Court Rulings

The issue on appeal is whether the commencement of a dependency and neglect action in the juvenile court deprived the chancery court of subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a pending motion to modify a parenting plan. Shortly after Father filed his petition to modify the parenting plan in the chancery court, the Department of Children's Services filed a dependency and neglect petition in the juvenile court. After the juvenile court held a preliminary hearing on the dependency and neglect petition and assumed jurisdiction, the chancery court modified the parents' child support obligations and awarded the father the federal income tax exemption for the child. Months later, the mother filed a motion to vacate the chancery court's judgment on the basis it was void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The chancery court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103 vests juvenile courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over dependency and neglect proceedings and, once a juvenile court has exercised jurisdiction in a dependency and neglect proceeding, its exclusive jurisdiction continues until the case has been dismissed, the custody determination is transferred to another court exercising domestic relations jurisdiction, or a petition for adoption is filed. Because none of the jurisdiction exceptions had occurred prior to the chancery court modifying the parenting plan, the chancery court's order was void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the chancery court's order modifying the parenting plan is hereby vacated.

Case in mandamus where self-insured employer is attempting to overturn the granting of permanent total disability compensation since the evidence before the Industral Commission fully supported the commission's order, the request for a writ is denied.

The Defendant, Patrick Jayson Reeners, pleaded guilty to public intoxication and disorderly conduct and received concurrent thirty day sentences. In a separate case, he pleaded guilty to telephone harassment and received a probation sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. After the entry of his guilty pleas and sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas "made under life threatening needed medical attention." The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not find a "fair and just reason" to allow the Defendant to withdraw his pleas. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The trial court ordered the Appellant to pay its employee for the full twelve hours of a work shift excused due to the employee's jury service. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court's judgment and order that the case be dismissed.

This is a slip-and-fall case. An employee of a catering company fell, injuring herself when leaving a private residence after dark as she attempted to traverse an outside staircase. The employee brought suit against the homeowners, and the homeowners filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the homeowners' motion, concluding that the homeowners did not owe the employee a duty of care. Our review of the record has revealed that material, disputed facts remain which render this case inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Geoffrey Cale Vermilyea ("Husband") sued Jessica Lynn Vermilyea ("Wife") for divorce. After trial, the Chancery Court for Dickson County ("Trial Court") entered its Final Decree of Divorce on June 13, 2017 ("Final Decree") declaring the parties divorced, distributing the marital assets, denying Wife's request to relocate to Canada with the parties' minor child ("Cale"), denying Wife alimony, and entering a Permanent Parenting Plan with regard to Cale. Wife appeals the Final Decree raising issues regarding the Trial Court's order denying Wife's request to relocate to Canada with Cale and denying her an award of alimony. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that it was not in Cale's best interest to relocate to Canada and, therefore, denying Wife's request to relocate. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife alimony. We, therefore, affirm the Final Decree.

The plaintiffs accepted an offer of judgment from the defendant company, which included payment of the plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees and expenses in an amount to be determined by the trial court. The trial court awarded attorney's fees and expenses to the plaintiffs in the amount of $56,423.24, expressly determining such amount to be reasonable. The defendant company has appealed. Inasmuch as the trial court failed to consider the factors listed in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 ("RPC 1.5") when making its determination regarding a reasonable award of attorney's fees, we vacate the trial court's fee award and remand this matter for further proceedings concerning this issue. We accordingly decline to award fees to the plaintiffs on appeal.

As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay child support. Within two months thereafter, the father lost his job as a finance manager for an automotive dealership. The father filed a motion to modify his child support obligation and took a job in another field, making significantly less money. The father claimed that a more lucrative job was not available to him because he only had a high school education. And he did not wish to pursue another job as an automotive dealership finance manager due to the long hours, pressure, and deleterious effect of the job on his health. The mother opposed the motion to modify, claiming that the father was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court agreed. On appeal, the father challenges only the court's determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. After a review of the record, we affirm.

This action involves a claim for compensatory damages for personal injury caused by a police dog. The defendant sought summary judgment, arguing that the victim, an officer acting in the course and scope of his employment, was a participant in the act or conduct that prompted the need for the dog's services, thereby removing liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413(b)(1). The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from an inmate filing a common law writ of certiorari challenging the actions of a prison grievance committee. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted specifically, that decisions of a prison grievance board are not reviewable under a common law writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the petition. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh ("Wife") sued Waleed Fawzi Abed ("Husband") for divorce in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County ("the Trial Court"). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, granted Wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan with respect to the parties' minor son ("the Child") awarding Wife 285 days to Husband's 80, and awarded Wife a judgment for the value of a Cadillac less $2,500 Wife received on the sale of her original vehicle for a total judgment of $13,400. Husband appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court found no statutory factors applicable to justify such a paltry award of parenting time to him and that the Cadillac at issue was not even marital property subject to division. We vacate the Trial Court's judgment with respect to the residential parenting schedule and remand for the Trial Court to award Husband significantly more time with the Child. Finding that the Cadillac was not marital property, we modify the Trial Court's award of $13,400 to Wife to $2,000 to account for only the sale of Wife's original vehicle. We otherwise affirm the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm as modified, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim of outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against his employer because the plaintiff had previously filed a workers' compensation claim against the employer, seeking compensation for injuries arising out of the same incident. The plaintiff has appealed the dismissal of his claim. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment of dismissal. We decline Appalachian's request for an award of attorney's fees, determining that Mr. Byrd's appeal was not frivolous or taken solely for delay.

The defendant, Mack Mandrell Loyde, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender for the aggravated burglary and employing a firearm convictions, and imposed fifteen-year sentences for each. For the aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a repeat violent offender to life without parole. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also challenges the trial court's sentencing as to his status as a repeat violent offender and resulting life sentence without the possibility of parole. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's application of the repeat violent offender statute to the defendant's aggravated robbery conviction and the trial court's determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence for the three convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the matter of sentencing as to Counts 1 and 3.