Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority

Political subdivision immunity; negligent operation of a motor vehicle; negligent training/supervision; summary judgment; final appealable orders. The trial court's denial of the political subdivision's (RTA) motion for summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Denying summary judgment as to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle claim is proper because there is a question of fact for the jury regarding whether the RTA driver was negligent, and thus, whether political subdivision immunity applies. The denial of summary judgment as to the negligent supervision and/or training claim was error, because under R.C. Ch. 2744, political subdivisions are immune from liability for negligent supervision and/or training of an employee operating a motor vehicle. The remaining arguments concerning mootness and dismissal of claims are not based on final appealable orders and we are unable to review them.

Civ.R. 12(B)(1)/motion to dismiss subject-matter jurisdiction arbitration agreement labor dispute interest arbitration R.C. Chapter 4117/Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act R.C. 306.12/employee rights after acquisition Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964/section 13(c) Agreement. The labor dispute in this case is otherwise governed by R.C. 4117.10 and 306.12, and those statutes apply. The arbitration provision under the section 13(c) Agreement is not controlling here. Because SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over this case, the trial court did not err where it granted appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Summary judgment res judicata federal court R.C. 4112.02 statute of limitations retaliation breach of contract R.C. 4117.02 State Employee Relations Board. Trial court properly awarded transit authority and union summary judgment where plaintiff's discrimination claims were previously rejected in federal court, retaliation and breach of contract claims were barred by the statute of limitations, claims for breach of rights set forth in the collective bargaining agreement were never arbitrated, were not filed with the State Employment Relations Board, and were also outside the statute of limitations.

Industrial commission did not abuse its discretion in ruling that relator voluntarily abandoned the workforce following the denial of her first PTD application in 2004. Because relator never previously contended that the commission failed to consider her allowed psychological condition in denying her three prior PTD applications, there is no merit to relator's claim that the commission failed to consider her allowed psychological condition in making the determination that she abandoned the workforce. Writ denied.