MICHIGAN STATE AFL-CIO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Case Details
- Citation
- 455 Mich. 720
- Judge(s)
- Mallett, C.J., and Boyle and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.; Riley and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- Michigan
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
Michigan Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions and held that Civil Service Rule 1-5.7, which prohibited partisan political activity during union leave, violates the Michigan Political Freedom Act. The court ruled that employees on union-reimbursed leave are entitled to engage in partisan political activity unless it adversely affects job performance.
Excerpt
MICHIGAN STATE AFL-CIO v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Docket No. 102567. Argued April 8, 1997 (Calendar No. 5). Decided July 31, 1997. Michigan State AEL-CIO and several other unions, serving employees in the state classified civil service, and others brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the Civil Service Commission and others, seeking to enjoin enforcement of revised Civil Service Commission Rule 1-5.7, which prohibits the use of union leaves of absence for partisan political activity. The court, John H. Hausner, X, granted summary disposition for the plaintiffs, ruling that they had standing to bring the action and that the commission, in promulgating the rule, had exceeded its authority and violated the Michigan political freedom act, 1979 PA 169, MCL 15.401 et seq.) MSA 4.1702(1) et seq. The Court of Appeals, Griffin, P.J., and Reilly and T. M. Burns, JX, affirmed the standing issue, but reversed with respect to the rule, and remanded the case for consideration of the plaintiffs’ pending constitutional claims (Docket No. 113228). On remand, the court granted summary disposition for the commission, finding that the rule did not violate equal protection or due process, and further that there was no violation of free speech and association. After remand, the Court of Appeals, Michael X Kelly, P.J., and Corrigan and C. D. Corwin, JJ., affirmed the dismissal of the constitutional claims, holding that the revised rule affects the Civil Service Commission’s legitimate ban on partisan political activity during actual-duty hours and that nothing in the rule offends a recognized constitutional right of free speech or assembly (Docket No. 149885). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the plaintiffs’ argument that Rule 1-5.7 unconstitutionally bans speech and association on the basis of the content of the speech. On remand, the Court of Appeals, Michael X Kelly, P.J., and Corrigan and Bandstra, JX, unable to identify a content-based abrogation of speech or association rights, affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 191523). The plaintiffs appeal. In an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, joined by Chief Justice Mallett, and Justices Boyle and Kelly, the Supreme Court held: Revised Civil Service Rule 1-5.7, prohibiting the use of union leaves of absence for partisan political activity, violates the Michigan political freedom act. 1. The political freedom act extends to employees in state classified civil service the right to engage in partisan political activity while on mandatory leaves of absence. What a state classified civil service employee does during off-duty hours, including political activity, is not of proper concern to the Civil Service Commission unless it is shown to adversely affect job performance. Whether an activity is off duty or actual duty depends on its particular circumstances. The political freedom act allows a state employee to engage in partisan political activity except during those hours when the employee is being compensated for the performance of duties as a public employee. 2. Where the union reimburses the state not only for the wages of an employee, but also the flange benefits, the state may not prohibit that employee from participating in partisan political activities pursuant to thp political freedom act. Because union leave is often antagonistic to an employer’s interest and because an employee on union leave is not doing the duty the employee was employed to perform, the state may not prohibit participation in partisan political activities while on union leave pursuant to the political freedom act unless the activities are shown to adversely affect job performance. Reversed. Justice Brickley, joined by Justices Riley and Weaver, dissenting, stated that, correctly interpreted, the political freedom act does not allow a classified state employee to engage in political activity while being compensated for the performance of the duties of a public employee. The majority determines that these employees were not compensated by the employer because the state was reimbursed for the total costs of their wages and benefits, and, thus, their activity is protected under the act. The source of the compensation is irrelevant, however. The fact that they were compensated merely presents the question whether they were engaged in the performance of their duties as public employees. Employees on union leave are performing their duties as public employees. Employees are assigned to these types of leave by the state. Further, legitimate union activities