Court Rulings

The Defendant, Jason Levi Butts, fired a shot from a rifle toward a home, and the bullet penetrated the wall and hit the sleeping victim in the hip. The trial court ruled that all three statements which the Defendant made to law enforcement during the investigation of the shooting were admissible. The Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of reckless endangerment, a Class C felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of three and two years, respectively. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's initial statement to police, which he made without being advised of his rights and after law enforcement twice told him he could not leave the police station. However, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm the convictions.

The Defendant, Gary E. Floyd, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the lesserincluded offense of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-210. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder (2) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence (3) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (4) that the trial court committed several errors when instructing the jury on self-defense and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Adam Davis, was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent term of eight years' imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

CIVIL - arbitration exceed authority language of the agreement ambiguous extrinsic evidence employee's favor application to vacate upheld construed in context of the evidence drawn from the essence of the agreement no error in confirming award.

The trial court erred in requiring Appellant to establish a 10% deviation from the prior child support obligation and to also establish a substantial change of circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of parties' divorce decree, before the court would modify child support. In addition, the trial court erred in finding that Appellee was not earning more than the current minimum wage in Ohio, and in deviating from the calculated child support obligation without following the statutory requirements in R.C. 3119.22 and R.C. 3119.23. The court did not err in deciding the amount of Appellant's gross income that was due to Appellant's wages from employment. However, the court did err by including mileage reimbursements in Appellant's gross income without considering whether the reimbursement caused Appellant, effectively, to have a higher income. Affirmed solely with respect to the court's decision on Appellant's gross income from wages, reversed on all other grounds, and remanded for further proceedings.

CONTRACTS: The trial court did not err in granting judgment in favor of defendant former employer on plaintiff real-estate broker's claim for breach of contract for failing to pay him a commission on two leases that neither party negotiated. Where the terms of the parties' severance agreement provided that if defendant did not receive a commission, plaintiff was not entitled to a commission and that defendant had the authority to determine whether to collect or enforce a claim for a commission, defendant did not breach the agreement by failing to pursue a claim for a commission or by not paying a commission to plaintiff. [But see DISSENT: The severance agreement prohibited defendant from waiving plaintiff's commission, and defendant's refusal to collect the commission constitutes a waiver of the commission in breach of the agreement.]

The dispositive issue in this case is whether Tennessee may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The plaintiff, a Tennessee company, filed this action against the defendants in Davidson County Chancery Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from security services it provided to facilitate the transfer of gold worth millions of dollars from Africa to Hong Kong. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of personal jurisdiction, contending a Tennessee court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them because their contacts with the forum were too attenuated. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed, arguing the defendants' apparent agent had numerous and substantial contacts with the forum sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction in Tennessee. The defendants assert the individual with whom the plaintiff entered into a contract was an independent contractor, not an agent of the defendants, and that the defendants have not had sufficient contacts with Tennessee to subject them to the jurisdiction of a Tennessee court. The defendants also raise a separate issue, contending the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. We have determined that the individual with whom the plaintiff principally communicated regarding the contract and services rendered by the plaintiff was an apparent agent of the defendants. Having applied the two-step analysis enunciated in State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., 403 S.W.3d 726 (Tenn. 2013), we have also determined that the nature and quality of the apparent agent's contacts, along with those of an officer of the defendant entities, were purposeful and of sufficient quantity with Tennessee to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Furthermore, the defendants failed to establish that it would be unreasonable or unfair for Tennessee to exercise specific perso

Opinion and Order: granting Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis granting [10] Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) REPORTED OPINION The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Margaret M. Sweeney. (ac7) Service on parties made.

The issues on appeal involve the proper number of days upon which to base the calculation of child support, the propriety of the award of extraordinary educational expenses under the parties' permanent parenting plan, and attorney's fees. Having determined that the trial court erred in its determination of child support and extraordinary educational expenses, we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.