ROY C. HYMAN, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. EFFICIENCY, INC., d/b/a TROJAN LABOR, Defendant
Case Details
- Citation
- 167 N.C. App. 134
- Judge(s)
- Judges BRYANT and LEVINSON concur.
- Procedural Posture — the stage the case had reached
- appeal
- State
- North Carolina
- Circuit
- 4th Circuit
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding that wage deductions for optional van transportation complied with North Carolina wage and hour law and that employees were not entitled to compensation for waiting and travel time.
Excerpt
ROY C. HYMAN, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. EFFICIENCY, INC., d/b/a TROJAN LABOR, Defendant No. COA04-246 (Filed 7 December 2004) 1. Employer and Employee— wage withholding — transportation deduction — specific authorization A de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant temporary employment agency after the trial court found no violations of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act under N.C.G.S. § 95-25.8 and N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305 based on defendant withholding class members’ wages to pay for an optional transportation service to and from job sites, because: (1) defendant’s daily log complies with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 95-25.8(2)(a) as a specific authorization since the log provides class members with advance notice of the specific deduction amount, and the deductions for transportation expenses are not automatic and are conditioned upon the class members specifically requesting use of the van pool each morning; (2) defendant’s daily log specific authorization form satisfied the formatting and content requirements under N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(b) since the daily log is written, signed by the class members on or before the payday for the pay period for which the deduction is made, includes the date signed, and states the reason for the deduction; (3) while administrative opinion letters from the North Carolina Department of Labor are not binding on the Court of Appeals, they are recognized as evidence of defendant’s good faith to comply with the statute; and (4) the optional transportation service offered to the class members is neither an incident of nor necessary to the employment, and it is not primarily for the benefit of defendant who hired from its locale even though the trip the class members pay for is between defendant’s home office and the job sites. 2. Employer and Employee— wage withholding — waiting and traveling to work A de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant temporary employment agency based on class members not being entitled to compensation under N.C.G.S. § 95-25.6 for time spent waiting for1 and traveling on defendant’s optional transportation service, because: (1) plaintiff testified that defendant never told him that hours worked included wait time or travel time to and from the job site, and the employment contract does not provide for the compensation the class members seek; (2) the class members’ wait or travel time is not a principal activity requiring compensation, but instead is preliminary and postliminary activity since the class members’ idle time either before or after the workday is personal; and (3) the receipt of general protective equipment does not make travel time compensable under 29 C.F.R. § 785.38. Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 21 November 2003 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 October 2004. Law Offices of Robert J. Willis, by Robert J. Willis, for plaintiff-appellant. Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by M. Robin Davis and Alycia S. Levy, for defendant-appellee. TYSON, Judge. Roy C. Hyman (“plaintiff’), on behalf of those similarly situated (collectively, “the class members”) appeal entry of summary judgment in favor of Efficiency, Inc., d/b/a Trojan Labor (“defendant”) after the trial court found no violations of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“the NCWHA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq. We affirm. I. Background Defendant is a temporary employment agency that hires individuals on a daily basis for casual labor. Defendant markets and provides the temporary labor to businesses that periodically need additional workers. Defendant’s hiring policy is structured on a first come first serve basis. The class members arrive at defendant’s office early in the morning to receive available employment. Upon arrival, the class members receive a time ticket indicating their place in line for job assignments. The time between receiving a number in line and departure to job sites is considered unpaid personal time. After receiving assignments, the class members may either transport themselves to the job sites or participate in defendant’s van pool. Defendant deducts $2.00 each way from a participant’s paycheck for optional van transportation. With their initial employment application, all the class members sign authorization forms that disclose the optional transportation program and related expenses. Each morning, the class members interested in using the van pool sign an additional form authorizing a wage deduction from their paycheck. The class members are not paid while waiting for the van pool at either defendant’s office or for return from the job site. Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court on 26 April 2002. Defendant removed the case to federal court alleging federal question subject matter jurisdiction under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“the FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. On 25 September 2002, the federal court granted plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court as the claims were based solely under substantive state law. On 24 February 2003, the trial court granted plaintiff’s uncontested motion to file an amended complaint. This complaint alleged two class action claims under the NCWHA. First, plaintiff alleged defendant withheld illegal wage deductions. Second, defendant failed to honor an express agreement to pay plaintiff for all daily wages due. On 11 April 2003 and 3 June 2003, plaintiff moved for and was granted class certification of two classes of plaintiffs: (1) the transportation deduction class; and (2) the waiting to work class. Defendant answered on 16 June 2003. Defendant moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative for partial summary judgment, on 28 August 2003. The motion alleged: (1) plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the NCWHA and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq.) (2) plaintiff’s claims under the NCWHA and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq. are preempted by the FLSA; (3) plaintiff was paid the agreed upon wage for “hours worked” under the FLSA; and (4) defendant’s wage deduction authorization forms fully complied with the NCWHA, specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-28.8(2). On 21 November 2003, the trial court found the “material facts regarding these claims are not in significant dispute [and] [t]he issue ... is whether