contribute to a productive relationship between the state and its employees; the state, as employer, derives a benefit from the activities. The majority’s holding to the contrary violates both the political freedom act and the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the application of Rule 1-5.7 to these employees did not violate the act. Rule 1-5.7 is neither a content-based restraint on the freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution nor an impermissible regulation of the content of speech during union leave. States have the authority to regulate the speech of their employees under certain conditions. The First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech when that speech involves a matter of public concern and is not outweighed by the interests of the state employer. Rule 1-5.7 is limited to specific conduct while an employee is performing the duties of a public employee. The state’s interest in preventing political activity while on actual duty overrides the employee’s interest in engaging in such activity. It is evenhanded in its application, uniformly prohibiting certain political activities by employees engaged in the performance of their actual duties, defined to include all times when the employee is performing the duties of a state employee. Likewise, it does not violate the protection provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution. While employees on occasion will be treated differently than other employees, especially in regard to benefits such as union leave to which they are entitled, the designation of union leave as actual duty does not violate equal protection. Further, the rule is not overbroad. It does not substantially interfere with conduct that the state cannot prohibit. Rather, it addresses a specific political activity by state employees when they are performing their duties as state employees. Under the constitution and the political freedom act, the state can regulate this behavior. This prohibition is consistent with the recognized interest of the state in preventing politics from interfering with the performance of classified state employees. In addition, the rule is not vague. It gives fair notice of the conduct prohibited. It is clear that both partisan and nonpartisan political activity are barred from working hours. Sachs, Waldman, O’Hare, Helveston, Bogas & McIntosh, P.C. (by Andrew Nickelhoff and Theodore Sachs'), for the plaintiffs. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Deborah Anne Devine, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. Amicus Curiae: Robert A. Sedler and Paul Denenfeld for American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan. Cavanagh, J. This is an appeal by the Michigan State AFL-CIO, challenging the validity of Civil Service Rule 1-5.7, modified effective July 14, 1988, prohibiting the use of union leaves of absence for partisan political activity. We hold that the revised rule violates the political freedom act enacted by the Michigan Legislature. i This case presents a rather long, factual and procedural history. In December 1987, the United Auto Workers-Conununity Action Program (UAW-CAP) and the Michigan Democratic Party sponsored a training seminar on election campaign strategies. The Office of the State Employer was given notice of the three-day seminar; however, it was unaware that the seminar would involve partisan political issues. Fifty-six state employees who were members of the UAW Local 6000 attended the seminar. Thirty-seven employees used the union sponsored administrative leave buy-back program, under which the union reimbursed the state the net salary of the employees for the period of absence. Seventeen employees invoked the union officer leave, pursuant to a collective bargain, under which the union reimbursed the state for the gross total cost of the employee’s wages and the employer’s share of insurance premiums and retirement. One employee invoked the administrative leave bank 1, under which the employee suffered no loss of pay or benefits and one employee used his own time, which was not provided for under any leave arrangement. In response to a letter from two Republican legislators, State Representative Frank Fitzgerald and Senator William Sederburg, the Civil Service Commission investigated the December 1987 meeting. As a result of the investigation, the commission issued a strong statement that partisan political activities are not to be engaged in by employees who are on administrative leave or who have been released from work under conditions specified for “union business” in bargaining agreements. The Department of Civil Service stated, “An employee using his or her authorized annual leave is not restricted, but annual leave used for partisan political purposes may not be ‘bought back’ under union business provisions . . . .” As a result of the controversy over the December 1987 meeting, the commission revised its rule relating to the activity prohibited during work hours. The old rule provided: 1-5.7 Prohibited During Work Hours.- — -Activities permitted under Sections 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 shall not be engaged in by a classified employee during the hours the employee is on actual duty.