Court Rulings

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as untimely, in part, due to its determination that the general savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, did not apply. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This case involves a military service member's claim against the Tennessee National Guard pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-208. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Paul William Purvis, entered a best interest guilty plea to theft of property valued over $10,000, a Class C felony. The guilty plea was entered several years after the State had filed a notice that it intended to seek enhanced punishment. The State's notice listed twelve prior convictions and stated that it would seek to sentence the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. The parties did not negotiate a sentence as part of the plea agreement but left determination of the sentence up to the court. At the sentencing hearing, the State sought to have the Defendant sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years' imprisonment as a Range III, persistent offender, and the Defendant appeals, asserting that he is entitled to be sentenced as a Range II offender due to the State's inadequate notice. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the State's notice was ambiguous. However, because the Defendant has not shown that he investigated the ambiguity and has not shown prejudice from the ambiguous notice, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff was a partner of a physician practice and a limited partner in a real estate investment limited partnership. Continuing employment with the physician practice was a condition of remaining a limited partner. Following the termination of Plaintiff's employment with the physician group, Plaintiff, the physician group, and the limited partnership entered into a Separation Agreement. The limited partnership agreed not to redeem Plaintiff's interest in the limited partnership if he did not expand his practice outside Giles and Hickman Counties. Plaintiff began practicing outside these counties, and the limited partnership redeemed Plaintiff's interest. Plaintiff objected and filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. The trial court granted the limited partnership's motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Appellants filed this lawsuit against Appellees for damages resulting from the alleged negligence of Appellees' subcontractor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, ruling that they could not be vicariously liable for the subcontractor's negligence because the uncontroverted facts conclusively established that the subcontractor was an independent contractor. We affirm.

Defendant, Louis Grieco, was arrested on August 24, 2013, without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI). On the date of the arrest, the arresting officer summarized the facts underlying the offense in an affidavit of complaint, which he signed under oath before a notary public. Two days later, a general sessions judge found probable cause that the offense was committed based on the officer's affidavit of complaint. Over one year later, on October 6, 2014, Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing in General Sessions Court and agreed to have the case bound over to the Sullivan County Grand Jury. The grand jury indicted Defendant for DUI on January 21, 2015. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as time barred, arguing that the affidavit of complaint was void because the officer did not make it on oath in the presence of an authorized official capable of making a probable cause determination. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The State appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Janice Darlene Helbert, was issued a Uniform Citation of Complaint for the offenses of driving under the influence and following too closely. The citation included the officer's narrative of the facts underlying the offenses. The officer also prepared an affidavit of complaint, which he signed under oath before a notary public. Three days later, the affidavit of complaint was signed by a deputy clerk. Over one year later, Defendant waived her right to a preliminary hearing and agreed to have her case bound over to the grand jury. The grand jury subsequently returned a presentment against Defendant for the misdemeanor offenses above, as well as one count of felony reckless endangerment. Subsequent to the presentment, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the two misdemeanor counts as time barred, arguing that the affidavit of complaint was void because the officer did not make the oath in the presence of an authorized official capable of making a probable cause determination. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges. The State sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's decision. On appeal, the State contends that the fact that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than a qualified judicial officer was a "technical defect" that should not render it void. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jabari Reynolds, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court Jury of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing a police officer to testify regarding recordings of telephone calls the Appellant made while in jail instead of requiring a telephone company employee to authenticate the calls, (2) by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication, (3) by refusing to give a special instruction that the lesser-included offense of second degree murder was "homicide in the 'heat of passion' without adequate provocation," and (4) by accepting the jury's verdict as thirteenth juror. The Appellant also contends that he is entitled to relief due to cumulative error. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Daniel Adams, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, agreeing to an out-of-range sentence of eight years. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence and that his judgment form should be amended to reflect applicable pretrial jail credit. We affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment that reflects the Defendant's applicable pretrial jail credit.

Henry Fletcher ("Plaintiff") sued CFRA, LLC ("CFRA"), which owns and operates an International House of Pancakes ("IHOP") restaurant in Antioch, Tennessee, alleging that CFRA was liable for the actions of its IHOP employee, Kenneth W. Hale, Jr. ("Hale"), in connection with an assault upon Plaintiff committed by Hale. The Circuit Court for Davidson County ("the Trial Court") granted summary judgment to CFRA. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We find and hold that CFRA made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, that Plaintiff failed to show that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment, and that CFRA was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to CFRA.