of judicial restraint prevented the Court from creating a private right of action under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Defendant Win

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This ruling information is sourced from public court records via CourtListener.com. Case outcomes, claim types, and summaries are extracted using AI analysis and may be incomplete or inaccurate. It is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

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