Ashford v. University of Michigan

PHINNEY v PERLMUTTER PHINNEY v ADELMAN PHINNEY v UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BOARD OF REGENTS Docket Nos. 175485, 175857, 176940. Submitted June 18, 1996, at Detroit. Decided April 4, 1997, at 9:00 A.M. Carolyn Phinney, formerly employed as a senior research associate at the Institute of Gerontology at the University of Michigan, brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against institute research scientist Marion Perlmutter, institute director Richard Adelman, and investigator Lois Verbrugge and an action in the Court of Claims against the University of Michigan Board of Regents. Phinney alleged that Perlmutter, among other things, committed fraud and misrepresentation in appropriating Phinney’s research and making false representations about the prospects of obtaining foundation grants for continued research and about Phinney’s continued employment at the institute. Phinney alleged that Adelman, Verbrugge, and the board of regents, among other things, violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., in taking retaliatory actions against Phinney after she complained about misconduct by Perlmutter. Judge Patrick J. Conlin, sitting as the circuit court and the Court of Claims in the respective actions, granted summary disposition for Verbrugge and found no cause of action against the board of regents. A jury returned verdicts against Perlmutter and Adelman. The circuit court entered a judgment on the verdicts, awarded prejudgment interest against Perlmutter from the date of Phinney’s fourth amended complaint and against Adelman from the date of Phinney’s first amended complaint, and denied Phinney’s request for an award of attorney fees against Adelman under the wpa. Perlmutter, Adelman, and Phinney appealed and Phinney and the board of regents cross appealed. The appeals were consolidated. The Court of Appeals held: 1. Perlmutter’s claim that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in view of federal copyright law is without merit. Phinney’s claim against Perlmutter was for fraud, a state-law claim over which federal courts have no jurisdiction. Phinney’s claim is not preempted by the Copyright Act in the absence of evidence that Phinney’s writings were registered with the Register of Copyrights. 2. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Phinney leave to file a fourth amended complaint against Perlmutter in the absence of a showing by Perlmutter of resulting prejudice. 3. The circuit court did not err in denying Perlmutter’s motion for summary disposition based on the statute of frauds. Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that Phinney’s fraud claim against Perl-mutter is inextricably intertwined with a contract of employment, an agreement for an indefinite term of employment, such as that which Phinney had, is generally regarded as not being within the proscription of the statute of frauds. 4. The circuit court did not err in denying Perlmutter’s motion for a directed verdict based on governmental immunity. A question of fact existed regarding whether Perlmutter’s actions were so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury resulted. 5. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perl-mutter’s motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial, which were all based on a claim of insufficient evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. A rational trier of fact can conclude from the evidence presented that Perlmutter made material misrepresentations, that they were false, that Perl-mutter knew they were false or made them recklessly without knowledge of their truth or falsity, that Perlmutter made the misrepresentations with the intent that Phinney would act on them, that Phinney acted in reliance on Perlmutter’s misrepresentations, and that Phinney suffered damages. 6. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of the evidentiary rulings challenged by Perlmutter on appeal. 7. The circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by Perlmutter, that “[djamages for emotional distress, humiliation, injury to reputation or exemplary damages are not available in a fraud claim,” but did err in limiting the available damages to those based on contract principles. Damages for mental and emotional distress may be awarded where, as here, there is allegation and proof of tortious conduct independent of a breach of contract. The circuit court’s error in limiting damages does not require reversal. The circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by Perlmutter, that reliance by Phinney on the alleged misrepresentations by Perlmutter had to be reasonable. Fraud requires proof of actual, but not reasonable, reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. Appellate review of Perlmutter’s claim that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury about burden of proof is precluded in light of Perlmutter’s failure to object at trial to the instruction that was given. 8. Perlmutter waived the issue concerning the lack of a distinction between past and future damages inasmuch as she stipulated the use of a general verdict form. 9. The damages assessed against Perlmutter are not excessive because they are not higher than the highest amount the evidence can support. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perlmutter’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of jury misconduct and improper closing argument by Phinney’s counsel. The alleged jury misconduct concerned the jury’s conduct after trial and therefore did not affect the trial or the evidence presented at trial. The circuit court was in the best position to determine whether the jury’s verdict was motivated by such impermissible considerations as passion, bias, or anger. 10. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perl-mutter’s motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Evidence of an interview of Phinney is ambiguous, and the fact that Phinney avoided further injury upon discovering Perl-mutter’s scheme does not undo the damage that was inflicted. 11. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perl-mutter’s motion for a new trial on the asserted ground of jury prejudice in the absence of an affirmative showing by Perlmutter of prejudice. 12. Phinney is entitled to prejudgment interest from Perlmutter from the date of the original complaint against Perlmutter, not the date of the fourth amended complaint by which Phinney first alleged the claim of fraud and misrepresentation and on which the judgment was issued. Prejudgment interest is paid from the date of the original complaint because the purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate the prevailing party for expenses incurred in bringing an action for money damages and for any delay in receiving such damages. Prejudgment interest for future damages may be assessed where, as here, the action does not result from personal bodily iryury. The case must be remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest against Perlmutter. 13. The circuit court had proper jurisdiction over the wpa claims against Adelman. The wpa defines “employers” to include state entities and specifies that actions thereunder may be filed in the circuit court. The Legislature, in enacting the wpa, waived the right of state entities to be sued only in the Court of Claims. 14. Adelman’s claim on appeal that Phinney was not entitled to a jury trial with regard to the wpa claims is without merit. State entities against whom claims under the wpa are brought may be subjected to jury trials. In any event, Adelman consented to the jury trial. 15. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Phinney leave to file a fourth amended complaint against Adelman in the absence of a showing of bad faith on Phinney’s part or prejudice to Adelman and in view of the imposition of $10,000 in costs against Phinney. Amendment was not futile because the claims against Adelman were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 16. For purposes of reviewing Adelman’s claim on appeal that Phinney’s action against him is barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations of the wpa, the filing date is October 1, 1990, the date of Phinney’s original complaint, not April 1, 1991, the date of the first amended complaint by which Phinney first named Adelman as a defendant. Adelman’s counsel at trial had referred to October 1, 1990, as the filing date, and Adelman is thus barred from now taking the contrary position that the later date was the filing date. A civil action under the wpa must be brought within ninety days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of the wpa, MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1). While two instances of alleged violations of the wpa by Adelman are within this limitation period, several others occurred before the ninety-day period. Phinney’s action against Adelman for alleged violations that occurred more than ninety days before she filed her action is timely under the continuing violations doctrine, which applies where there was a policy of discrimination, or, as in this case, a continuing course of conduct, i.e., a series of discriminatory acts that were sufficiently related so as to constitute a pattern, only one of which occurred within the limitation period. The circuit court did not err in denying Adelman’s motion for summary disposition based on the statute of limitations in light of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Adelman had engaged in continuing violations of the wpa. 17. Phinney’s claims against Adelman under the wpa are not barred by governmental immunity, and the circuit court did not err in denying Adelman’s motions for summary disposition, a directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, all of which were based on governmental immunity. The act explicitly includes the state in its definition of “employer” and includes an agent of an employer within its definition of “employer.” The governmental immunity statute must be read in pari materia with the wpa, the extension of the remedies under the wpa is consistent with the protections that the governmental immunity act offers to governmental employees against third parties, and the wpa not only contains no language freeing the government from its requirements, regulations, and restraints, but it explicitly includes the state among those employers who are subject to the act. The wpa, being more special and particular than the governmental immunity statute, was intended to be an exception to the governmental immunity statute, because the Legislature must be presumed not to have intended a conflict. 18. The wpa, insofar as it abrogates governmental immunity, does not, as Adelman claims on appeal, violate the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution. The purpose of the wpa is to protect employees who suffer retaliation for reporting violations of law. The inclusion of the state among employers subject to wpa is incidental to the purpose of the wpa and need not have been stated in the title of the wpa. 19. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adelman’s motions for summary disposition, a directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, all of which were based on the asserted grounds that Phinney failed to prove that she had engaged in protected activity under the wpa, failed to establish any nexus between her activily and the nonrenewal of her appointment, or failed to demonstrate pretext. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Phinney, the record discloses that she reported violations of law by Perlmutter to the university, a public body, that there was a sufficient nexus between Phinney’s reporting of such violations and the retaliatory actions taken by Adelman against her, and that her failure to publish academic writings was a pretext for the retaliatory actions taken against her. 20. Phinney’s claims against Adelman are within the scope of the WPA. 21. Adelman, by failing to object at trial, failed to preserve as an issue on appeal his claim that the circuit court failed to properly instruct the jury about quantum of proof. Manifest injustice will not result from the Court of Appeals’ decision not to review this issue. 22. The fact that the circuit court jury ruled against Adelman while the Court of Claims ruled in favor of the board of regents with regard to similar claims under the wpa does not mean that the trial judge improperly deferred to the jury. A trial court sitting as the Court of Claims is not obligated to return a verdict consistent with the jury’s verdict in a circuit court action joined with the Court of Claims action. 23. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in several evidentiary rulings challenged by Adelman on appeal. 24. The circuit court did not err in denying Adelman’s motions for remittitur or a new trial. The damages assessed against Adelman were not higher than the highest amount the evidence can support, and the jury’s verdict was not motivated by impermissible considerations. Adelman waived the issue concerning a lack of distinction between past and future damages by not objecting to the verdict form used. Contrary to Adelman’s assertion, damages for emotional distress may be awarded in an action under the wpa. 25. Attorney fees in an action under the wpa may be awarded by the trial court at its discretion. In this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Phinney’s request for attorney fees after considering the contingent fee arrangement between Phinney and her counsel. 26. Prejudgment interest assessed against Adelman must be from the date of the first amended complaint, when Adelman was first named as a defendant, not from the date of the fourth amended complaint, when the claims under the wpa were first made against Adelman. Prejudgment interest on future damages may be awarded where, as here, the action does not result from personal bodily injury. The case must be remanded for recalculation of the amount of prejudgment interest Adelman must pay. 27. The circuit court did not err in granting summary disposition for Verbrugge on the basis of the expiration of the period of limitation applicable to the action against her. Phinney failed to establish any fraudulent concealment, MCL 600.5855; MSA 27A.5855, by Verbrugge that would have tolled the running of the period of limitation. 28. The Court of Claims did not clearly err in finding that Phinney had failed to establish that the board of regents had violated the wpa. The record supports the Court of Claims’ findings that the board had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for actions taken' against Phinney and that Phinney had not shown that those reasons were a pretext. Phinney waived the issue of a wrong burden of proof being employed by the Court of Claims when she failed to raise it in the statement of questions presented. Affirmed; circuit court case remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest. 1. Fraud — Reliance on Misrepresentation. Fraud requires proof of actual, but not reasonable, reliance on an alleged misrepresentation. 2. Interest — Prejudgment Interest — Amended Complaints. The purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate the prevailing party for expenses incurred in bringing an action for money damages and for any delay in receiving such damages; prejudgment interest against a defendant who loses with regard to a cause of action raised in an amended complaint should be assessed from the date of the original complaint; prejudgment interest against a defendant who is added in an amended complaint and who loses with regard to a cause of action first raised in a later amended complaint should be assessed from the date of the amended complaint by which the defendant was added (MCL 600.6013[1]; MSA 27A.6013[1]). 3. Interest — Prejudgment Interest — Future Damages. Prejudgment interest may be awarded for future damages where the action does not result from personal bodily injury (MCL ' 600.6013[1], 600.6301; MSA 27A.6013[1], 27A.6301). 4. Master and Servant — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Statute of Limitations — Continuing Violations. A civil action under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act must be brought within ninety days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of the act; violations that occur more than ninety days before the bringing of the action are actionable under the continuing violation doctrine where there is a policy of discrimination or a continuing course of conduct, i.e., a series of discriminatory acts that are sufficiently related so as to constitute a pattern, only one of which occurs within the limitation period (MCL 15.363[1]; MSA 17.428[3][1]). 5. Governmental Immunity — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. A civil action under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act against a governmental entity or agent in their capacity as employer is not barred by governmental immunity (MCL 15.361[b], 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 17.428[l][b], 3.996[101] et seq). 