or not the undisputed material' facts of record establish a violation of the Wage and Hour Act.” The trial court found plaintiff failed to show a violation of the NCWHA and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. II.Issues The issues on appeal are whether the trial court properly granted: (1) summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs transportation deduction claim; and (2) summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs waiting to work claim. III.Federal Statutes. Regulations, and Cases as Guidance The issues before us arise from Employment and Labor Law, an area substantively monopolized by federal law. Plaintiffs claims are based on the NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et. seq. The NCWHA is modeled after the FLSA. Laborers’ Int’l Union of North America, AFL-CIO v. Case Farms, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 312, 314, 488 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1997). The North Carolina Administrative Code (“the Code”) provides that “judicial and administrative interpretations and rulings established under [] federal law” may guide us when interpreting North Carolina laws that are identical to provisions of the FLSA. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0103 (June 2004). We are not bound by decisions of Federal circuit courts other than those of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit arising from North Carolina law. Haynes v. State, 16 N.C. App. 407, 409-10, 192 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1972) (citing State v. Barber, 278 N.C. 268, 179 S.E.2d 404 (1971)). IV.Standard of Review We review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Shroyer v. County of Mecklenburg, 154 N.C. App. 163, 167, 571 S.E.2d 849, 851 (2002) (citing Falk Integrated Tech., Inc. v. Stack, 132 N.C. App. 807, 809, 513 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1999)). Under de novo review, a reviewing court considers the matter anew, and it may substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when: “(1) the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140 N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000) (quotation omitted), aff’dper curiam, 353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001). The moving party has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 572, 515 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1999). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all inferences from that evidence must be drawn against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party. Id. After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ oral arguments, we conclude no genuine issues of material fact exist. We review the trial court’s conclusions of law. V. Transportation Deduction Claim Plaintiff asserts defendant failed to comply with the North Carolina statutes and the Code, which provide when and how employers may deduct wages from employees’ paychecks. We disagree. A. Blanket and Specific Authorizations of Wage Withholding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq. comprise the NCWHA. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8 (2003) addresses wage withholding, which states: An employer may withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages when: (1) The employer is required or empowered to do so by State or federal law, or (2) The employer has a written authorization from the employee which is signed on or before the payday for the pay period from which the deduction is to be made indicating the reason for the deduction. Two types of authorization are permitted: (a) When the amount or rate of the proposed deduction is known and agreed upon in advance, the authorization shall specify the dollar amount or percentage of wages which shall be deducted from one or more paychecks, provided that if the deduction is for the convenience of the employee, the employee shall be given a reasonable opportunity to withdraw the authorization; (b) When the amount of the proposed deduction is not known and agreed upon in advance, the authorization need not specify a dollar amount which can be deducted from one or more paychecks, provided that the employee receives advance notice of the specific amount of any proposed deduction and is given a reasonable opportunity to withdraw the authorization before the deduction is made. The statute offers employers two options of written authorization to deduct wages. First, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a) addresses deductions of a “known” sum of money, a specific authorization. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305 (June 2004). Employees who agree to specific authorizations must receive from their employers an opportunity to withdraw the authorization before the deduction is made, “if the deduction is for the convenience of the employee . ...” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a). Second, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(b) refers to a blanket authorization, one made for an unknown amount of money. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305. Before a deduction may be completed under a blanket authorization, the employee must receive notice of the specific amount and a reasonable opportunity to withdraw the authorization. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(b). The Code requires wage deduction authorizations to be: (1) written; (2) signed by the employee on or before the payday for the pay period for which the deduction is made; (3) show the date of signing by the employee; and (4) state the reason for the deduction. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(b). A specific authorization must provide the exact dollar amount or percentage of wages withheld. Id. Before wages may be deducted under a blanket authorization, the employee must be provided: (1) advance notice of the specific amount of the proposed deduction; and (2) a reasonable opportunity of at least three calendar days from the employer’s notice of the amount to withdraw the authorization. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(d). Defendant’s policy requires each individual hired to read and sign an employment contract that includes a provision entitled, “Acknowledgment of Transportation Expense and Request to Deduct Transportation Expenses from Wages,” which states: I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE that to be eligible for employment with THE COMPANY that I provide my own transportation to a job site. If I am unable to provide my own transportation to a job site, I request THE COMPANY to arrange such transportation for me. I acknowledge that such transportation is for my benefit, and that without THE COMPANY arranging the transportation to the job site, I would not be able to accept employment with THE COMPANY. If THE COMPANY or another employee provides transportation for me, or if I am advanced funds to provide for my own transportation, I hereby request and authorize THE COMPANY to deduct the actual and reasonable cost, not to exceed specific state law, of that transportation from my wages. This provision authorizes defendant to withhold wages for the class members use of the van pool. It does not specify a dollar amount for the van pool service and is a blanket authorization under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(b). If this were the only wage deduction authorization form, defendant must provide the class members: (1) advance notice of the specific amount of the proposed deduction; and (2) a reasonable opportunity of at least three calendar days from the employer’s notice of the amount to withdraw the authorization. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(d). In addition to the employment contract blanket authorization, defendant presents another form to the class members every day. Each work morning, defendant offers the class members transportation to the job sites. Those interested sign a daily log which includes the following language: I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE that I am accepting transportation from a co-employee in order to report to. my assigned work site. If I did not accept such transportation, I would be unable to report to the job site assigned, or I would have to use public transportation, if available. I further acknowledge that my share of the cost of transportation shall be $4.00 per round trip, and I agree that this amount is reasonable. Trojan Labor does not set this fee and will not receive any part of the $4.00 cost of transportation. I acknowledge that the cost of transportation reimbursement amount will be credited in full to the co-employee who provides transportation for me to the job site. For each day that I accept as described herein, I agree that Trojan Labor provided transportation to me. I acknowledge and agree that this deduction of the transportation reimbursement from my paycheck by Trojan Labor is reasonable and is an accommodation to me, I ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE that I have a choice to accept the transportation from my co-employee and pay to him/her as explained herein the cost of transportation fee of $4.00 or travel to the job site on public transportation. With full knowledge that I have such a choice, I have elected to accept transportation from my co-employee and to reimburse him/her the cost of transportation as described herein. As a result of this election, I WAIVE any right to bring any action against Trojan Labor under State or Federal law relating to the cost of transportation to a job site. This daily log authorizes defendant to withhold wages for the class members use of the van pool. Unlike the blanket authorization above, the daily log provides the class members advance notice of the specific deduction amount, $2.00 each way, and qualifies as a specific authorization under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a). We further note the deductions for transportation expenses are not automatic. They are conditioned upon the class members specifically requesting use of the van pool each morning. Only then are wages withheld. The class members receive frequent and sufficient notice of the cost to use defendant’s van pool. We hold the daily log complies with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a) as a specific authorization. Defendant’s daily log specific authorization form satisfies the Code’s formatting and content requirements. The daily log is written, signed by the class members on or before the payday for the pay period for which the deduction is made, includes the date signed, and states the reason for the deduction. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(b). On 3 July 2003, defense counsel requested and received an opinion letter from the North Carolina Department of Labor (“the NCDOL”) concerning defendant’s two authorization forms. In that opinion letter, the NCDOL concluded defendant’s daily log form satisfied the statutory and regulatory guidelines concerning wage withholding under a specific authorization. It also determined defendant’s employment contract was a blanket authorization under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(b). Accordingly, defendant would need to provide the class members both advance notice of the specific deduction amount and at least three calendar days from the date of the notice of the deduction to withdraw the authorization. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(b); N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(d). The opinion letter also reiterated that defendant need not provide both a specific and blanket authorization form. While administrative opinion letters are not binding on this Court, we recognize it as evidence of defendant’s good faith to comply with the statute. Brooks, Comr. of Labor v. Grading Co., 303 N.C. 573, 581, 281 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1981) (although not binding, interpretations of a statute by the agency created to administer that statute are provided some deference by appellate courts) (citing In re Appeal of North Carolina Savings and Loan League, 302 N.C. 458, 466, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (1981)). Defendant’s daily log satisfies the requirements of both N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a) and N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(b) as a specific authorization. We decline to consider whether defendant’s employment contract meets the statutory and Code requirements as a blanket authorization. This portion of plaintiff’s assignment of error is overruled. B. Incident of and Necessary to Employment Plaintiff contends the optional transportation services offered by defendant to the class members are a benefit to defendant and thus are considered neither wages nor deductible. We disagree. “An employer is allowed to count as wages the reasonable cost ‘of furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging, or other facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished by such employer to his employees.’ ” Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (2002) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)). The employer may then deduct the reasonable cost from the employee’s paycheck, even if the net sum is below the minimum wage. 29 C.F.R. § 531.27 (2004). The United States Department of Labor (“the USDOL”) defines “other facilities” as [m]eals furnished at company restaurants or cafeterias or by hospitals, hotels, or restaurants to their employees; meals, dormitory rooms, and tuition furnished by a college to its student employees; housing furnished for dwelling purposes; general merchand
Similar Rulings
Browse Related
Facing something similar at work?
Court rulings like this one are useful, but every situation is different. Take 2 minutes to see which laws may protect you — it's free, private, and no account is required to start.
This ruling information is sourced from public court records via CourtListener.com. Case outcomes, claim types, and summaries are extracted using AI analysis and may be incomplete or inaccurate. It is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
See something wrong, or named in this ruling and want it corrected or redacted? Request a correction.