Michael Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc.

The plaintiff filed an affidavit of illegal discriminatory practice with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the defendant A Co. wrongfully terminated her employment. Follow- ing an assignment of the matter to the commission's Office of Public Hearings, a human rights referee granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff and the commission separately appealed the referee's decision granting the motion for summary judgment to the Superior Court. The plaintiff claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed. The trial court consolidated the appeals, sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a trial before the Office of Public Hearings, concluding that the referee improperly rendered summary judgment because A Co. did not meet its burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. On A Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a hearing: the court properly considered the plaintiff's affidavit as competent evidence in opposition to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiff's affidavit of discriminatory prac- tice was sworn and was properly considered pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-49); moreover, the court properly conducted a plenary review of the record in considering whether genuine issues of material fact existed, as the deferential standard used to review administrative fact-finding did not extend to the determination of whether genuine issues of material fact existed in the summary judgment context; furthermore, the court did not err in considering whether genu- ine issues of material fact existed, as the record contained contradictory information, including a sworn statement by an employee of A Co. that the plaintiff's job duties required her to be physically present at the workplace and the plaint

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to amend her complaint, to include facts regarding her PTSD diagnosis and claims of racial and disability discrimination, eight months after she filed her administrative appeal from the termination of her teaching contract. The trial court did not consider Appellant's prior discipline at another school when determining that she was subject to termination, and Appellant was not denied due process. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant's failure to enter third quarter final grades was good and just cause for termination. Judgment affirmed.

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendants, Brown University and two of its employees. In Superior Court, the plaintiff asserted claims under both the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in determining that her claims under RICRA were precluded by the prior dismissal of the plaintiff's federal Title IX claim. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in holding that section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not grant the plaintiff a private right of action. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff's claims under RICRA were predicated upon the defendants' alleged violations of Title IX, which had already been litigated in federal court. Further, the Supreme Court stated that the resolution of that issue in federal court was essential to the judgment on the merits and, therefore, issue preclusion barred the plaintiff's claim in Superior Court. The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff's claim that the defendants interfered with her contract with an educational institution was not actionable. Next, the Supreme Court examined the antidiscrimination clause contained in section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution and held that it was not self executing. Further, the Supreme Court held that principles of judicial restraint prevented the Court from creating a private right of action under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.