6 Constitutional Law — Title-Object Clause — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Governmental Immunity. The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, insofar as it abrogates governmental immunity, does not violate the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 24; MCL 15.361 [b]; MSA 17.428[l][b]). 7. Master and Servant — Whistleblowers’ Protection Act — Emotional Distress Damages. Damages for emotional distress are awardable in a civil action under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (MCL 15.363[1], [3]; MSA 17.428[3][1],[3]). Green & Green (by Philip Green) (Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, PC. by Patrick Burkett, of Counsel), for Carlyon Phinney. Bodman, Longley & Dahling, LLP (by Jerold Lax), for Marion Perlmutter. Butzel Long (by Diane M. Soubly and James S. Rosenfeld), for Lois Verbrugge, Richard Adelman, and University of Michigan Board of Regents. Before: Wahls, P.J., and Murphy and C. D. Corwin, JJ. Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment. Wahls, P.J. Defendant Marion Perlmutter hired plaintiff, Carolyn Phinney, as a senior research associate at the Institute of Gerontology (lOG) at the University of Michigan. At the time, Perlmutter was a research scientist at the lOG, and defendant Richard Adelman was the director of the institute. Plaintiff accused Perlmutter of stealing her research. Adelman appointed defendant Lois Verbrugge to conduct an investigation. The investigators found that Perlmutter was not guilty of scientific misconduct. Perlmutter was also found not guilty in two other investigations concerning allegations that she committed plagiarism. In the meantime, plaintiff lost her job at the lOG. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Perlmutter had defrauded her of her research and that Adelman and defendant University of Michigan Board of Regents retaliated against her for reporting Perlmutter’s misconduct. The jury agreed with plaintiff and awarded her $133,000 in damages against Perlmutter for fraud and $989,200 against Adelman for retaliatory discrimination. The trial court, sitting as the Court of Claims, found no cause of action against the board of regents with regard to plaintiffs claim under the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 el seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq. In Docket No. 175485, which involved the fraud claim, Perlmutter appeals and plaintiff cross appeals the judgment against Perlmutter. We affirm in part and remand for a recalculation of the amount of prejudgment interest to which plaintiff is entitled. In Docket No. 175857, the retaliation claim against Adelman, Adelman appeals and plaintiff cross appeals the judgment against Adelman. We affirm in part and remand for a recalculation of the amount of prejudgment interest to which plaintiff is entitled. In Docket No. 176940, the claim against the board of regents, plain

ROWRY v UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Docket Nos. 91292, 91293. Argued April 7, 1992 (Calendar No. 2). Decided September 22, 1992. Ezra L. Rowry filed a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement against the University of Michigan, his employer, seeking reinstatement following dismissal as a bus driver. After the grievance had proceeded through the three-step procedure required under the collective bargaining agreement, it was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator found discharge inappropriate and ordered Rowry reinstated without back pay. While the grievance was pending, the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation petition, alleging that he was unable to work because of an aggravated hernia condition, blood pressure, and an ulcer condition due to the stress of the job. The petition was denied. Thereafter, he filed another grievance, which resulted in another three-step hearing and a denial of that grievance. The plaintiff then brought an action in the Court of Claims, seeking to enforce the arbitration award. The court, Peter D. Houk, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant on the ground that the lawsuit was barred by a six-month period of limitation. The plaintiff brought a second action in the Court of Claims, alleging breach of contract, discrimination under the Workers’ Disability Compensation and the Civil Rights Acts, and wrongful discharge. The court again granted summary disposition for the defendant, finding the action barred by the decision in the first case. The plaintiff appealed both decisions. The Court of Appeals, Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and T. J. Lesinski, JJ., consolidated the appeals and affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, relying on Walkerville Ed Ass’n v Walkerville Rural Communities School, 164 Mich App 341 (1987), applying the six-month period of limitation of the public employees relations act (Docket Nos. 114413, 118325). The plaintiff appeals. In an opinion by Chief Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justices Levin, Brickley, and Mallett, the Supreme Court held: The plaintiff’s cause of action to enforce the arbitration award is not barred by the six-month period of limitation applied by the Court of Appeals. References Am Jur 2d, Arbitration and Award § 165. See the Index to Annotations under Arbitration and Award. 