Court Rulings

I join the majority in affirming the Defendant's convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and seven counts of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon. I write separately to dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not err by admitting exhibit 13, the photograph showing the Defendant pointing two handguns at the camera, into evidence.

A mother obtained a default judgment against her former spouse for child support arrearages and other amounts. At the mother's request, the trial court entered orders of income assignment to the former spouse's employers, each directing them to deduct a set amount from the former spouse's salary to satisfy the default judgment. Nearly fourteen and one-half years later, the former spouse asked the court to terminate the wage assignment, claiming the culmulative amount deducted from his income exceeded the amount of judgment plus interest. The former spouse also sought a judgment against the mother to the extent she had received more than she was entitled to under the default judgment. The mother argued that the voluntary payment doctrine barred recovery. The trial court found that the former spouse's "overpayments were made with full knowledge of the facts chargeable to him" but that they "were not voluntary payments." Accordingly, the court entered judgment against mother plus statutory post-judgment interest.

The Petitioner, Steven Davis, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition as time-barred, arguing that he delivered his petition to the designated employee in the prison mail room in a timely manner. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

This appeal of a conviction for criminal contempt arises out of a civil suit brought by business owners against the owners and employees of a competing business for fraud in the use of the tax-sale and redemption process for real property. The trial court issued a temporary injunction, prohibiting defendants from, inter alia, recording deeds in real estate transactions without an authentic notary seal on the documents and requiring defendants to notify the court and opposing counsel of any documents they intended to record in the Register's Office. Appellant, the owner of the business which was the subject of the injunction, subsequently formed a trust in which Appellant retained the right to direct the distribution of income and principal and to amend, revoke, or terminate the trust. The trustee of the trust was conveyed real property in trust and recorded the deed without the notice required by the injunction. The property was subsequently sold, and, at Appellant's instruction, a portion of the proceeds of sale used to pay Appellant's legal fees for a related proceeding the trial court held that, in so doing, the Appellant willfully and for a bad purpose violated the injunction, and held him in contempt. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We have reviewed the record and conclude that there is evidence to support the contempt conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and accordingly affirm the judgment.

The instant appeal challenged a Providence County Superior Court hearing justice's decision granting a motion to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendants, the Cumberland Town Employees Union and Norman Tremblay (Tremblay) (collectively, the union), brought by the Town of Cumberland (the town), and denying the union's cross-petition to confirm the same. The union argued that the Superior Court justice improperly held that the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) prevented the parties from bringing the claim to arbitration. Further, the union asserted that Tremblay and the town's collective bargaining agreement (CBA) properly granted Tremblay a longer leave of absence than the WCA. The town countered that the dispute was not arbitrable because the WCA governed Tremblay's reinstatement, and the WCA gave exclusive jurisdiction over Tremblay's reinstatement to the Workers' Compensation Court. The Supreme Court held that the grievance was arbitrable because Tremblay brought his action in reliance on the CBA, and not on the WCA. Further, the Court concluded that the CBA between the union and the town could grant greater protection than the WCA. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court judgment and remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award.

The trial court did not err by affirming the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision allowing claimant-appellee's request for unemployment compensation. There is some competent, credible evidence supporting the Commission's determination that claimant-appellee worked in covered employment with appellant.

Appeal from Utilities Commission order declaring that NC WARN acts as a 'public utility' when it sells to a single nonprofit customer electricity produced for that customer from solar panels placed at no cost on the customer's property.

The Defendant, Charles Lee Warner, appeals his jury conviction for first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, challenging the evidence establishing his identity and premeditation, and alleging that his jailhouse confession was not sufficiently corroborated (2) that the trial court erred by declaring Robert Strange to be an unavailable witness and admitting his preliminary hearing testimony and (3) relying on the rules of evidentiary relevance, that the trial court erred (a) by permitting a law enforcement officer to testify "regarding the [D]efendant's propensity to carry weapons in the past" (b) by allowing a former employer to testify about murderous threats made by the Defendant to the victim over a year prior to the victim's death and (c) by prohibiting defense counsel from eliciting testimony "regarding the potentially violent propensities of others known to the witness in the homeless community." Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.