Court Rulings

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Javon Jolarry Spivey, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and robbery. After merging the first degree premeditated murder and felony murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce a video and still photograph of him the police found on YouTube without proper authentication. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

REPORTED OPINION granting Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Elaine D. Kaplan. (feb) Service on parties made. Keywords re Opinion and Order on Motion for Protective Order: Protective Order Anonymity FLSA Overtime Pay Federal Bureau of Investigation English Monitor Analyst

This case involves a forcible entry and detainer action regarding a parcel of real property that was purchased at a foreclosure sale. The purchaser at foreclosure brought this detainer action against the previous owners of the property. The General Sessions Court ruled in favor of the purchaser, as did the Circuit Court pursuant to a de novo appeal. Although the prior owners now appeal to this Court to raise certain grievances, we affirm.

This is an action to recover damages for a purported buyer's breach of a contract to purchase improved residential real property. The trial court awarded Sellers damages calculated as the difference between the contract price and the amount for which the home sold one year after the breach. It also awarded Sellers and both realty companies prejudgment interest. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in its determination of damages. He contends that, under the circumstances, an appraisal of the property performed at the time of breach demonstrates a substantially greater real market value than the sales price. Appellant also appeals the trial court's calculation of the amount of prejudgment interest awarded to Sellers and the realty companies. Because the trial court made no findings of fact with respect to the fair market value of the property at the time of breach, we remand this matter for further findings and, if necessary, recalculation of the damages and prejudgment interest awarded to Sellers. We also remand this matter to the trial court to recalculate the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to the realty companies.

This appeal arises from the decision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Electric Power Board to terminate a Nashville Electric Service ("NES") cable splicer/working foreman. The foreman allegedly approved fraudulent timesheets for a Metropolitan Nashville Police Department officer, who performed traffic control at NES jobsites for a private contractor. After NES preferred charges against the foreman and suspended him without pay, the board referred the matter to an administrative law judge ("the ALJ") for adjudication. Following a two-day administrative hearing, the ALJ made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 55-page report. The ALJ found that the foreman's job description did not include verifying the accuracy of the timesheets, NES had not trained the foreman on how to verify the accuracy of the timesheets, and a majority of the inaccurate timesheets could be explained by NES's common practice of rounding up hours at the end of an officer's shift. Although there was evidence that the officer overstated his hours, the ALJ found the evidence was insufficient to establish the foreman knowingly approved any false timesheets. Accordingly, the ALJ recommended that the charges of termination be denied and that the foreman be reinstated without back pay. After reviewing the ALJ's report, the board rejected his recommendation and approved NES's termination of the foreman. However, the board did not make its own findings of fact or express disagreement with the ALJ's findings. After the foreman filed his petition for judicial review, the trial court reviewed the administrative record and heard arguments of counsel. In its final order, the trial court concluded that "NES's lack of proof and the apparent acceptance of time-approval practices combine here to demonstrate a lack of substantial and material evidence to uphold the Board's decision to terminate." Thus, the trial court reversed the board's decision, adopted the ALJ's R

The defendants B Co. and its insurer appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the decision of the Work- ers' Compensation Commissioner, which determined that B Co., a gen- eral contractor, was the principal employer of the plaintiff D, when he suffered a compensable injury while working for an uninsured subcon- tractor, M Co. B Co. had contracted with the state on a construction project, and B Co. then subcontracted work to M Co. and C Co. D was an employee of C Co. and worked on the construction project installing siding and gutters until he was laid off in November, 2014. B Co. war- ranted all the work performed against failures of workmanship and materials for one year after it left the worksite in September, 2014. In November, 2014, the state contacted B Co. about repairing a leaking gutter. Thereafter, B Co. contacted M Co. and indicated that it was refusing final payment until the repairs were made. Subsequently, the president of M Co., R, hired D directly to repair the leaking gutter. On December 4, 2014, D and R traveled to the worksite to make the repairs, during which D fell from a ladder and sustained injuries. After a formal hearing, the commissioner found, inter alia, that D was an employee of M Co. and sustained a compensable injury, and ordered M Co. to accept compensability for D's injuries. Thereafter, the commissioner made a subsequent finding that B Co. was a principal employer pursuant to statute (§ 31-291) and, thus, also was liable for compensation benefits due to D, on the basis that B Co. initially subcontracted with M. Co. and that D's injuries were sustained as the result of B Co.'s direct communication and directive to M Co. to repair the gutters. On appeal, the board, inter alia, affirmed the commissioner's decision, finding that more than one entity may be deemed a claimant's principal employer. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim tha