[] The new rule provides: 1-5.7 Prohibited During Work Hours. — Activities permitted under sections 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 shall not be engaged in by a classified employee during the hours the employee is on actual duty. Actual duty includes the employee’s scheduled work hours and overtime. Off duty includes all time outside scheduled work hours and overtime, annual leave, unpaid leave of absence, lost time and leave granted to the employee to become a full time employee of an employee organization holding exclusive representation rights, pursuant to an approved collective bargaining agreement. For purposes of this rule, employees released from their regular state workplace for union activities, union business or any other employee organization purpose under any leave agreement, including “annual leave buy-back” provisions, shall be considered to be on actual duty, assigned by the employer to take part in union activities deemed to be in the best interests of the state and not including partisan political activity. In response to the rule change, an objection was filed by every employee organization exclusively representing state classified employees, representing in the aggregate approximately seventy-two percent of the state classified work force, or roughly 44,600 individuals. The employees’ objections stemmed from the commission’s exclusion of partisan political activities while on union leave, while allowing partisan political activities while on other types of leave. To fully understand the employees’ objections, it is necessary to review the different types of leave of absences that are available to an employee: 1. Leave for Union Business. There are seven types of leave for union business. The employee is compensated by the state in whole or in part. 2. Jury Duty Leave. The employee is granted administrative leave for jury duty, with full pay. 3. Time off for Court Appearances. The employee is entitled to administrative leave with full pay. However, if an employee appears in court in any capacity other than as a witness for the People, he or she will not be considered as being on duty, nor will administrative leave be granted. 4. Sick Leave. The employee may use accrued sick time, annual leave, or lost time to cover periods of approved medical absence. All sick leave must be approved by the employer. 5. Annual Leave. Initial annual leave is available upon approval of the employer, for such purposes of voting, religious observances, and necessary personal business. 6. Paid Leave. The employee is authorized to use paid leave for education and systematic improvement of knowledge or skills required in the performance of their work. The State Personnel Director reviewed the objections filed by the employees; however, it found no basis for delaying the effective date of the enactment of the revised rule. Therefore, on July 14, 1988, the revised rule became effective. The employee unions commenced the instant action in Wayne Circuit Court for a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining enforcement of revised Rule 1-5.7, and for declaratory relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. On October 28, 1988, the circuit court granted summary disposition for plaintiffs. It ruled that the plaintiff employee organizations had standing to assert the claims and that the commission had exceeded its authority and violated the Michigan political freedom act. The trial court did not reach the constitutional issues raised in counts I and in of the complaint. The commission appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 191 Mich App 535; 478 NW2d 722 (1991) (hereinafter AFL-CIO I). The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that plaintiffs had standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Id. at 544-549. However, it reversed the ruling that the revised rule violated the political freedom act. Plaintiffs argued that union leave is “off-duty” time that is beyond the scope of regulation by the Civil Service Commission. However, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ characterization of union leave as “off-duty” time because Rule 1-5.7 defines union leave time as “actual-duty.” AFL-CIO I at 550-551. The Court stated that actual duty means on-the-job behavior related to job performance, including activities of classified employees during work hours for which they are being compensated. The Court relied on Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Service Comm, 408 Mich 385, 408; 292 NW2d 442 (1980), in which this Court stated that “the commission’s ‘sphere of authority’ delimits its rule-making power and confines its jurisdiction over the political activity of classified personnel to on-the-job behavior related to job performance.” The Court of Appeals held that a prohibition against political activity by classified employees is permissible under the political freedom act if three conditions are satisfied: (1) The classified employee receives some form of compensation for the time spent on leave, (2) The employee would be performing duties at the usual job site if the employee were not on leave, and (3) The employee is permitted to leave for a specific purpose approved by the employer. [AFL-CIO I, supra at 550.] The Court concluded that the release of employees under union leave was part of the employees’ duties for which