1. MCL 423.1 et seq.; MSA 17.454(1) et seq., the labor-mediation act, provides alternatives to resolve labor disputes through mediation and arbitration. After an arbitration award has been rendered, it is enforceable at law or in equity as the agreement of the parties. The act does not expressly limit the period during which a party may enforce an arbitration award. The public employees relations act’s six-month limitation period applied by the Court of Appeals, MCL 423.9d; MSA 17.454(10.3), pertains only to actions filed with the Employment Relations Commission. Application of that limitation by analogy is not appropriate in this case. Rather than seeking money damages for breach of contract the plaintiff sought specific performance of the arbitration award. Because a suit for the specific performance is purely an equitable remedy, the Court of Appeals erred in applying by analogy the pera six-month period of limitation. 2. Two time limitations are applicable to the enforcement of arbitration awards: the six-year period of limitation for breach of contract, and the equitable doctrine of laches, requiring the exercise of due diligence to ensure the timely prosecution of the claim to avoid undue prejudice. Ordinarily, a plaintiff has six years to seek enforcement of an arbitration award. In certain cases this period may be diminished substantially if the arbitration award grants equitable relief and a delay in its enforcement is shown to prejudice the defendant in a way that evokes laches to bar the claim. In this case, because the defendant failed to raise laches in its responsive pleadings or by motion, this affirmative defense was waived. As a result, the claim is governed solely by the six-year period of limitation applicable to a breach of contract. Because the plaintiff’s complaint was within this six-year period, he may seek enforcement of the arbitration award. Justice Griffin, joined by Justice Boyle, concurring, stated that application of the six-year limitation period in this case will seriously undermine state and federal policies favoring the prompt resolution of labor disputes. Involved here is more than a simple breach of contract or a straightforward refusal to, comply with an arbitration award. The plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of a collective bargaining agreement between his union and his employer, and includes a grievance procedure designed to effect prompt resolution of disputes. If a policy of prompt resolution of labor disputes is to have meaning, a relatively short limitation period should govern resort to the courts after exhaustion of a grievance procedure. Justice Riley, concurring, stated that because the labor mediation act, the collective bargaining agreement, and the arbitration award do not provide a period of limitation for enforcement of an arbitration award, the six-year period of limitation for breach of contract must apply. MCR 2.116(C)(6) is designed to stop parties from litigating matters involving the same questions and claims presented in pending litigation. In this case, the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit against the same party, alleging exactly the same events. Because the same claim was being litigated by the plaintiff in the Court of Appeals and in the Court of Claims, the defendant was entitled to summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6). Reversed and remanded. Labor Relations — Arbitration — Limitation op Actions — Laches. An action for enforcement of an arbitration award is limited by the six-year period for breach of contract and by the equitable doctrine of laches; application by analogy of the six-month period of limitation provided by the public employees relations act is inappropriate (MCL 600.5807[8], 600.5815; MSA 27A.5807[8], 27A.5815). Hurbis, Cmejrek, Clinton & Fernandez (by James R. Cmejrek) and Kurt Berggren for the plaintiff. Butzel, Long (by Virginia F. Metz and Lynne E. Deitch) for the defendant. Amici Curiae: Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman (by Noel D. Massie) and Miller, Canñeld, Paddock & Stone (by Diane M. Soubly) for the American Society of Employers and Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce. Cavanagh, C.J. The plaintiff has appealed to this Court raising two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s first complaint to enforce an arbitration award ordering the University of Michigan to reinstate the plaintiff is barred by a period of limitation, and (2) whether the plaintiff’s second complaint, alleging wrongful discharge, breach of contract, discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, and discrimination under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act, is barred by the first complaint to enforce the arbitration award. We hold that the plaintiff’s cause of action to enforce the arbitration award is not barred by the six-month period of limitation applied by the Court of Appeals. Because we resolve the first issue in favor of the plaintiff, we need not reach the second issue. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. i The plaintiff, employed by the University of Michigan as a bus driver since 1973, was discharged in November 1986 for negligently operating his bus. He filed a grievance under his collective bargaining agreement. The agreement has a three-step grievance procedure. The first step requires an employee to notify his immediate supervisor of the particular problem. If an unsatisfactory oral answer is received, step two permits the employee to file a written grievance to the department head, or designated representative, for a written answer. If an unsatisfactory written answer is received, step three requires the submission of a written grievance from the chairperson of his union bargaining committee to the university review committee for a hearing and a written answer. After a grievance has proceeded through the three-step procedure, the grievance may be submitted to arbitration. The plaintiff’s grievance went through the three-step procedure and was taken to arbitration. On April 23, 1987, the arbitrator issued a decision, finding