Court Rulings

In this consolidated, interlocutory appeal, we review the order of the trial court granting the motions of the defendants, Jennifer Langley and James Broce, to dismiss the drug-free zone enhancement alleged in their presentments. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court determined that the Mark Vance Memorial Greenway located in Sullivan County, Tennessee was not a public park and in turn, was not a designated drug-free zone under the Drug-Free School Zone Act. The trial court's finding rendered the enhancement provision of the Act inapplicable to the defendants' presentments. Upon our review, we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the enhancement alleged in the presentments because the determination of whether the Mark Vance Memorial Greenway is a public park as contemplated by the Drug-Free School Zone Act is a question of fact to be decided by the finder of fact. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court.

This case involved a petition to modify the parties' parenting plan to change the primary residential parent. The father sought to be designated as the primary residential parent of his minor child, alleging, among other things, that the child's sibling was violent, that the mother had moved to a new county and enrolled the child in a new school, that he never received notice from the mother regarding the child's medical appointments, and that the mother intentionally interfered with his and the child's relationship. Because mother was not listed in father's response to mother's interrogatory—which specifically asked for a list of all potential trial witnesses—the trial court prohibited father's counsel from calling mother as a witness during father's case-in-chief. The trial court, however, allowed father to submit mother's deposition as an exhibit and also allowed father to call mother to testify as to events that had occurred since her deposition had been taken. At the close of father's proof, mother's counsel moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court granted, finding that none of the incidents relied upon by father constituted a material change in circumstances. Construing the trial court's order as if it were an order granting a motion for involuntary dismissal, and concluding that barring father from calling mother as a witness in his case-in-chief was harmless error by the trial court, we affirm.

REAL PROPERTY/LANDLORD AND TENANT: In a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, the trial court erred by prohibiting the tenant from introducing evidence to support his defense of retaliation by the landlord: the defense of retaliation under R.C. 5321.02 need not be pleaded in the answer to a complaint for forcible entry and detainer, because, under Civ.R. 1(c), the civil rules of procedure are not applicable to such actions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the tenant's motion for leave to amend his counterclaims where his request was untimely: although the tenant had filed his counterclaims well before trial, he only moved for leave to amend on the first day of the jury trial and only after the landlord had moved to dismiss the counterclaims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the tenant's second motion for leave to amend his answer and counterclaims when the request was untimely: the request was made over a year after the tenant had filed his original answer and counterclaims, and the facts underlying the new defenses and counterclaims asserted were known by the tenant at the time the forcible-entry-and-detainer action was filed against him. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the tenant from introducing evidence of the condition of the premises to demonstrate the reasonable rental value of the property when the reasonable rental value was not at issue at trial instead, the rental rate the parties had agreed upon was at issue.

EVIDENCE — WORKERS' COMPENSATION: Where the defendant-employer asserted on appeal that the trial court had failed to consider all the exhibits before rendering judgment, the court did not err in granting plaintiff-employee the right to participate in the workers' compensation fund for the condition of accessory navicular displacement where it is apparent from the record that the trial court properly reviewed all the evidence prior to entering judgment.

This appeal arises from a dispute over vacation benefits. The plaintiffs allege that their employer deprived them of earned vacation time when it changed its vacation policy. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After hearing both motions, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and denied the motion for class certification. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the trial court's ruling.