Court Rulings

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the wife was granted a partial default judgment after the husband failed to enter an appearance or file a responsive pleading to the complaint, and failed to file a response or appear at the hearing on the wife's motion for a default judgment. After receiving the order granting the partial default judgment, the husband retained counsel and filed a motion to set it aside pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) and (5), seeking relief for "excusable neglect" and for "any other reason justifying relief." Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the partial default judgment upon a determination that the husband's conduct precipitating the default was willful. The court also set a final hearing to try the remaining issues, including child support for the parties' minor child and property division. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court valued the marital estate at well over one million dollars however, the total did not include the present value of the wife's pension plan, which was classified as marital property and awarded to the wife. Excluding the unknown value of the wife's pension, the court awarded 60% of the marital assets to the wife and 40% to the husband. This decision was based in part on the court's finding that in addition to being the sole wage earner for the family, the wife was primarily responsible for the children and the home while the husband "dissipated marital assets" through stock trading. The husband appeals, contending the trial court erred by (1) failing to set aside the partial default judgment (2) failing to make an equitable division of the marital estate by not determining the value of the wife's pension plan, designating the husband's stock trading losses as a dissipation of marital assets, and awarding the wife a greater share of the marital estate, despite the fact that the husband was the economically disadvantaged spouse and (3) failing to award the husba

The Defendant, Christopher Calvera, was indicted for retaliation for past action, a Class E felony and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101, -16-510. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the retaliation for past action charge and acquitted of the assault charge. The trial court later imposed a four-year sentence for the retaliation conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and (2) the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion for a mistrial alleging that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the wife challenges the trial court's designation of the husband as the primary residential parent of the minor children, the crafting of the parenting plan, and the marital property determinations. The trial court neglected to make findings under the appropriate statutory provisions. We vacate the judgment except as to the divorce and remand with instructions to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that consider all the relevant and applicable statutory factors.

QUESTIONS: Proposed relators EULALIO GOMEZ, THOMAS TRESTER, MONICA DIAZ, and JERI NOWAK have requested leave to sue proposed defendants RILEY TALFORD, JOHN ROBINSON, and JOHN ADAMS in quo warranto to remove them as trustees of the Board of Retirement of the Fresno County Employee Retirement Association on the ground that their elections resulted from violations of election procedures. CONCLUSIONS: Leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED to determine whether the elections of proposed defendants RILEY TALFORD and JOHN ROBINSON as trustees of the Board of Retirement of the Fresno County Employee Retirement Association resulted from violations of election procedures. Leave to sue in quo warranto is DENIED as to proposed defendant JOHN ADAMS because his challenged term of office has expired.

I concur in the result of the majority's opinion insofar as it affirms the dismissal of the action on the basis, set forth in Section V, that Dr. Johnson was not an employee of Gateway Medical Center and, consequently, did not have access to Ms. Williams' medical record. I concur with the holding in Section IV A that the omission of an expiration date on the HIPPA authorization was insignificant and did not keep the form from being substantially compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). I respectfully disagree with the holding in Section IV B that the failure of Mr. Williams to check the box to authorize access to specific medical records makes the authorization non-compliant. In my opinion, the purpose of the authorization form is to allow the recipient to receive the records pertinent to the case, thus serving as a bypass to the normal procedures for discovery governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Consistent with the letter and spirit of the discovery rules, any deficiency in the authorization forms that limit the recipient's ability to obtain the pertinent records should be addressed in accordance with Rule 26.

The magistrate did not err in finding that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in not requiring the claimant to comply with employer relator's request for a global medical release from the claimant based on her filing an application for permanent total disability compensation. Objections overruled writ of mandamus denied.

Breach of fiduciary duty breach of contract defamation jurisdiction exclusive jurisdiction collective bargaining rights State Employee Relations Board Unfair Labor Practices R.C. Chapter 4117 Civ.R. 12(B)(1) Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo statute of limitations R.C. 2305.11. Dismissal of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims by employees against their union was proper where the claims were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board because they arose from, or depended on, the collective bargaining framework and rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117. Dismissal of defamation claim was proper where the claim was asserted outside of the one-year statute of limitations.