that the plaintiff had operated his bus negligently but that discharge was not an appropriate remedy. The arbitrator ordered the plaintiff reinstated without back pay. While the plaintiff’s grievance was pending, in December 1986, the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation petition, alleging that he was unable to work because of an "aggravated hernia condition, blood pressure and ulcer condition due to stress of job.” The plaintiff listed three doctors who had treated him for his condition, Dr. Person-Brown, Dr. Dew, and Dr. Strasius. On May 5, 1987, the defendant’s doctor, Dr. Stunz, examined the plaintiff and concluded that "[o]n the basis of my evaluation of this man’s hypertension, peptic ulcer disease and hiatus hernia, I do not believe he is disabled from performing any and all duties which might be involved in the performance of his job as a bus driver for the University of Michigan.” Following the examination by the defendant’s doctor, the plaintiff sought reinstatement by the university. On May 12, 1987, the university informed the plaintiff that he would have to submit a university physician’s statement from the three physicians listed on his workers’ compensation petition before he could return to work. The plaintiff submitted a release from Dr. Person-Brown, but not from the other two doctors. Although the defendant had successfully subpoenaed the records of Drs. Strasius and Dew, a further attempt by the plaintiff to be reinstated was again denied. As a result of this denial, the plaintiff filed another grievance on July 24, 1987, which resulted in a third-step hearing being held on August 6, 1987, and a decision being issued on September 18, 1987. The university review committee found that [t]he delays in assessing his ability to return to work are the result of his unwillingness to cooperate in providing the University with necessary medical information on his medical condition. There has been no violation of our Agreement. Therefore, this grievance and requested remedy are denied. On February 29, 1988, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Claims to enforce the April 23, 1987, arbitration award. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition on the ground that the lawsuit was barred by a six-month limitation period. The plaintiff responded with two arguments: First, there was no statutory basis for the six-month period of limitation; and second, even if a six-month period of limitation applied, the lawsuit was brought within six months of the September 18, 1987, decision by the university review committee. The Court of Claims granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The plaintiff filed a second complaint in the Court of Claims, alleging breach of contract, discrimination under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act, discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, and wrongful discharge. The defendant responded with a motion for summary disposition, claiming that another action had been initiated involving the same parties and the same underlying claim. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition of the plaintiff’s second complaint. The plaintiff appealed both decisions. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims, relying on Walkerville Ed Ass’n v Walkerville Rural Communities School, 165 Mich App 341, 345; 418 NW2d 459 (1987). The plaintiff appealed in this Court, and we granted leave to appeal. 439 Mich 922 (1992). ii The dispositive issue before this Court is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by a six-month period of limitation. We hold that it is not. The labor-mediation act, MCL 423.1 et seq.; MSA 17.454(1) et seq., is intended to provide alternatives to resolve labor disputes through mediation and arbitration. The act provides procedures for parties to submit disputes to voluntary arbitration. After an arbitration award has been rendered, the award is "enforceable at law or in equity as the agreement of the parties.” Absent from the act is any express legislation that limits the period during which a party may enforce an arbitration award. Attempting to remedy the absence of a period of limitation, the Court of Appeals in Walkerville borrowed a six-month period from the public employees relations act (pera). Specifically, the Court of Appeals in Walkerville stated: An arbitration proceeding, being based on an agreement, is contractual in nature. Bay City School Dist [v Bay City, 425 Mich 426; 390 NW2d 159 (1986)]. The difficulty in this case arises because of MCL 423.9d; MSA 17.454(10.3), which, while allowing public labor disputes to be resolved by arbitration, does not specify a limitation period for enforcing the arbitration award. Rather, the award rendered "shall be enforceable at law or in equity as the agreement of the parties.” MCL 423.9d(4); MSA 17.454(10.3)(4). This requirement suggests that an arbitration award in the public sector should be subject to the six-year limitation period for contracts contained in the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8). This limitation period, although perhaps applicable under strict rules of statutory construction, appears to be an unduly lengthy period for enforcing an arbitration award. This is particularly so when viewed with the statutory declaration that the best interests of the people of this state are served by the prompt settlement of labor disputes. MCL 423.1; MSA 17.454(1). Similar policy considerations, under federal labor law, along with a consideration of competing interests affected by the limitation period, have led federal courts to adopt the six-month limitation period contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 160(b), for