Court Rulings

The plaintiffs, L and L's minor daughter, G, sought damages for personal injuries that G had sustained allegedly as a result of the defendants' medical malpractice. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs filed an offer of compro- mise for $2 million, which the defendants did not accept. On October 28, 2016, the trial court accepted the jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs $4.2 million against both of the defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for statutory (§ 52-192a (c)) offer of compromise interest and for statutory (§ 37-3b) postjudgment interest. On November 28, 2016, evidently as a result of a clerical error, an entry was placed on the case docket, stating ''judgment on verdict for plaintiff.'' On December 12, 2016, the court awarded the plaintiffs both offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. On December 16, 2016, the defendants filed an appeal with the Appellate Court, challenging both the jury verdict and the trial court's awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment inter- est. The plaintiffs filed a timely motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the defendants had failed to file the appeal within twenty days of the date that judgment was rendered, as required by the rule of practice (§ 63-1 (a)) governing the time to appeal. The defendants filed an objec- tion to that motion, claiming that their appeal from the judgment ren- dered in accordance with the jury verdict was timely because they filed it within twenty days of the trial court's December 12, 2016 awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants also filed a motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit the filing of a late appeal pursuant to the applicable rules of practice (§§ 60-2 (5) and 60-3), claiming, in the alternative, that there was good cause to permit the late appeal in light of the confusion in the trial court concerning the date the judgment was rendered. The Appellate Court dismissed as untimely that portion of the defendants' appeal ch

The plaintiffs, L and L's minor daughter, G, sought damages for personal injuries that G had sustained allegedly as a result of the defendants' medical malpractice. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs filed an offer of compro- mise for $2 million, which the defendants did not accept. On October 28, 2016, the trial court accepted the jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs $4.2 million against both of the defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for statutory (§ 52-192a (c)) offer of compromise interest and for statutory (§ 37-3b) postjudgment interest. On November 28, 2016, evidently as a result of a clerical error, an entry was placed on the case docket, stating ''judgment on verdict for plaintiff.'' On December 12, 2016, the court awarded the plaintiffs both offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. On December 16, 2016, the defendants filed an appeal with the Appellate Court, challenging both the jury verdict and the trial court's awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment inter- est. The plaintiffs filed a timely motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the defendants had failed to file the appeal within twenty days of the date that judgment was rendered, as required by the rule of practice (§ 63-1 (a)) governing the time to appeal. The defendants filed an objec- tion to that motion, claiming that their appeal from the judgment ren- dered in accordance with the jury verdict was timely because they filed it within twenty days of the trial court's December 12, 2016 awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants also filed a motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit the filing of a late appeal pursuant to the applicable rules of practice (§§ 60-2 (5) and 60-3), claiming, in the alternative, that there was good cause to permit the late appeal in light of the confusion in the trial court concerning the date the judgment was rendered. The Appellate Court dismissed as untimely that portion of the defendants' appeal ch

Brian Bowling ("Employee") was employed as a laborer for Potter South East ("Employer"). During his employment with Employer, he was constantly exposed to loud noise from jackhammers, sledgehammers, power drivers and heavy equipment. Employee initially developed hearing loss in 2010 or 2011. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment raising the one-year statute of limitations. The motion was supported by the evaluating physician's C-32 report. The trial court granted Employer's motion and entered an order dismissing Employee's claim. Employee has appealed from that order. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer for personal injuries he sustained at work while cleaning equipment that allegedly resulted from the defendant's having intention- ally created a dangerous condition that it knew with substantial certainty would result in injury to the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defen- dant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284 (a)) of the Workers' Compensation Act because the plaintiff failed to present a genuine issue of material fact to show that the defendant engaged in intentional conduct that it knew with substantial certainty would result in injury to him. The court determined, inter alia, that there was no information that the defendant's failure, prior to the plaintiff's injury, to install a lockout device it had previously required that would have activated and controlled the equip- ment was intentional or would cause injury. The court also determined that, in the months prior to the plaintiff's injury, the defendant had discussed with the plaintiff and other employees changes it was making for safety and other operational procedures, and that there was no evidence of a failure to follow safety regulations before the plaintiff's injury or that the defendant had disabled or changed any of its devices for any improper reason. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for sum- mary judgment because questions as to intent are to be decided by the trier of fact, and the defendant coerced him into cleaning the equipment and was deliberately deceptive in having failed to install the lockout device when it knew that the device was required to be used. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff having failed to show that there was a genuine i