Court Rulings

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant city for employ- ment discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Prac- tices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) following his resignation from his employment after he was notified by the defendant that he was going to be discharged. The plaintiff, a Hispanic American citizen of Puerto Rican descent, who was employed as a probationary police officer by the defendant and was seeking a position as a police officer with the defendant's police department, filed a two count complaint, alleging that the defendant, in discharging him, had discriminated against him on the basis of national origin and race. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted uncontroverted documentary proof to substantiate its proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for deciding to dis- charge the plaintiff, namely, the plaintiff's deficient performance throughout his field training and probationary period. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeal to this court. Held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's nondiscriminatory justification for his discharge was a pretext for unlaw- ful discrimination on the basis of national origin and race: although the plaintiff asserted that the defendant did not discipline other officers who had performed deficiently in the same manner that he had been disciplined, he did not produce any evidence to substantiate that asser- tion, and the defendant presented contrary evidence that it had dis- charged a Caucasian officer during his probationary period due to that officer's failure to meet the police department's expectations and to properly document reports in accordance with department require- ments; more

The plaintiff, an architectural firm owned by a licensed architect, C, sought to recover damages from the defendants for the unpaid work it had performed on four projects. The plaintiff alleged claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment regarding each of the four projects, and sought to pierce the corporate veil. C had a business relationship with K and the defendant R, who together oversaw the defendant business entities and owned the majority interest in nearly all of them. K and R managed their business entities by having the businesses owned by one limited liability company while being managed and controlled by another, and at the top of that corporate structure were the defendants P Co. and M Co. The trial court noted that K rationalized his refusal to pay the plaintiff for architectural services rendered for two of the projects, including a certain reservoir project, by claiming that the plaintiff was working ''on spec'' or without compen- sation for its services unless and until the projects were ultimately approved for funding. The court found, however, that there was no credible evidence that the plaintiff or C agreed to that arrangement. The court rendered judgment in part in favor of the plaintiff and found in favor of the plaintiff on three of its claims for breach of contract, as well as on its claim for quantum meruit as to the reservoir project. The trial court also pierced the corporate veil, holding K and R personally liable for damages awarded on each count found in favor of the plaintiff, and awarded prejudgment interest pursuant to statute (§ 37-3a) on all the damages. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly pierced the corporate veil and held K and R personally liable under the identity rule, which was based on their claim that the court improp- erly found that the identity test was satisfied based solely on its finding that K and

The plaintiff sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages from the defendant executrix of the estate of the decedent for, inter alia, intentional sexual assault in connection with the decedent's sexual abuse of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that her father, the decedent, had sexually abused her repeatedly in Connecticut from when she was six years old until she was seventeen, that she suffered extreme trauma, mental anguish and psychological injuries as a result of the decedent's sexual abuse and that her injuries were permanent. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of other wrongs or acts of verbal and physical abuse committed by the decedent against the plaintiff, her brothers and the family dog. The court denied the motion in limine but stated that it was reserving judgment on specific objections to such evidence until the evidence was offered at trial. Following the trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and returned a verdict awarding her $15 million in compensatory damages. The jury also found that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of punitive damages, but it was not asked to determine the amount of the punitive damages to be awarded. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, reserving to itself the finding as to the amount of the punitive damages award, which would be determined later. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss; contrary to the defendant's claim that that court's assertion of personal jurisdic- tion over her violated her right to due process because she personally had no minimum contacts with Connecticut, because the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the decedent pursuant to this state's long arm stat

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclo- sure, from which the defendant appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of setting a new law day. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to open and a notice of hearing to reset the law day, but before the hearing could be held, the defendant filed a bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the foreclosure proceedings. The bankruptcy court then granted the plaintiff's motion for relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay. The defendant appealed to the federal district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, concluding that the defendant, who had filed four bankruptcy petitions during the course of the foreclosure proceed- ings, had engaged in the serial filing of bankruptcy petitions to benefit from the automatic bankruptcy stays and to delay, hinder, or defraud his creditors. On the basis of that decision, the plaintiff sought to have the law day reset, but, on May 24, 2018, the defendant filed a fifth bankruptcy petition. The parties subsequently appeared at a hearing before the trial court, at which the court, by agreement of the parties, opened the judgment of strict foreclosure, set a new law day of August 15, 2018, and made updated findings regarding the value of the property for redemption. Thereafter, the defendant moved in the bankruptcy court to extend the automatic bankruptcy stay. On July 10, 2018, the bankruptcy court granted the defendant's motion and suspended for sixty days the relief from the stay it previously had granted to the plaintiff. In September, 2018, the bankruptcy court vacated the suspen- sion of and reimposed the plaintiff's relief from the stay. The plaintiff then filed in the trial court an application and execution for ejectment, in response to which the defendant objected and filed a motion for a sta

The plaintiff physician sought to recover damages from the defendant medi- cal practice and its sole member for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the termination of her employ- ment. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg- ment, concluding that the plaintiff had not provided an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the extreme and outrageous conduct element of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, or as to the duty and causation elements of the negligence claim. From the summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff appealed to this court, challenging the propriety of the court's determination. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants as to the plaintiff's claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress; that court having properly resolved the issues, this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts, issues and applicable law. Argued May 28—officially released September 10, 2019

This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over child custody wherein the father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan. Following a hearing in October 2017, the Trial Court found that a material change in circumstance existed and implemented a temporary parenting plan, determining that plan to be in the child's best interest. Thereafter in April 2018, the Trial Court converted that temporary parenting plan into a permanent parenting plan upon its determination that the temporary plan appeared to be working satisfactorily. Mother appeals to this Court. Because the Trial Court did not conduct a best interest analysis or make the required statutory finding of best interest, we vacate the April 2018 judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings as necessary. We affirm the Trial Court in all other respects.

REAL PROPERTY/LANDLORD AND TENANT: The trial court erred in holding an owner of a limited-liability company liable to a former tenant under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") where the owner had filed an action for forcible entry and detainer in the owner's name, instead of in the name of the company: the owner operated and managed the company and acted as the tenant's landlord, therefore, the owner was a creditor, and not a debt collector, under the FDCPA moreover, even though the company, and not the individual owner, had legal title to the property, the owner's conduct in filing the eviction action did not materially mislead the tenant in connection with the collection of a debt, given the four years of business dealings between the owner and the tenant. The trial court erred in holding that the landlord violated R.C. 5321.16 in failing to return the tenant's security deposit: the trial court found that the tenant had paid a $1,000 security deposit, and that the tenant owed the landlord $847 in unpaid rent and $200 for damages to the property therefore, because the amount of damages exceeded the security deposit, the trial court should have concluded that the landlord did not wrongfully withhold any of the tenant's security deposit. The trial court's judgment holding that the landlord breached the lease agreement by filing a premature eviction action against the tenant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the landlord had lied about not receiving the tenant's rent, and the landlord had filed the action in retaliation for the tenant's complaints to the city, resulting in the tenant and her children becoming homeless. Because the trial court erred in holding that the landlord wrongfully withheld the tenant's security deposit, and the trial court also erred in determining that the landlord violated the FDCPA, no legal basis exists to support the trial court's attorney-fee award.