arbitration purposes. .See McCreedy v Local Union No 971, UAW, 809 F2d 1232 (CA 6, 1987). We conclude that the trial court did not err in adopting the six-month limitation period. A six-month period is part of pera; it effectuates the state’s express policy in favor of the prompt resolution of labor disputes in the public sector. Adoption of the six-month limitation period also contributes to statute of limitation uniformity. [Walkerville, p 345.] We disagree. By its terms, the pera limitation only applies to actions filed with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission. Additionally, the practice of applying statutes of limitation by analogy does not appear to be applicable in this case. Rather than seeking money damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff in this case seeks specific performance of the arbitration award that orders his reinstatement as an employee of the defendant. In Keys v Hopper, 270 Mich 504, 507; 259 NW 319 (1935), this Court recognized that "[a] suit for the specific performance of a contract [is] a purely equitable remedy . . . .” (Citation omitted.) As this Court stated in Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 170; 324 NW2d 9 (1982), [C]ourts traditionally have not bent to the strictures of a statute of limitations where the law does not supply relief analogous to that afforded in equity. Thus, it is said that . . . "where the relief sought is in its nature one of equitable and not of legal cognizance, and the remedy is of a purely equitable nature, equity follows its own rules,” Michigan Ins Co [v Brown, 11 Mich 265, 272 (1863).] Consequently, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the pera six-month period of limitation "by analogy” in this case. iii We do not suggest that an arbitration award can be enforced without limitation. We find two time limitations applicable to the enforcement of arbitration awards. The first time restriction applicable to the enforcement of an arbitration award is the six-year period of limitation for breach of contract. As this Court has previously recognized, arbitration is a matter of contract. It is the agreement that dictates the authority of the arbitrators and the disputes to be resolved through arbitration. In this case, the arbitration agreement provides that "[t]he arbitrator’s decision when made in accordance with his/her jurisdiction and authority established by this Agreement, shall be final and binding upon the University, the Union, and the employee or employees.” The university has never challenged the authority of the arbitrator to resolve this labor dispute. Therefore, the university’s alleged failure to comply with the arbitrator’s decision would constitute a breach of that contractual provision and would be subject to the six-year limitation period for breach of contract. The second time restriction applicable to this case is the equitable doctrine of laches. As previously noted, the plaintiff is seeking specific performance of his arbitration award and specific performance is a "purely equitable remedy.” In defining the scope of the various limitation periods contained in the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815 provides: The prescribed period of limitations shall apply equally to all actions whether equitable or legal relief is sought. The equitable doctrine of laches shall also apply in actions where equitable relief is sought. [Emphasis added.] In the context of this case, we interpret this statutory provision to require all actions seeking judicial enforcement of arbitration awards to be commenced within six years after the award is granted. Where the award purports to grant relief that is traditionally equitable in nature, the equitable doctrine of laches also applies, requiring the exercise of due diligence to ensure the timely prosecution of the plaintiif’s claim to avoid unduly prejudicing the defendant. While we find authority for this approach in MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815, we note that this Court had previously recognized that laches can operate to cut short a statutory limitation period when equitable relief is sought. In Olson v Williams, 185 Mich 294, 301; 151 NW 1043 (1915), this Court stated: The omission to do what one is by law required to do to protect his rights, and which justifies a fair presumption that he has abandoned the same, under circumstances which misled or prejudiced an adverse party, may in equity operate as laches which bar[s] the assertion of such right later under changed conditions, even though the statute of limitations has not run. IV We hold that a plaintiif ordinarily has six years to seek enforcement of an arbitration award. We also recognize that in certain cases this time period may be substantially diminished if a plaintiff’s arbitration award grants equitable relief and a delay in its enforcement is shown to prejudice the defendant in a way that evokes laches to bar the plaintiff’s claim. In failing to raise laches in its responsive pleadings or by motion, the defendant has waived this affirmative defense. As a result of this waiver, the plaintiff’s claim in this case is governed solely by the six-year period of limitation applicable to a breach of contract. Because the plaintiff filed his complaint with the Court of Claims well within this six-year period, the plaintiff is entitled to seek enforcement of his arbitration award. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Levin, Brickley, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J. MCR 2.116(C)(6). MCL 423.9d; MSA 17.454(10.3). MCL 423.9d(4); MSA 17.454(10.3X4). See MCL 423.216(a); MSA 17.455(16)(a). MCL 423.216(a); MSA 17.455(16)(a) provides: Whenever it is charged tha