Court Rulings

The industrial commission had some evidence for its view that payroll clerk here was fired for the fireable offense of submitting false time records, and that therefore she had voluntarily abandoned her employment and was not eligible for temporary total disability status. Claimant made no argument that company's suggestion that a prospective application for unemployment compensation could be characterized as arising from a "permanent lay-off" necessarily estopped company from arguing voluntary abandonment to commission. Objections to magistrate's decision overruled writ of mandamus denied.

A credit union initiated this action on December 12, 2007, by filing a civil warrant to recover an amount alleged to be due on an account. On June 14, 2011, after several unsuccessful attempts to serve the warrant, a return on service was filed indicating that the defendant had been served with the warrant a default judgment in the amount of $13,717.79 was entered on July 25, 2011. The credit union levied on the defendant's bank account on April 25, 2018, following which the defendant moved the general sessions court to set aside the judgment on the ground that service of the warrant was defective and the judgment was void the court granted the motion and set the case for trial. Before the trial could be held, the credit union appealed to the circuit court, where the defendant moved for summary judgment to affirm the general sessions court's order setting aside the judgment. The circuit court dismissed the action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12.02(3), holding that service of the warrant was not in compliance with the applicable statutes. The credit union appeals. Upon our de novo review, we have determined that the record does not show that the defendant was duly served with the warrant that led to the default judgment and, as a result, the judgment entered against him is void. Because of the current proceeding, however, trial on the merits has not been held. Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the circuit court that the judgment of the general sessions court is void, modify the judgment of the circuit court to reinstate the credit union's cause of action, and remand the case to the circuit court with instruction to remand it to the general sessions court for trial.

The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the determination of the state medical board permanently to revoke the license of a doctor who, even after having been convicted of a federal felony, was convicted by plea of seven subsequent felonies under Ohio law. Medical board proceedings do not allow collateral attack on criminal convictions, and neither that rule nor the enforcement there of certain relevancy limitations on the introduction of supposed mitigation evidence violates due process. The board was authorized by law to strip the doctor of his medical license, and courts are not empowered to recalibrate that sanction. Judgment affirmed.