Vossbrinck v. Hobart

Negligence duty of care sexual assault Title IX Section 1983 substantive due process equal protection independent contractor tort law failure to train and supervise precedent education special-needs exceptional children summary judgment and motion to dismiss

Negligence duty of care sexual assault Title IX Section 1983 substantive due process equal protection independent contractor tort law failure to train and supervise precedent education special-needs exceptional children summary judgment and motion to dismiss

The plaintiff, Michael Crenshaw, appealed from a January 7, 2019 judgment entered in the Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants, the State of Rhode Island and Lieutenant Scott Raynes (State Defendants) and the Community College of Rhode Island, the Council on Postsecondary Education, and Captain Timothy Poulin (CCRI Defendants), pursuant to a grant of both the State Defendants' motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the CCRI Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on Rule 12(c). The plaintiff also appealed from a December 21, 2018 order denying his motion to amend his complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in dismissing his claim under G.L. 1956 § 28-50-3 of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (the Act) because, in the plaintiff's view, the statute does not limit protection to reports of the particular employer relative to which the Act's protection is sought. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint as to the allegations supporting his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations and, therefore, futile. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice correctly determined that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim under the Act because the activity occurred while Mr. Crenshaw was not employed by the defendants and involved violations of law allegedly committed by a previous employer—an entity that had no nexus with CCRI. The Court also held that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint as futile because his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and the order of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025

The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025