Court Rulings

Trial court's determination that money was a loan and not a gift supported by the record.

Claimant was president of the local union. She worked for Pueblo County (employer). Union membership is required for workers in a bargaining unit, and union dues are deducted from workers' paychecks. Participation in union meetings is voluntary. Claimant stayed after work for a union meeting, which was held immediately after claimant clocked out for the day and took place in a conference room in the building in which she worked. The purpose of the meeting was to review and revise the new collective bargaining agreement. After the meeting, claimant walked to the adjacent parking lot where she normally parked for work. While getting in her car, she slipped on ice and injured herself. She filed a workers' compensation claim for her medical expenses. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied and dismissed the claim, finding the claimant "was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury." The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) disagreed, finding the union activities were "sufficiently incidental" to claimant's work "as to be properly considered as arising out of and in the course of employment." It remanded to the ALJ to determine benefits. On remand, the ALJ ordered employer to pay all of claimant's reasonable, necessary, and related medical expenses. The Panel affirmed. On appeal, employer argued that the Panel erred in holding that the post-work injury sustained immediately following claimant's attendance at a union meeting arose out of and in the course of employment. An injury arises out of employment when it originates in an employee's work-related functions and is sufficiently related to those functions to be considered part of employment. It is not essential that an employee be engaged in an obligatory job function. This was a case of first impression in Colorado but has been addressed in a number of other states. In general, injuries sustained during "unilateral union activities conferring, if any, only a remote or indirect benefit

I concur in the majority's determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's judgment (1) finding a material change in circumstances (2) holding that "the best interest of the children [is] that [Mr. Bell] be the Primary Residential Parent" and (3) awarding father 215 days of residential parenting time with the balance of days awarded to mother.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - summary judgment Civ.R. 56 genuine issue of material fact compensable workplace injury arising out of employment unexplained slip or fall neutral origin direct benefit.

This is a breach of contract action in which the issues hinge on the meaning of several provisions in the agreement. In 1999 and again in 2009, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. ("BlueCross") and Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. ("IHS") entered into a general agency agreement that authorized IHS to solicit applications for individual insurance policies through IHS's in-house agents and outside "subagents." The commission rates to be paid were stated in a schedule, which was subject to modification by BlueCross. During the first eleven years, BlueCross modified the commission schedule several times and each modification was prospective only. In 2011, BlueCross modified the commission schedule and, for the first time, applied the commission schedule retrospectively. At the same time, IHS determined that BlueCross had been underpaying commissions since 1999. As a consequence, it commenced this action asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and damages, while also claiming it was entitled to recover its attorney's fees based on the contract's indemnification provision. BlueCross denied any breach of contract. It also asserted the statute of limitations defense as a bar to recovering any commissions that accrued more than six years earlier, and asserted that IHS was not entitled to recover its attorney's fees because the indemnification provision did not apply to disputes between the contracting parties. Shortly thereafter, BlueCross terminated the general agency agreement and began paying renewal commissions directly to IHS's subagents instead of paying them to IHS as it had done since 1999. IHS then amended its complaint to assert a claim that BlueCross also breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions directly to IHS. Following a bench trial, the court denied BlueCross's statute of limitations defense on the ground that IHS's claims were "inherently undiscoverable." The court also determined that BlueCross breached the contract by und

The trial court abused its discretion when it 1) made findings of fact regarding the appellant's gross income and child care expenses that were not supported by the record 2) applied R.C. 3111.13(F)(3)(a) instead of R.C. 3113.13(F)(2) when considering appellant's request to retroactively date the child support order and 3) imputed income to appellant without making a finding that appellant was voluntarily underemployed or considering the factors under R.C. 3119.(C)(11). Furthermore, no party before the trial court had actually challenged the administrative determination of appellant's income or child care expenses. Reversed and remanded with instructions to consider appellant's request to retroactively date the child support order by applying R.C. 3111.13(F)(2).

The Defendant, Wynell Ford, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to convicted felon in possession of a firearm with a prior violent felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction at thirty-five percent. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's denial of his request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE - INTENTIONAL TORT - R.C. 2745.01 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court did not err in granting defendant employer's motion for summary judgment in an intentional-tort case brought by its employee's estate: R.C. 2745.01(C)'s rebuttable presumption did not apply because the employer's failure to require the employee to use a submersion tank before cutting away metal casings on air filters was not tantamount to the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard where the submersion tank was not an equipment safety guard, and there was otherwise no issue of fact as to whether the employer had deliberately intended to harm its employee.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Dequan Hasani Bertrand, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury acquitted the Defendant of one count of aggravated rape and was unable to reach a verdict as to two other counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted the victim's identification of him (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum sentences within his range and ordered his sentences to run consecutively. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Trial court was within its discretion to award attorney fees and punitive damages.

This appeal involved a dispute over a two-mile stretch of beach in the Misquamicut area of Westerly, Rhode Island. The Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island brought an action against the beachfront property owners to enjoin them from preventing public access to the beach area. The state asserted that, in 1909, five sets of property owners dedicated the beach area to the public through a Plat and Indenture that they signed and recorded. Following a bench trial, a Superior Court justice entered judgment for the landowner-defendants. The trial justice found that the 1909 Plat and Indenture, read together, did not reveal the Plattors' manifest intent to dedicate the beach area to the public. The trial justice deemed the 1909 Plat and Indenture to be unambiguous instruments and, therefore, he did not need to consider extrinsic evidence in reaching his determination. Had he found the 1909 Plat and Indenture ambiguous, however, the trial justice nevertheless determined that the extrinsic evidence did not demonstrate the Plattors' manifest intent to dedicate the beach area. The Attorney General appealed and asserted that the 1909 Plat and Indenture clearly demonstrated the Plattors' intent to dedicate the beach area. Alternatively, the Attorney General maintained that, even if the 1909 Plat and Indenture were ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence revealed the manifest intent to dedicate.

CIVIL - reverse discrimination Ohio Civil Rights Commission random draw apprenticeship program unlawful practice R.C. 4112 probable cause application of prior federal court decisions manifest imbalance voluntary affirmative action plan prima facie case