Court Rulings

This is the fourth appeal in a case primarily concerned with whether two individual defendants are liable on loan guaranties. Following the third appeal, we remanded the case to the trial court to determine: (1) whether one of the defendants is liable under a Guaranty of Validity of Collateral ("GVC") (2) whether prejudgment interest should be awarded to the lender on personal guaranties both defendants signed and (3) whether the lender is entitled to recover additional attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the guaranties since the previous appeal. On remand following the third appeal, the trial court found that the defendant was not liable on the GVC. The trial court also found that the lender was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the lender committed fraud, and it declined to award the lender any additional attorney's fees. Although the defendants prevailed on all three issues, they appeal, seeking reconsideration of this court's determination in an earlier appeal that the defendants failed to prove their claim of fraud, which would relieve them of any liability. The lender counters, insisting that this court's previous decision, wherein we affirmed the trial court's determination that the defendants failed to prove fraud, is the law of the case. The lender also raises its own issues for our consideration, including whether the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning fraud, as stated in the final order drafted by counsel for the defendants, reflects the trial court's independent judgment. A careful review of the trial court's oral ruling from the bench and the written order, as well as previous findings of fact made by the trial court, leads us to conclude that some of the findings of fact stated in the final order do not reflect the trial court's independent judgment. Therefore, the presumption under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) that a trial court's specific findings of fact are supported by the evidence shall be limited to those fin

This is an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the pro se plaintiff's discrimination action against Tennessee State University and certain administrators. The court determined that the plaintiff had requested relief beyond its authority to award and granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Evidence before the Industrial Commission did not support the finding that claimant voluntarily abandoned his employment. Writ granted to return the issue of entitlement to temporary total disability compensation to the commission for further review.

CIVIL - workers' compensation R.C. 4123.512 administrative appeal limited right to appeal claimant's right to participate in workers' compensation fund causal connection between death and employment dependency claim subject matter jurisdiction

Cross-motions for summary judgment. Breach of contract claims. Wrongful termination claim. Ambiguous contract language.

Defendant was convicted by a Rutherford County Jury of driving under the influence ("DUI"), retaliation for past action, assault, and resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, of which Defendant was ordered to serve six months in incarceration and the balance of the sentence on supervised probation. Defendant appeals his conviction for retaliation for past action, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jurisdiction motion to stay pending arbitration. The trial court did have jurisdiction to determine the validity and conscionability of the arbitration agreement and it was error to not do so prior to staying the proceedings.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Stephan Richardson, was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement because the "officers unreasonably delayed booking [him] in order to" secure his statement and because his statement was involuntarily given (2) his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is invalid because the indictment failed to specify the predicate dangerous felony and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to sever or bifurcate the unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon offense from the other three counts, thereby, preventing him from receiving a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. However, because the jury was charged with a nonexistent crime regarding the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction, we reverse that conviction and remand that count for a new trial.

This appeal involves a contentious continuing dispute over visitation with the parties' young daughter. After numerous hearings, the trial court reluctantly continued limited structured visitation to the mother. The principal issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court's rulings were in the best interests of the child. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record before us, we find that the evidence supports the parenting plan determination and other rulings made by the court.