Court Rulings

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Antonio Johnson, on charges of attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and three counts of aggravated assault the State later dismissed two of the aggravated assault counts. The jury convicted Defendant of attempted second degree murder, employment of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for the aggravated assault conviction, six years for the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction, and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment to run concurrently with each other and ordered the remaining sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of attempted second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt (2) the trial court erred in allowing the admission of testimony regarding Defendant's past fight with one of the victims (3) the trial court erred in allowing the admission of a surveillance video and (4) the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the facts andlaw, we affirm.

Kenneth Jolicoeur, a part-time faculty member at the University of Rhode Island (URI) and a member of the American Association of University Professors, Part-Time Faculty United union (the union), was assigned two courses and a "Special Programs Contract" for the fall 2013 semester. URI then informed Jolicoeur that he could not perform all three assignments. Jolicoeur opted to teach the two classes and filed a grievance with URI protesting the limitation on assignments, but a resolution could not be reached through the grievance process. The union then filed a demand for arbitration on Jolicoeur's behalf. The arbitrator deemed the dispute arbitrable, found that URI's limitation on Jolicoeur's assignments violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and ordered URI to pay Jolicoeur $6,500 in salary for the rescinded "Special Programs Contract" and to cease and desist from unilaterally imposing a two-course limit. URI moved in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award and to stay the implementation of the award, to which the union objected and moved to confirm the award. The hearing justice denied URI's motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted the union's motion to confirm the award. On appeal to the Supreme Court, URI challenged the hearing justice's decision on three grounds: (1) the dispute was not substantively arbitrable (2) URI's imposition of a limitation did not violate the CBA and (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing a cease-and-desist order. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the dispute was arbitrable because its resolution required interpretation of the CBA (2) the arbitrator's conclusion that URI violated the CBA was based on a passably plausible interpretation of the CBA and (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority by imposing the cease-and-desist order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the cease-and-desist order and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all other respects. Justice Indeglia

Planned community, fiduciary duty, R.C. 1702.30(B), Fair Housing Amendments Act, reasonable accommodation, restrictive covenants.

This appeal arises from a judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort. The trial court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and full custody of their minor child. After determining that the husband was willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the court set child support based on his earning capacity rather than his actual gross income. Then, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The court also granted the wife a judgment for compensatory damages on her tort claim. On appeal, the husband challenges the court's determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the valuation of the marital residence, the alimony awards, and the award of damages in tort. After careful review, we vacate the court's award of damages to the wife for her child's pain and suffering. In all other respects, we affirm.

Discharge just cause unemployment benefits Review Commission appeal manifest weight of the evidence, evidence supported in record. Judgment reversed. The Review Commission's decision is not supported by the evidence in the record. The claimant was an 11-year employee at the YMCA without any disciplinary complaints in her file. Over the course of a year, the employee was involved in several physical and verbal incidents with a YMCA member. The employee advised the YMCA about these incidents. The YMCA indicated that the member's behavior would not be tolerated and the employee was to advise management if any other issues occurred. The employee and the member did have another incident. The employee advised the YMCA of the same and the YMCA did nothing to address the member's conduct. Approximately five months later, the employee and the member had the sixth and final incident that resulted in the termination of the employee's employment. The employee gave the YMCA the opportunity to correct the problem with the member and the YMCA neglected to do so. The YMCA's failure to act placed the employee in a position where she was subjected to abusive conduct while waiting for her employer to respond. This isolated incident of physical conduct with the member, when viewed along with the employee's good record of job performance and the circumstances prior to the altercation, is insufficient evidence to support the Review Commission's determination that the employee was terminated for just cause.

The plaintiff, C.D., a minor, was a resident of Mountain Youth Academy, a traumafocused residential treatment facility,1 when he got into a physical altercation with an employee of the defendant Keystone Continuum, LLC doing business as Mountain Youth Academy. The employee, Jacob Spencer, is described by the defendant as a "mental health associate." The plaintiffs describe him as a "third shift night guard." The minor's mother filed this action, proceeding both individually and on behalf of her son. The complaint alleges, among other things, that Spencer pulled the minor plaintiff to the ground and stomped on his foot, causing him injury. Defendant moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint in this case alleges health care liability claims. Defendant argued that because of plaintiffs' (1) failure to provide pre-suit notice under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (the THCLA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 121 (Supp. 2017), and (2) their failure to file a certificate of good faith with the complaint, id. § 29-26-122, the lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court held that plaintiffs' claims sounded in health care liability. It dismissed the mother's action with prejudice. The court also dismissed the minor's action, but did so without prejudice.2 Defendant appeals, arguing that the minor's action should have been dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs also present issues. They argue that the trial court erred in ruling that their claims are based upon health care liability. Additionally and alternatively, plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the "common knowledge" exception to the general requirement of expert testimony in a health care liability action. We hold that plaintiffs' claims for assault and battery are unrelated to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. As a consequence of this, we hold that the plaintiffs' assault and battery claims do not fall within the ambit of a "healt