they were compensated, therefore the union leave programs at issue did not implicate classified employees’ off-duty activities. The Court remanded the case for consideration of plaintiffs’ pending constitutional claims. Id. at 552. The parties again filed cross-motions for summary disposition with respect to the constitutional claims. Judge Hausner granted summary disposition for the commission, finding that the rule did not violate equal protection or due process, and further that there was no violation of free speech and association. After remand, plaintiffs appealed, and in a decision issued February 6, 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 208 Mich App 479; 528 NW2d 811 (1995) (hereinafter AFL-CIO II). It held that the revised rule affects the Civil Service Commission’s “legitimate ban on partisan political activity during actual-duty hours. Nothing in this rule offends a recognized Michigan or federal constitutional right to free speech or assembly. The state government, as an employer, most assuredly may restrict the partisan political activity of its employees while they are on duty.” Id. at 491. The Court also disagreed with the plaintiffs that the revised rule is unconstitutionally vague and over-broad, and that it violates equal protection and due process. It affirmed the decision of the trial court on remand. Plaintiffs filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to this Court. In an order dated December 19, 1995, this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals “to address plaintiffs’ argument that Rule 1-5.7 unconstitutionally bans speech and association on the basis of the content of the speech.” The Court of Appeals issued a supplemental opinion on remand on March 8, 1996, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 191523), which stated in part, “[t]he rule arose out of a specific incident of partisan political activities while employees were on union leave and the Commission amended the rule to address that problem. Unless and until evidence is adduced that the Commission fails to prevent other partisan political activity that comes to its attention in a similar fashion, we cannot identify a content-based abrogation of speech or association rights, much less a violation of equal protection.” The plaintiffs again appealed to this Court, and this Court granted leave on May 22, 1996. 451 Mich 898. n Initially, defendant asserts that plaintiffs failed to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals in AFL-CIO I to this Court pursuant to MCR 7.301(C)(3) and (4), and instead pursued remand. As a consequence, defendant asserts, this Court is divested of its jurisdiction to review the determinations made in AFL-CIO I, and those determinations are now the law of the case. We reject defendant’s argument. MCR 7.302(C)(4) provides: If the decision of the Court of Appeals remands the case to a lower court for further proceedings, an application for leave may be filed within 21 days after (a) the Court of Appeals decision ordering the remand, or (b) the Court of Appeals decision disposing of the case following the remand procedure, in which case an application may be made on all issues raised in the Court of Appeals, including those related to the remand question. We agree with plaintiffs that MCR 7.302(C)(4) gives the parties the option, after a Court of Appeals judgment ordering remand, of seeking immediate appeal or of waiting until proceedings following remand are completed, before seeking plenary appeal. The commentary to the rule provides guidance: New MCR 7.302(C)(4)-(6) clarifies the parties’ options when a decision of the Court of Appeals remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Basically, a party may immediately appeal to the Supreme Court or may await the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals following the remand. Therefore, we retain jurisdiction over both AFL-CIO I and AFL-CIO II. m THE POLITICAL FREEDOM ACT The political freedom act is an uncommon exercise of the Legislature’s power to protect and insure the personal freedoms of all citizens, “including the rights of free speech and political association . . . Council No 11, supra at 394. As a unanimous Court stated, the act “undertakes to authorize and extend to a specific class of citizens — employees in the state classified civil service — the right to engage in partisan political activity . . . while on mandatary leave of absence.” Id. at 395. In Council No 11, this Court stated: We do not question the commission’s authority to regulate employment-related activity involving internal matters such as job specifications, compensation, grievance procedures, discipline, collective bargaining and job perfo
Similar Rulings
Browse Related
Facing something similar at work?
Court rulings like this one are useful, but every situation is different. Take 2 minutes to see which laws may protect you — it's free, private, and no account is required to start.
This ruling information is sourced from public court records via CourtListener.com. Case outcomes, claim types, and summaries are extracted using AI analysis and may be incomplete or inaccurate. It is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
See something wrong, or named in this ruling and want it corrected or redacted? Request a correction.