Court Rulings

Employment discrimination reverse race discrimination reverse sex discrimination magistrate Civ.R. 53. Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, brought an action for reverse race and reverse sex discrimination, asserting that he was asked to resign from his position as a result of discrimination. Defendant asserts that plaintiff was not asked to resign because of discrimination but because he didn't share the vision for the department and was no longer meeting expectations. The court found that plaintiff was unable to meet the elements for direct proof of discrimination, specifically relating to the elements of proximity and relation to decision making. The court also found that plaintiff was unable to prove a prima facie case using indirect evidence for reverse race discrimination because he was replaced by a person in the majority race and there were no comparable employees in his department. The court found that plaintiff proved a prima facie case for reverse sex discrimination using indirect proof. However, plaintiff did not prevail on his claim because defendant was able to prove that he was not meeting the expectations of his position. Accordingly, the magistrate found in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiffs, potential beneficiaries of two family trusts, sought a judgment declaring the proper distribution of assets from those trusts. Each trust contained explicit language that, upon the expiration of the trust term, the trust principal was to be distributed to the grantor's issue then living, per stirpes. The plaintiffs claimed that, upon the passing of the last measuring life, the principal of the trusts should be distributed in six equal amounts to the six grandchildren of H, the grantor of one of the trusts, and the son of the grantor of the other trust, and that the refer- enced distribution will be per stirpes, such that the one-sixth share that would have gone to any deceased grandchild of H will instead go to the issue of that grandchild. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the trusts grant the principal to the grandchildren of H or their families in equal shares. Certain defendants, other potential beneficiaries of the trust, also filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the interpretation of the two trusts and that the court should render judgment declaring that, at the expiration of the term of those trusts, the principal of the trusts should be distributed such that each of the three children of H shall be the head of each stirpe. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and rendered judgment declaring that, upon the termination of the two trusts, the corpus of each trust will be distributed in equal shares to the three children of H, with living descendants of each of the three children succeeding to the shares of their deceased ancestors. The plaintiffs and the defendant C filed separate appeals from the trial court's judgment. On appeal, although the parties generally agreed that the grantors of the trusts intended a

REPORTED OPINION finding as moot Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record denying [58] Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record granting [61] Partial Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge David A. Tapp. (co) Service on parties made. Keywords re: Order on Motion for Judgment on the Admin. Record, Reported Opinion: Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204(a) Motion to Dismiss Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034 Service Member Correction Boards 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) Civilian Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.